US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI231

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2015 
TAGS: MASS, MOPS, MARR, PREL, IR, IQ, TC 
SUBJECT: ASD RODMAN MEETS UAE MINDEF MOHAMMED BIN RASHID 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison; Reason: 1.4 (B) 
and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary: In a January 11 meeting with Dubai Crown 
Prince and UAE Minister of Defense Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid 
(MBR), ASD Rodman expressed USG appreciation for UAE's 
contributions to our counter-terror and counter-proliferation 
efforts.  In response to a question on Iraq, ASD Rodman 
outlined the U.S. political and military strategy for 
achieving stability.  MBR doubted that stability could be 
achieved as long as Sunnis were "sitting at home depressed"; 
a way needed to be found to give them hope.  US mistakes had 
led to Iran playing an increased role in Iraq.  MBR said the 
Palestinian elections had left him "pleased and hopeful." 
End Summary 
 
2. (C) On January 11 Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA), 
visiting the UAE for the first annual Joint Military 
Commission meetings with the UAE military, called on the UAE 
Defense Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MBR), 
the Crown Prince and de facto ruler of Dubai.  ASD Rodman 
expressed condolences at the recent passing of UAE founder 
and President Sheikh Zayid, and congratulated MBR on the 
smooth transition.  ASD Rodman noted that the JMC sessions 
were going well, a reflection of the healthy state of the 
UAE-USG relationship. MBR, noting that the UAE had been a 
partner "from day one" in the war on terror, said he thought 
Dubai and the UAE had probably provided the US with more 
information on the whereabouts of terrorists than any other 
country.  Relations between the intell services of our two 
countries were increasing, and exchange of information was 
growing. 
 
3. (C) How are things going in Iraq, MBR asked?  Noting that 
it was a difficult period, ASD Rodman said the US had a 
combined military and political strategy.  In parallel with 
our military efforts against the insurgents, we were 
supporting an Iraqi political process, reflected in the 
January 30 elections, because an elected government would 
have legitimacy.  The insurgents feared this and were thus 
trying to disrupt the elections. Sunnis faced a painful 
dilemma, because whatever happened they would not play the 
same dominant role they had played in the past. Nevertheless 
they would play an important role in a benign political 
system.  Polls showed that 85 percent of Iraqis wanted the 
elections to take place, including most Sunnis; the 
insurgents were using fear to prevent them from 
participating.  Delaying the elections would not solve 
anything -- the Sunnis needed to come to terms with their 
situation, and delaying six months wouldn,t change the 
reality.  And the elections were not the end of the process 
-- Sunnis would be included in the new government and 
participate in drafting the new Constitution whatever the 
results of the elections.  The Shia and Kurds were showing 
great wisdom in that respect. 
 
4. (C) MBR said the lack of Sunni participation was not 
because they were afraid of the terrorists.  They were a very 
strong group; if they disagreed with the terrorists they 
would kill them or drive them out of their midst immediately. 
 The problem was that the U.S., and the Pentagon in 
particular had made mistakes.  It had backed "the wrong man," 
Chalabi, and had erred in disbanding the army and forcing 
Baathists out.  Teachers, doctors, engineers had been made 
jobless because they were Baathists.  The Baath party was the 
backbone of the country, had held the country together. 
Anyone who wanted a decent job had needed to join the party. 
 
5. (C) The void created by de-Baathification, MBR declared, 
had "given Iran the chance of a lifetime."  It was simply not 
true that most Sunnis supported the election process; Sunnis, 
the backbone of the country, were sitting at home, depressed. 
 It was essential to "get the right people back in their 
jobs; if elections were held now, with the Sunnis sitting at 
home depressed, the resistance would expand. The Sunnis knew 
they would never go back to having all the power themselves, 
but the needed to be given hope. The only way of getting rid 
of terrorists would be to get the Sunnis on board -- once 
that happened they would get rid of the terrorists 
themselves. But they had to be given their jobs back and 
given hope -- they would never accept being forced to sit at 
home (as former Baathists) while the Shia took all the power, 
thereby granting influence to Iran. 
 
6. (C) ASD Rodman said that in our view the Shia of Iraq were 
very different from those in Iran.  They were more moderate 
and secular, and clearly understood the need for unity in 
their country.  They were showing great openness to Sunnis 
and Kurds, working together with them in the current 
government.  The so-called Shia electoral list included many 
Sunnis, and the Shia clearly understood they would need to 
form coalitions after the elections.  We did not believe the 
elections would lead to a radical Shia state.  On the issue 
of de-Baathification, it was only supposed to have affected 
the very top levels of the Baath party, and we had been 
working for months to repair the implementation.  As for the 
Iraqi army, we had not disbanded it; the great tragedy of the 
army was that it had disintegrated on its own.  ASD Rodman 
said he agreed fully that it was our job to get the Sunnis to 
help us defeat the extremists.  We were training the Iraqi 
security forces quickly, and their performance was improving. 
 
 
7. (C) ASD Rodman told MBR that we shared his perception of 
Iran as a strategic threat; it was safe to assume that no 
warming of the US-Iran relationship was in the works.  We 
were worried about Iran's nuclear program, and very skeptical 
of the agreement with the Europeans because we believed the 
Iranians would cheat. If they cheated, we would need to find 
ways of imposing costs on them.  ASD Rodman added that we 
shared MBR's earlier-stated view that it was a very positive 
moment in the Israeli-Palestinian situation.  There was new 
leadership on the Palestinian side and a new coalition on the 
Israeli side.  The Israeli government was now willing to 
negotiate its withdrawal from Gaza rather than making it 
unilateral, and there was a willingness to take the "historic 
step" of removing settlements.  We would use our influence to 
help both sides make this disengagement work.  We recognized 
that progress on the Palestinian track would make things 
easier for our friends in the region. 
 
8. (C) MBR assured ASD Rodman that "we are doing our best to 
be partners, and we won't stop...there will always be bad 
people."  The UAE approach was to "give our people a good 
life, to work hard for their benefit," so that there would be 
no reason for them to become terrorists.  If they turned to 
terrorism anyway, then the UAE would not hesitate to "use 
arms against them." 
 
9. (U) Meeting participants included: 
 
U.S. - ASD Rodman and staff, Ambassador Sison, USLO Col. 
Simm, Dubai CG Davis 
 
UAE - MbR, Mohammed Gergawi (economic advisor), Sultan bin 
Sulayam (Director, Dubai Port Authority), Shaikh Ahmed bin 
Sayeed al Maktoum (Emirates Group Chairman), and two of 
MbR,s sons, Shaikh Rashid and Shaikh Hamdan. 
 
10. (U) ASD Rodman has cleared this message.  Congen Dubai 
drafted this cable. 
 
11. (U) Baghdad ) minimize considered. 
SISON