US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI301

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 000301 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
NSC FOR HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR FRAN TOWNSEND FROM 
AMBASSADOR 
DEPT FOR EB A/S TONY WAYNE AND NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINS, EFIN, IZ, IR, TC 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER - NSC HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR 
TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO UAE 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
1. (C) Overview: We look forward to welcoming you to the 
United Arab Emirates February 6-7.  U.S.-UAE cooperation in 
the security and counterterrorism fields is robust and the 
UAE leadership is actively seeking ways to enhance the 
relationship.  Your visit here will be an excellent 
opportunity to thank the Emiratis for the outstanding 
cooperation they have provided on numerous CT issues.  It 
will also be an occasion to encourage them to continue CT 
cooperation with their neighbors, improve internal 
coordination shortcomings, share more leads with us, and sign 
an MLAT.  In Abu Dhabi, we have requested meetings with Crown 
Prince General Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), State 
Security Department Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan, and Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser Al Suweidi. 
In Dubai, we have requested a meeting with Dubai Crown Prince 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MBR).  (We will 
suggest that Interior Minister Sheikh Saif sit in on his 
brother MBZ,s session, and that SSD Dubai and the Minister 
of State for Finance sit in with MBR.) 
 
2. (S) In response to terrorist threats, the UAE is 
implementing numerous measures in hopes of preventing attacks 
that could cripple its economy and destroy the Emirates, 
image as a peaceful, profitable place to do business.  UAE 
law enforcement agencies )- with U.S. assistance and 
training -- are also focusing on how they would respond to a 
potential attack, including attacks on critical oil 
production, power and water infrastructure, and 
ports/airports.  The UAE armed forces have made 
counterterrorism a leading concern.  UAEG funding for 
security, including defense, soaked up a whopping 43 percent 
of federal budgeted expenditures in 2004. 
 
3. (S/NF) By many accounts, the Emiratis may be better 
prepared to prevent, and to cope, with a terrorist assault 
than other Gulf neighbors, but the jury is still out on 
whether they could capably defend against a sustained 
campaign of terrorist violence on their soil.  There is 
relatively little coordination within and between the 
emirates on counter-terrorism strategies.  Only in July 2004 
did the government pass a new anti-terrorism law that 
provides UAE agencies a framework and broad powers for future 
operations.  There is also still an atmosphere of complacency 
that may emanate from the fact that the UAE has, thankfully, 
not yet been "hit." 
 
4. (U) We have identified 13 issues for you to explore; they 
appear in paragraphs 5 - 17, below. 
 
Suggested Issues 
---------------- 
 
5. (S/NF) REGIONAL COOPERATION. 
 
Background: The arrest of an Al Qaida-affiliated terrorist 
cell in Buraimi in 2004 was an excellent example of CT 
cooperation between the UAE and Oman.  The UAE State Security 
Division and its Omani counterpart developed information and 
jointly investigated the case of a terror cell that allegedly 
planned to attack oil infrastructure in the Gulf.  However, 
CT cooperation with other Gulf neighbors has lapsed. 
 
The UAE is focusing significant resources on controlling its 
porous land and maritime borders.  Your UAE interlocutors are 
worried about terrorism in Saudi Arabia and potential 
spillover.  UAE-Saudi cooperation has been problematic.  UAE 
officials have told us that when they try to cooperate with 
the Saudis by giving them information about suspects in the 
Kingdom, the Saudis either reject the offer of cooperation, 
saying it is &Saudi business,8 or take so long to act on 
the information that it becomes fruitless.  Likewise, we have 
some evidence that UAE-Kuwaiti CT cooperation is weak. 
 
Points to make: Encourage more regional cooperation; cite 
Buraimi cell example. 
 
