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| Identifier: | 05NEWDELHI492 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NEWDELHI492 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy New Delhi |
| Created: | 2005-01-19 12:35:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PTER PK IN INDO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 000492 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK, IN, INDO-PAK SUBJECT: INDIA DOWNPLAYS LOC CEASEFIRE VIOLATION Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 1. (C) New Delhi has publicly downplayed the January 18 evening incident of artillery fire at the LOC, the first such case since guns fell silent in November 2003, and has assigned its Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) to discuss the incident with his Pakistani counterpart via a regularly scheduled weekly hotline call. Immediately following the incident, a 16th Corps spokesman in J&K gave Pakistan the benefit of the doubt, telling the press "we will not like to accuse the Pakistan Army, as we have to investigate first whether militants have fired from across the LOC." The message from Delhi was similar, with an Army spokesman emphasizing on January 18 that India was "exercising full restraint." 2. (C) Media have reported that the two DGMOs spoke on the morning of January 19. Relating the content of that conversation, Vice Chief of the Army Staff LtG Bhupinder Thakur said Pakistan did not know who had fired the artillery, and had agreed to investigate the incident. Again not excluding the possibility that militants may have been source of the firing, Thakur said that 82mm shells were "available with terrorists," adding that "we will take it on a case-by-case basis." The incident, allegedly involving about 15 mortar shells fired into the Poonch area in three salvos of 60mm and 82mm shells during a two hour period in the evening of January 17, reportedly wounded one local girl. The MEA had no immediate reaction. 3. (C) The incident, which Indian sources attribute to the Pakistani military, has sparked speculation as to its rationale, given that Indo-Pak relations were otherwise normalizing, and the 2003 ceasefire was one of the most significant bilateral achievements since former PM Vajpayee's "Hand of Friendship" speech in April 2003. --Some Army sources reportedly linked the incident to a failed attempt on January 17 in which the Indian army killed five infiltrators. According to this theory, Islamabad was seeking to prevent Indian from recovering the bodies and finding out more about their origin and activities. --Another more bizarre theory suggests that it was an expression of disapproval by Pakistan over the lack of progress in the Baglihar dispute. --The most unsual hypothesis came from Srinagar, where some journalists speculated that India might be behind the incident, in order to divert attention from the Baglihar case, after Pakistan on January reportedly formally approached the World Bank for mediation. A well-informed Jammu-based Indian correspondent saw a connection between the incident, the abrupt cancellation of a 400-man unit that was supposed to have been de-inducted (withdrawn) from J&K, and the recent failed infiltration attempt, calling the case "Indian mischief." Comment ------- 4. (C) The GOI has dealt with this incident as it has following the few minor LOC ceasefire incidents since November 2003 -- by downplaying them publicly, clarifying them with Pakistan at the military level via established channels, and then closing the chapter. We are also heartened that there has been virtually no public echo in the political arena, including from the opposition BJP which in an earlier phase of Indo-Pak relations would have made much of this occasion for anti-Pakistan rhetoric. Aside from criticism of the government's handling of the Composite Dialogue, the BJP has been silent, yet another indication that the Indian political class is prepared to subordinate blips like this to the larger interest in reconstructing India's ties with Pakistan. MULFORD
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