US embassy cable - 05SANAA99

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GENERAL ABIZAID MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ALAIWA

Identifier: 05SANAA99
Wikileaks: View 05SANAA99 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2005-01-16 10:57:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL MASS MCAP PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, MCAP, PTER, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER 
ALAIWA 
 
REF: SANAA 36 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
1. (C) Summary. General Abizaid met with Minister of Defense 
Alaiwa and Chief of Staff Qassemi on January 4.  Abizaid 
briefed Alaiwa on current USG priorities in the region: The 
political transition in Iraq, continued worldwide pressure on 
al-Qaida, and resumption of the Peace Process.  Alaiwa raised 
pending Yemeni purchases of F-5, C-130, Bell-Agusta 
Helicopter, and other spare parts, U.S. training and 
assistance for the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF), 
and asked for U.S. help in soliciting increased Saudi 
security and development assistance for Yemen.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Abizaid on Regional Priorities 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) General Abizaid briefed Alaiwa on the USG's top three 
priorities for the region in 2005.  He said he was hopeful 
the new year would bring a resumption of the Peace Process 
and that following the Palestinian Authority Elections to 
expect the Administration to take an important positive 
initiative.  Abizaid told Alaiwa that stabilization of Iraq 
and moving forward with the political transition was another 
top priority.  The mission of the USG, he said, was to assist 
stability by building Iraqi security forces, on the upcoming 
election, Abizaid continued, we expect to face continued 
difficulties with the insurgency in Iraq but the vast 
majority of Iraqis want to vote and desire a stable situation 
in their country.  Continued worldwide pressure on al-Qaida, 
particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains a top 
priority as well, said Abizaid, expressing his desire for 
continued and increased US - Yemen cooperation in fighting 
the GWOT. 
 
3. (C) Defense Minister Alaiwa told Abizaid that he was 
generally satisfied with US security cooperation and 
assistance to Yemen, but asked for his personal intervention 
on a number of FMF issues.  Alaiwa complained that he 
continues to wait for six million USD in spare parts for the 
air force namely parts for C-130s, F-5s, and four Bell-Agusta 
helicopters currently grounded.  Chief of Staff Qassemi added 
that the ROYG had learned from the al-Houthi rebellion that 
special forces require special training and equipment and 
repeated requests for USG assistance to train and equip three 
YSOF Units. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Yemen is a Time Bomb -- Need Saudi Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Alaiwa reported that Saudi-Yemeni relations have 
improved since reaching a border agreement, but that the KSA 
was not doing enough to assist Yemen in controlling its 
border, or for that matter, in assisting Yemeni development 
in general.  "There is a great discrepancy in wealth between 
us and our Saudi neighbors," said the Defense Minister, 
complaining that Saudi only does the minimal and should do 
more including providing jobs for Yemenis, allowing more 
guest laborers, and investing in Yemen's economy.  Alaiwa 
described Yemen's underdevelopment, poverty, and population 
growth as a "time bomb" that threatens the entire region, 
implying that the KSA has a responsibility and an interest in 
helping defuse it.  Following a recent trend of senior ROYG 
leaders appealing to visiting senior USG official to weigh in 
with Saudi Arabia, Alaiwa asked Abizaid to "tell our Gulf 
friends," to give more assistance to Yemen. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
CT Cooperation Should be a Two-Way Street 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. (S) Abizaid raised current AQ threats against maritime 
targets and oil infrastructures in the Gulf region, saying 
that he trusted the ROYG was exchanging information and 
cooperating closely with the USG on this matter.  Alaiwa 
replied that such threats were indeed out there and that "we 
need your information on this."  (Comment: Alaiwa's response 
illustrates current USG frustration with the ROYG on 
intelligence sharing which can often be a one-way street. 
During his visit Abizaid pressed officials, including the 
President, for more complete information sharing on the part 
of the ROYG.  End Comment). 
 
6. (S) Abizaid pointed to USG attempts last fall to fulfill 
Saleh's request for US reconnaissance overflights of areas 
where al-Houthi forces were thought to be operating.  We 
remain ready to provide such assistance Abizaid told Abizaid 
and Qassemi.  (Note: When the USG was ready to conduct such 
operations, the ROYG turned down the offer having already put 
down the rebellion.  End Note).  Chief of Staff Qassemi told 
Abizaid that they still required photography as well as 
mapping assistance for several parts of the country, 
including the Sa'da, Marib and Shebwa regions.  Abizaid 
replied that the USG remains ready to assist with overflights. 
 
7. (S) Alaiwa said he was satisfied with ROYG progress in 
fighting and routing out AQ cells in Yemen.  He said that 
there have been important successes and that the population 
was on the side of the government in this fight, but added 
the caveat "we are dealing with al-Qaida after all." 
 
8. (C) Comment:  The MOD and ROYG military staff are likely 
frustrated that the most successful USG security assistance 
programs fall under purview of the Ministry of Interior -- 
the Central Security Forces Counter Terrorism Unit and the 
Yemeni Coast Guard.  The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) 
at Post reports extensive difficulties in working with MOD 
officials, who complain to every visiting US official about 
parts and other acquisitions they need, while failing to file 
the necessary DOD paperwork to receive the materiel.  In a 
positive step, Alaiwa has recently acknowledged the 
ministry's lack of ability to work with the FMS/FMF system. 
To address this problem, Sanaa OMC is funding travel and 
training for MOD officials to the US for training on how to 
navigate the U.S. defense acquisitions and assistance 
environment.  The first group of Yemeni military officers 
will travel to the U.S. in February to begin this training. 
End Comment 
KRAJESKI 

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