Expected UAE points: Difficulty getting cooperation from Gulf 
neighbors due to political sensitivities. 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza 
 
6. (S/NF) UAEG INTERNAL CT COORDINATION 
 
Background: There is relatively little coordination between 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai on CT strategies. The primary federal 
decision-makers on matters related to CT are MBZ, Sheikh 
Hazza, and Interior Minister Sheikh Saif.  The Central Bank 
takes decisions on freezing accounts, while transshipment 
issues, which primarily involve Dubai, are handled 
autonomously through the Dubai State Security Division.  When 
the other five emirates have issues related to transshipment 
or CT, they refer the matter to federal authorities (Abu 
Dhabi) for guidance.  (We point to the example of Sharjah 
emirate,s handling of Osman Saeed, which landed on Interior 
Minister Sheikh Saif,s desk.)  The AQ Khan network dossier 
has been worked at both the Abu Dhabi and Dubai level. 
 
In August 2004, the UAEG adopted a new anti-terrorism law 
that gives UAE officials greater authority to respond to 
terrorist-related activity.  The legislation defines 
terrorism, lists the persons and organizations affected by 
this new law, specifically criminalizes terrorist financing, 
and sets stiff penalties for violations.  The law also 
establishes an anti-terrorism committee. 
 
Points to make: Underscore the need for the UAE to improve 
interagency and inter-emirate coordination in the CT arena; 
equally important that the U.S. continue to explore avenues 
of cooperation to assist them. 
 
Expected UAE points: Committee being set up under National 
Anti-Terror Law to improve coordination.  USG needs to do a 
better job of passing on information that is usable for 
prosecution purposes.  UAEG Central Bank has legal 
constraints on asset freezing. 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza, Al Suweidi, MBR 
 
7. (S/NF) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREAT. 
 
Background: UAE officials have said that they have taken 
measures to enhance security at oil installations, but 
acknowledge that significant critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities remain and extend beyond oil infrastructure 
to power and water grids, ports and airports.  Attacks on the 
UAE,s power and desalination plants, which produce nearly 
all the UAE,s potable water, could have a far greater and 
more immediate impact on UAE, senior UAE officials have told 
us.  Raytheon Corp. is working with the Coast Guard and oil 
companies to develop security systems for onshore and 
offshore oil installations. 
 
Points to make: Interested in progress on UAE,s assessment 
of its critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. 
 
Expected UAE points: Appreciate U.S. cooperation (DHS/ICE ran 
a December 2004 Security Threat Assessment Training). 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza, MBR 
 
8. (S/NF) GREATER UAEG CT ACTIVISM. 
 
Background: While the USG has urged the UAE to provide us 
with leads to pursue in CT cases, the UAE has been hesitant 
to do so unless they are absolutely certain that the 
information is accurate.  For example, we believe Sheikh 
Hazza wants to be 100 percent certain about the information 
he shares with us to avoid being seen in a negative light. 
 
Points to make: Urge UAE intelligence services to be more 
proactive and give us leads. 
 
Expected UAE points: Urge the USG to provide it with 
actionable information. 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): Hazza 
 
9. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCING. 
 
Background: The UAE is seized with the terrorism financing 
issue.  Progress on terror finance cases requires information 
that is specific, actionable, and releasable to the UAEG. 
Salah Al Shamsi remains in UAE detention.  In a separate 
case, Dubai authorities have moved unilaterally against a 
Dubai-based Iraqi insurgent support network.  DHS/ICE is also 
working a joint investigation with MoI targeting a Dubai 
based company allegedly involved in acquiring weapons for the 
previous Iraqi regime and financing insurgency operations in 
Iraq.  If the Ahmed Al Kubaysi or Human Appeal International 
cases are to be raised, our side must come armed with 
specific, actionable, and releasable information. 
 
Points to make: Appreciate UAE cooperation on Al Shamsi case; 
looking forward to further cooperation.  What is being done 
regarding Iraqi insurgent fundraising connections?    Propose 
enhanced information exchange, joint terrorist finance 
working group or task force.  Highlight DOJ training 
possibilities on prosecuting terror finance, bringing 
prosecutors, judges, and bankers together. 
 
Expected UAE points: U.S. can count on cooperation; ask U.S 
for specific actionable information. 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, MBR 
 
10. (C/NF) MIDDLE EAST NORTH AFRICA/FINANCIAL ACTION TASK 
FORCE (MENA/FATF). 
 
