US embassy cable - 05ANKARA295

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISTANBUL PLS PASS ADANA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, IS 
SUBJECT: TURKISH FM GUL'S VISIT TO ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Turkish and Israeli contacts in Ankara 
portray FM Gul's January 3-5 visit to Israel and Palestine as 
giving mixed results: signaling the end of 2004's 
Turkish-Israeli public tensions (both Turkish and Israeli 
interlocutors affirm that deeper, long-standing security and 
intel cooperation has remained essentially steady), but 
pointing up the gap between the GOT's conception of itself as 
a serious player in the MEPP or Middle East in general and 
the reality.  Although Turkey views itself a possible 
mediator between Israel and the Arabs, neither the Turks, 
Israelis nor Palestinians made any concrete proposals for 
Turkish mediation.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) This cable is based on readouts from Turkish MFA DDG 
Gokturk, Israel/Palestine Desk Officer Sakar, Israeli DCM 
Nahshon, Israeli First Secretary Bar-li Sa'ar, MFA 
Coordinator for Palestine Dincerler, "Sabah" Ankara bureau 
chief Aydintasbas, and Turkish national security analyst 
Faruk Demir. 
 
Both Sides Try to Put Tensions Behind 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Turkish and Israeli diplomatic interlocutors aver that 
Turkey and Israel are using Gul's visit to try to put behind 
them the public bilateral tension stemming from PM Erdogan's 
sharp criticism of Israeli targeted assassinations.  MFA 
Office Director Sakar said the visit illustrates that "we are 
over these problems."  Israeli DCM Nahshon said that, Israel 
is casting the visit as a success because it will have a 
positive effect on the Turkish public's perception of 
relations and because it will set up a much more significant 
visit by Erdogan, which the Israeli Embassy sees as 
exponentially more important and as occurring some time in 
Spring 2005.  Likewise, although the visit produced no new 
agreements or initiatives, Bar-li Sa'ar assessed it as 
important just because it happened and cast it as opening a 
"new page" in bilateral relations.  Sakar, Nahshon and Bar-li 
Sa'ar all affirmed that neither Gul nor any of his Israeli 
interlocutors raised last year's tensions during the visit. 
According to Sakar, the "tough points" were discussed during 
Israeli Foreign Ministry DirGen Prosor's November 2004 visit 
to Turkey.  The Israelis reiterated their desire for PM 
Erdogan to visit Israel. 
 
4. (C) Nahshon and Bar-li Sa'ar both said the Gul-Sharon 
meeting had "good chemistry" (although Nahshon acknowledged 
that neither Sharon nor Gul was fooled into thinking the 
other holds warm feelings); the meeting lasted 90 minutes 
instead of the planned 45, with Sharon canceling other 
appointments in order to spend more time with Gul.  Bar-li 
Sh'ar claimed the atmospherics of Gul's meetings with DPM 
Olmert and Labor Party leader Peres were also good; Nahshon 
and Bar-li Sa'ar said the meeting between Gul and FM Shalom 
was cooler. 
 
No Proposals for Turkish Mediation 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Turkey views itself as a possible mediator between 
Israel and the Arabs, and the Turkish media portrayed Gul's 
visit as a step in that direction, although neither of our 
MFA interlocutors was able to clarify how.  Moreover, both 
Nahshon and Bar-li Sa'ar told us Gul came with no concrete 
proposals for mediation.  Sakar said Gul's Israeli 
interlocutors asked him to give the Palestinians a generic 
message to end terror, although Gul told the Israelis that 
Abu Mazen may not be influential with all Palestinian groups. 
 
 
6.  (C) Regarding Syria, Sakar said Gul told the Israelis 
Turkey would like to be helpful "when the time comes." 
Nahshon dismissed the significance of this Turkish offer, 
saying that Israel's priority is dealing with the 
Palestinians.  Moreover, he said, the Israelis used the Gul 
visit to test the sincerity and capability of the Turks, and 
found Gul wanting in both regards.  Shalom deliberately used 
his joint press conference with Gul publicly to note that 
Israel had asked Erdogan to use his December visit to Syria 
to raise the case of repatriation of the remains of executed 
Israeli spy Eli Cohen from Syria and had asked Gul to raise 
the case of another disappeared Israeli.  Davutoglu's 
subsequent complaint that Turkey had been on the verge of a 
breakthrough with Syria regarding Cohen's remains but that 
Shalom's statement had blown the whole deal reflected 
Davutoglu's and Turkey's lack of seriousness and weight, 
Nahshon said.  Nahshon also relished noting that an Israeli 
journalist had trapped Gul by asking whether Syria's 
renunciation of its claim to Hatay set a precedent to 
renounce its claim to the Golan Heights; Gul was thrown into 
confusion, Nahshon remarked. 
 
7. (C) Gul's Israeli interlocutors urged Turkish 
contributions to Gaza's humanitarian, infrastructure, 
education and public health needs, as well as hosting 
Israeli/Palestinian people-to-people contacts, Bar-li Sa'ar 
said.  She characterized Gul as "not satisfied" with these 
ideas; he counter-proposed a Turkish peacekeeping role in 
Gaza.  Assessing the visit from a (dismissive) Egyptian 
perspective, Egyptian Embassy counselor Moucharafa noted to 
us dryly that the Turks do not know what they are letting 
themselves in for if they think they can tackle peacekeeping 
in the deeply radicalized Gaza. 
 
