US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI203

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, KPAO, TW 
SUBJECT: "CHINA TIMES" ARTICLE DETAILING SENSITIVE 
DEALINGS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
Summary: The centrist, pro-status quo Chinese-language 
"China Times" Sunday (1/16/05) carried an excerpt from 
a new book written by journalist Wang Ming-yi entitled 
"Dialogues and Confrontations: Political Competitions 
between Taiwan and China."  In the excerpt, Wang 
describes a secret visit paid December 1, 2003, by then 
U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for 
Asian Affairs James Moriarty to President Chen Shui- 
bian in which Moriarty handed Chen a letter written by 
President George W. Bush expressing his concern about 
Taiwan's referendum plans.  The excerpt also discusses 
dealings between Taiwan and the United States before 
and after Taiwan's March 20 presidential elections. 
Full text translation of the article follows. 
 
"Moriarty Met With Bian and Said Strong Words; the 
[Atmosphere of] U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Trust Suddenly 
Changed.  [Moriarty] Handed [Chen] a Letter Written by 
Bush, Persuading Taiwan to Stop Holding a Referendum on 
`Independence.'  Moriarty and Bian Had a Huge 
Discrepancy in Their Perceptions; the Meeting Ended 
Unpleasantly, and the U.S-Taiwan Relationship Dropped 
to the Freezing Point" 
 
Journalist Wang Ming-yi wrote in the excerpt (1/16): 
 
"December 1, 2003, 110 days before the day for casting 
votes in the 2004 presidential election. Taipei City 
Chungching South Road, the Presidential Residence, the 
National Security Bureau Special Service Center and the 
Mt. Jade Residential Guard Office received an order to 
strictly control the personnel and vehicles coming in 
and out of the Presidential Residence, and to 
strengthen control of the situation on contiguous 
roads. The reason was because the Mt. Jade Residence 
was waiting for an 'important and mysterious' U.S. 
guest, who is not so friendly towards Taiwan. 
 
"He was said to be important because he was an `envoy 
on behalf of the [U.S.] President' sent by the White 
House; he was described as mysterious because Taiwan 
and the United States agreed not to reveal this secret 
schedule.  On that day, National Security Council 
Consulting Member Ke Cheng-heng welcomed the visitors 
in front of the Presidential Residence.  Ke had 
accompanied the then `Legislator Chen Shui-bian' on a 
visit Beijing in the 1990s, and had become the major 
window for communication between Taiwan and the United 
States after the DPP became the ruling party.  U.S. 
National Security Council Senior Director for Asian 
Affairs James F. Moriarty entered the Mt. Jade 
Residence, accompanied by AIT Director Douglas H. Paal. 
 
"The identification of Moriarty for this trip was 
`special envoy of President George W. Bush,' and he 
brought a letter written by Bush.  The purpose of that 
letter had not only the diplomatic intention to 
persuade Taiwan to refrain from holding a referendum, 
but also the intention, by chance, to put political 
pressure on Taiwan. 
 
"Bush in his letter explicitly expressed the United 
States' policy position that `[the United States] 
opposes either side of the Taiwan Strait unilaterally 
changing the status quo.'  Regarding Taiwan's push for 
a sensitive and provocative referendum, [the letter] 
even explicitly expressed [the position] that the 
United States was not willing to see and would not 
support Taiwan holding the referendum that would `lead 
to Taiwan independence.'  At the same time, Bush 
reiterated the United States' `One China' policy and 
expressed the attitude that the United States was 
looking forward to [both sides of the Strait] 
peacefully solving the Taiwan Strait dispute. 
 
"Presidential Office Spokesman James Huang, who had 
been in the foreign service, said in regard to 
Moriarty's visit to Taiwan that: 'for the last two 
days, no U.S. government or AIT official has entered 
the Presidential Office.'  Huang did not lie, because 
Moriarty actually did not enter the Presidential 
Office, but the Mt. Jade Presidential Residence 
instead. 
 
"The unpleasant secret meeting became the critical 
turning point in the relationship of mutual trust 
between Taiwan-U.S. high-ranking officials [and caused 
the relationship] to fall to its lowest point in 
history. 
 
"The critical factor of the unpleasant meeting between 
Chen and Moriarty was that Moriarty's `perception of 
[his] role' differed greatly from that of Chen's. 
Taiwan's decision-making staff considered that Moriarty 
``expressed too many `personal opinions,' beyond the 
policy information that President Bush wanted to 
express.'' 
 
"U.F.O Broadcasting Company Manager Jaw Shaw-kong, in a 
TV debate on the referendum before the presidential 
election, quoted internal documents from [Taiwan's] 
National Security Council and revealed that Moriarty, 
before the meeting with Chen, made a harsh criticism: 
`If you really think that [everything] is okay so long 
as you don't change the national flag, the name of the 
country, and the territory -- you are wrong.  Doing so 
will bring about the deaths of U.S. soldiers in the 
Taiwan Strait, and we don't want to pay that price. 
The defensive referendum has no other purpose but to be 
provocative.  The referendum merely wants to show that 
Chen Shui-bian can challenge China.  To demand that 
China remove its ballistic missiles, however, will end 
up causing negative effects.' 
 