Background: The Central Bank Governor has stressed that the 
UAEG will play a fully supportive role in the MENA/FATF 
process, but has stated that the UAEG would like to be 
considered for FATF membership in its own right.  We assess 
that the UAE will participate in MENA/FATF fully and 
constructively, despite not being the host of the 
organization. 
 
Points to make: The new MENA/FATF will help to address 
structural anti-money laundering counter-terrrorist financing 
issues in the region.  Important to participate fully and 
actively. 
 
Expected UAE points: UAEG will be fully supportive of 
MENA/FATF.  Important that the organization be technical and 
not political.  May ask about possibility of Iranian and 
Syrian participation and UAE interest in FATF membership 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): Al Suweidi 
 
11. (C/NF) CASH COURIERS. 
 
Background: UAE regulates both the import of cash and 
inbound/outbound wire transfers.  Individuals are required to 
declare cash that they import to the UAE in amounts greater 
than the equivalent of $10,800.  Legislation specifically 
requires cash to be declared when it is brought into the UAE. 
 The Central Bank recently held a training session on cash 
declarations for the emirate level customs services and is 
addressing the problem of cash couriers.  The UAE is seeing 
large sums of cash coming from India and Pakistan. 
 
Points to make: Would welcome UAE taking same leadership role 
in cash couriers that it has taken in Hawala (informal funds 
transfer networks).  Increasingly important way for 
terrorists to move funds.  Will UAE specifically add a cash 
reporting requirement for cash exports? 
 
Expected UAE points: Central Bank is working with UAE 
customs, but tracking this is a customs lead.  Hosted 
training for customs.  Would be area for customs training. 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): Al Suweidi 
 
12. (S/NF) CHARITIES. 
 
Background:  The UAE Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
monitors registered charities in the country and requires 
them to keep records of donations and beneficiaries.  In 
2002, the UAEG mandated that all licensed charities transfer 
funds abroad via one of three umbrella organizations: the Red 
Crescent Authority, the Zayed Charitable Foundation, or the 
Mohammed bin Rashid Charitable Trust.  The purpose of this 
regulation was to make the process of sending charitable 
contributions to foreign countries more transparent and to 
prevent financing of extremist groups.  The Foreign Ministry 
has contacted the governments in numerous aid-receiving 
countries to compile a list of recognized, acceptable 
recipients for UAE charitable assistance. 
 
There are reports of UAE money going to charities linked to 
Hamas.  (Note:  UAE contributions to the Palestinians are to 
be funneled through the Red Crescent Society, which is 
overseen by MinState for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan.  RCS 
funds for assistance go directly to projects and are not 
provided in cash.) 
 
Points to make: Important to work together to ensure that 
charities are not misused.  Give examples of how the Saudis 
are working to control charities.  Solicit UAE leadership in 
the efforts to control charities. 
 
Expected UAE points: Understand the need to control flow of 
funds from charities.  If USG has information to indicate 
problems with UAE charities, please provide it. 
 
Suggested interlocutors: MBZ, MBR, Al Suweidi 
 
13. (S/NF) EXPORT CONTROLS/CSI 
 
Background: The UAE recognizes the need to stop the 
proliferation of WMD and related materials and welcomes USG 
assistance.  Although the UAE is not a source of WMD, its 
ports have been used to transship WMD related material to 
states with burgeoning WMD programs.  On December 13, 2004 
Commissioner Bonner from U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
signed the Container Security Initiative with the Port of 
Dubai.  CSI should be operational in February 2005 at Port 
Rashid. 
 
The UAE,s draft export control law is still in the UAE 
interagency process. 
 
In the past year, the U.S. sponsored: 
 
-- Seaport Interdiction Training Program. 
 
-- A Control List workshop targeted at legal and licensing 
experts. 
 
-- A WMD components identification course for federal and 
emirate-level customs and law enforcement officials. 
 
-- Legal and regulatory fora for UAE legal and regulatory 
experts from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Foreign 
Affairs, the Federal Customs Authority, and emirate-level 
officials. 
 