8. (C) Gul offered (amid much fanfare, according to Bar-li 
Sa'ar; "Sabah" bureau chief Aydintasbas described it as much 
self-important scurrying too and fro) a Turkish donation of 
25,000 uniforms to the Palestinian police.  Claiming that the 
offer is an important one because it will cost the Turks $3.2 
million, Dincerler said the idea is to help mold the police 
into one professional unit instead of several units with 
diverse loyalties.  Saying the idea  reflected a paltry 
nature of Turkish initiatives, Nahshon thought it doubtful 
the Palestinians will bother to wear the uniforms.  The GOT 
also reiterated a previous proposal to donate $900,000 for 
school and hospital projects in Palestinian territory. 
 
9. (C) Despite the overall good will, there were some awkward 
moments, Nahshon said.  Gul refused to wear a yarmulke during 
a tour of the Holocaust Memorial; Bar'li Sa'ar said the 
Turkish MPs accompanying Gul did not understand what the 
memorial was dedicated to.  The Turkish press reported Gul 
refused to have an Israeli flag on the car in which he rode 
to the Dome of the Rock; Nahshon noted that this contretemps 
made Gul 20 minutes late for his appointment with the Israeli 
President. 
 
10. (C) According to Bar-li Sa'ar, the two sides did not 
discuss the long mooted, long delayed project to ship water 
from Turkey's Manavgat River to Israel; when prodded, Gokturk 
acknowledged that, in any event, the Israelis continue to 
drag their feet. 
 
Talks in Palestine 
------------------ 
 
11. (C) Dincerler said the Palestinians told Gul they welcome 
good Turkish relations with Israel as an asset for Palestine. 
 However, neither side proposed any concrete way in which 
Turkey could mediate between Israel and Palestine. 
 
12.  (C) According to Gokturk and Sakar, Gul raised the need 
to stop terrorism with Palestinian PM Qurei, specifically 
mentioning suicide bombings and artillery and missile 
attacks.  Sakar said that Qurei took Gul's point and promised 
serious steps on security and reforms to Palestinian security 
services.  Dincerler said Gul did not raise this point with 
Abu Mazen.  Dincerler said one Palestinian official (whom he 
did not identify) downplayed the seriousness of Kassem 
missile attacks, saying the missiles are too primitive to 
represent a real danger.  Gul also stressed the need for good 
governance, transparency and democracy, according to 
Dincerler. 
 
13. (C) Dincerler and Aydintasbas separately described 
efforts by Gul and Davutoglu to put a positive spin on 
Turkish efforts to contribute to the Palestinian election 
process, a spin which their Palestinian interlocutors did not 
fully accept.  As Gul and Davutoglu tried to present it, the 
Palestinians complained to Gul that Israeli police would 
escort Palestinian ballot boxes from Jerusalem to counting 
stations in Palestinian territory.  Gul and Davutoglu 
asserted that by passing this concern to the Israelis, they 
were able to secure Israeli agreement not to escort (Bar-li 
Sa'ar said the call from the Turks was the first time Israel 
heard this complaint).  In his January 10 meeting with Codel 
Kyl, FM Gul cited this as a small example of how Turkey might 
be helpful between the two sides.  In fact, Aydintasbas said, 
the Palestinian Authority wanted Israeli escorts to ensure 
that rival Palestinian groups would not be able to tamper 
with the ballot boxes, and in the end it was the Americans 
who worked out arrangements satisfactory to both sides. 
 
14.  (C) Comment: While Tel Aviv and Ankara, each for its own 
reasons, want to restore a harmonious public face to 
bilateral relations, challenges remain.  Sakar predicted 
Turkey will continue to speak out about Israeli actions with 
which it disagrees.  Erdogan's ruling AK party and the 
party's grass roots include significant segments of people 
who express anti-Jewish sentiments and Turkish popular 
opinion in general remains anti-Israel.  Moreover a research 
assistant at a Turkish think-tank, one of the few Turkish 
analysts who speaks fluent Hebrew, found in her survey of 
Israeli contacts from official and think-tank circles that 
Gul left a singularly dull impression. 
 
15. (C) Yet both sides want to portray the Gul visit as a 
positive step.  For the Israelis, according to Nahshon, the 
immediate goal is to build on Gul's visit to secure an 
Erdogan visit.  For the GOT, the visit is proof that Turkey 
can play a significant mediating role.  Turkey's desire for a 
mediation role is unrealistic, however.  The Turks 
underestimate resentment toward them in the Arab world 
stemming from the Ottoman occupation of Arab land, and people 
like Gul are blind to the dismissive nature of the flattery 
that the Arab world uses to string them along.  As 
Aydintasbas recounted from the Jan. 6 Iraq neighbors' meeting 
in Amman, the irony in the Egyptian FonMin's remark that 
Turkey is so fortunate to be trying to play an active role 
because it is such a great nation went completely over Gul's 
head. 
End comment. 
EDELMAN