"Actually, the document that Jaw quoted was not the 
real copy of the conversation between Chen Shui-bian 
and Moriarty.  What Jaw quoted was a compilation of the 
talks between [Taiwan's] National Security Council core 
staff, Moriarty, incumbent National Security Council 
Senior Director for Asian Affairs Michael Green, and 
Green's deputy Ford Hart not long after Moriarty left 
Taiwan and after `the meeting between U.S. President 
George W. Bush and China's Premier Wen Jiabao.' 
Moriarty, Green, and Hart, with regard to Chen Shui- 
bian's policy direction and electoral language, 
proposed direct and harsh `warnings' to Taiwan National 
Security Council officials that "the formerly `one 
side, one country' [formula] proposed by the Taiwan 
leader is an obvious example [of unpleasant surprises]. 
For the past few months, Taiwan has kept on giving us 
`surprises,' and anyone could consider that Taiwan's 
political purpose is to change Taiwan's status quo." 
 
[The U.S. officials also warned that] "You cannot 
consider that you can do anything except for the `Five 
Nos.'  If you make other moves, there will still be 
conflicts." 
 
"We do not trust the leaders of Taiwan too much.  I 
[Moriarty] went to Taipei three times.  President Chen 
listened to my opinion the first time; [he listened to 
me] a little the second time; [he listened to me] not 
at all the third time.  You still insist on taking that 
route.  We are so worried about what the Taiwan 
government plans to do, and this is why my president is 
so worried.  He is worried that there will be another 
conflict.' 
 
"National security staff of the Chen Shui-bian 
administration judged that the keynote of President 
Bush's remarks at the `Bush-Wen meeting' was a `script' 
directly drafted by Moriarty alone.  Chen's diplomatic 
staff recalled later: `During that period of time, 
Taiwan took a lot of beatings from Moriarty but was 
unable to talk about them.  But the situation got 
better after Moriarty was transferred.'  Chen had also 
told his staff that `Green should be a better person 
than Moriarty!' 
 
"Taiwan evidently stood in an unfavorable position with 
regard to the competition between Washington, Beijing 
and Taipei before and after the `Bush-Wen meeting.' 
But Washington's and Beijing's doubts about Chen had 
not been successfully removed even after Chen's re- 
election.  Washington and Beijing even matched each 
other's strength in private [at that time]. 
 
"Sources said the reason why Beijing indicated in its 
`March 26 announcement' that it `will not sit back with 
its hands off' if Taiwan's situation gets out of 
control was mainly because Beijing had seen AIT Chair 
Therese Shaheen say in Washington that the United 
States would deliver a congratulatory message to Chen 
Shui-bian and Annette Lu after the Taiwan authorities 
formally announced their re-election.  [For Beijing,] 
the move was evidently an attempt `to interfere with 
Taiwan's domestic affairs' while the election disputes 
on the island were not yet settled.  As a result, 
Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office acted quickly to issue 
the [March 26] statement, a move that seized the 
opportunity to counter Washington's efforts to quickly 
`acknowledge' Chen's re-election. 
 
"Two days prior to the March 19 shootings [of Chen and 
Lu], AIT Taipei Deputy Director David J. Keegan called 
the then Taiwan Presidential Office Secretary-General 
Joseph Wu and KMT Chairman Office Director Ting Yuean- 
chao, respectively.  Keegan said under the State 
Department's instructions, when the March 20 election 
results came out, AIT Taipei Director Doug Paal would 
call on the President-elect first and other candidates 
later.  Keegan also asked Wu and Ting to arrange the 
respective meetings. 
 
"When [KMT Chairman] Lien Chan announced late in the 
evening of March 20 that he would file an appeal to 
annul the presidential poll, Taiwan's political 
situation was in unprecedented chaos because of the 
uncertain election results.  Paal, however, paid a 
secret visit to Lien's residence on Tunhua Road at 
 
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10:30 AM, March 21, and met with Lien and James Soong, 
who had just returned from [the demonstrations] outside 
the Presidential Office.  Former National Security 
Council Secretary General Ding Mou-shih was also 
present at the meeting.  During the meeting, both sides 
expressed their concern about Taiwan's political 
situation.  Paal was also concerned that the chaotic 
situation on the island would not subside very soon. 
Paal did not meet with Chen until the next day.  Since 
AIT said before the elections that Paal would call on 
the `President-elect' first, Paal's meeting with Lien 
and Soong was later interpreted by Chen as an 
illustration showing that `someone in the United States 
did not want to see me elected.'" 
 
PAAL