We are encouraged by the UAE,s continuing cooperation in 
individual cases (e.g., their quick action in the Osman Saeed 
case involving diversion of controlled missile technology 
items through the UAE to Pakistan,s missile program).  The 
UAE intends to prosecute Saeed under the National 
Anti-Terrorism Law, which prohibits the import of WMD-related 
components into the UAE. 
 
Points to make:  CSI good initiative; export control law and 
national control list will help UAE to exercise control over 
proliferation-related goods that enter the UAE and take 
unilateral action to halt such trade. 
 
Expected UAE points:  Nonproliferation is a priority; 
appreciate U.S. assistance; draft law in pipeline. 
 
Suggested interlocutors: MBZ, MBR 
 
15. (S/NF) TRAINING. 
 
Background: The UAE has welcomed training opportunities.  In 
December 2004 DHS/ICE completed Security Threat Assessment 
training with the Ministry of Interior on how to assess 
security threats, particularly those posed by terrorist 
organizations, for critical infrastructure sites and to 
employ appropriate countermeasures.  Sheikh Saif, Minister of 
Interior, was pleased with the training and has created a 
dedicated unit comprised of course graduates that will be 
handling all future security/threat assessments for the 
Ministry.  UAE police have participated in Department of 
State-sponsored Anti-Terrorism Assistance training courses. 
 
Points to make: Highlight the new DOJ/OPDAT Resident Legal 
Advisor position at Embassy Abu Dhabi (RLA arrived 1/05); 
seek input on training needs. 
 
Expected UAE points: Desire to explore more training. 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza, MBR 
 
16. (SBU) MLAT. 
 
Background: U.S. and UAE teams will resume MLAT negotiations 
in Washington February 22-24.  (We intend to send our DOJ 
OPDAT back for the session.)  The UAE side will also raise 
their concern on extradition issues during the MLAT talks. 
An extradition treaty poses problems for the USG because the 
UAE Constitution prevents extradition of UAE nationals.  USG 
policy is not to sign extradition treaties with countries 
that do not extradite their own nationals.  The U.S. is 
concerned with a recent increase in formal refusals to render 
fugitives to the U.S.  The UAEG has cooperated with the USG 
in the past on rendering fugitives, and now it has changed 
its policy (probably to gain negotiating leverage in the MLAT 
negotiations).  Within our legally available means, the USG 
has always been helpful to the UAEG in fugitive cases, and 
would ask that the UAE show us the same courtesy and return 
our fugitives to the U.S. 
 
Points to make: Need for our negotiating teams to sit down 
with each other to understand what can, and cannot be 
achieved. 
 
Expected UAE points: Link MLAT with extradition treaty. 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza, Al Suweidi, MBR 
 
17. (S/NF) DHS/ICE, VISAS. 
 
Background: DHS/ICE opened offices at Embassy Abu Dhabi and 
ConGen Dubai in 2004.  DHS/ICE has focused on transshipment 
and money laundering investigations but is also conducting 
joint cases with UAE counterparts involving organized crime, 
fraud, and child pornography.  ICE has developed a close 
working relationship with the Ministry of Interior, 
particularly on the Saeed investigation where ICE agents were 
permitted to accompany MoI personnel during the searches of 
several businesses resulting in the recovery of inertial 
navigation equipment with missile guidance applications. 
Most recently MoI has approved a joint undercover operation 
with ICE targeting Hawala dealers operating illegally in the 
United States and the UAE.  This operation is expected to 
commence in February 2005. 
 
On the visa front, our Consular and Public Diplomacy staff 
work hard to explain the complexities of our visa regulations 
and correct Emiratis, sometimes negative perceptions on U.S. 
visa and homeland security policies. 
 
Points to make:  Thank MBZ for the close cooperation that ICE 
has received from the Abu Dhabi Police Department and the MoI 
on joint investigations. 
 
Expected UAE points:  Interest in continued training. 
 
Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, MBR 
 
SISON 
SISON