US embassy cable - 05RANGOON104

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP AND INL; DEA FOR OF, OFF; 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, SNAR, MOPS, KCRM, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA: U.S. BILATERAL INITIATIVES VICTIM OF 
POST-KHIN NYUNT PURGE 
 
REF: A. USDAO RANGOON BM 240926Z JAN 05 
     B. USDAO RANGOON BM 290508Z NOV 04 
     C. RANGOON 88 AND PREVIOUS 
     D. RANGOON 11 
     E. CDR JPAC HICKAM AFB HI 142210Z JAN 05 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The GOB's new intelligence chief has 
considerably less political stature and experience than 
ousted Prime Minister and Military Intelligence Czar Khin 
Nyunt and oversees a military intelligence apparatus with a 
reduced mandate and less authority.  It is unclear whether 
the new apparatus is under instructions to forgo cooperation 
with the international community or is simply incapable of 
carrying out the expansive functions of the former Office of 
the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI).  However, the 
result is a lack of GOB action on a host of issues formerly 
facilitated by Khin Nyunt and his subordinates, including our 
annual joint opium yield survey and WWII remains recovery 
operations.  GOB paralysis or stalling has led to the 
cancellation of the survey and delayed the remains recovery 
operations for FY2005, a setback to U.S. bilateral 
initiatives in Burma that leaves very little common ground on 
which to pursue more significant bilateral objectives in 
democracy and human rights.  End Summary. 
 
Nothing Got Done Without Khin Nyunt and OCMI 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The October 2004 ouster of Prime Minister General Khin 
Nyunt, and subsequent purge of his military intelligence 
apparatus (the former Office of the Chief of Military 
Intelligence, OCMI) has resulted in substantially reduced 
interaction between the Burmese regime and the international 
community.  Prior to the purge, OCMI directly handled and/or 
authorized most international assistance programs, contact 
with senior SPDC officials, travel to the interior, and, in 
the case of the U.S. mission, an annual joint opium yield 
survey and WWII remains recovery operations.  Diplomats, UN 
agencies, and NGOs communicated with the GOB through relevant 
ministries for routine matters, but OCMI involvement was a 
prerequisite for all operational and substantive issues. 
 
3. (C) In November 2004, Senior General Than Shwe abolished 
OCMI and created a new Office of the Chief of Military 
Affairs Security (MAS, ref B).  However, the new chief, LtGen 
Myint Swe (who also serves concurrently as commander of the 
Rangoon regional military command), has considerably less 
political stature and experience than Khin Nyunt and now 
oversees a military intelligence apparatus that has a reduced 
mandate, shrunken resources, and wields far less authority 
than its predecessor, OCMI. 
 
4. (C) The post-Khin Nyunt purge not only reduced the MI 
structure to a shell of its former self, but it also swept 
away thousands of officers and soldiers who formerly staffed 
OCMI.  Regime authorities detained or retired hundreds of MI 
officers, and transferred others to regular military units. 
By most accounts, the purge is unfinished; imminent trials 
will apparently target a host of intelligence officers 
charged with corruption and insubordination.  One former MI 
agent, recently transferred to a light infantry brigade, told 
us that the purge extended "not just to the roots, but to the 
soil attached to the roots," indicating that even privates 
and corporals were ousted and their family members, who 
previously resided on OCMI compounds, were sent packing. 
 
Nothing Gets Done With Myint Swe and MAS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Simultaneous to the purge, most diplomats and UN 
agencies have experienced a substantial slow down in 
communications with the GOB.  Traditional OCMI contacts have 
disappeared, their replacements are perpetually 
"unavailable," correspondence goes unacknowledged, and 
individual ministries deflect most inquiries and requests to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a poorly staffed bureaucracy 
that has almost no influence within the GOB. 
 
6. (C) The new Minister of Home Affairs, Maung Oo--appointed 
in November as the senior GOB official responsible for most 
issues of interest to the international community including 
narcotics, immigration, and security--has failed to meet with 
more than a handful of UN representative or diplomats. 
According to several Embassy sources, Maung Oo told his staff 
that he has "no interest or desire to meet with foreigners." 
One rare exception was a December 29 meeting with the COM, 
during which Maung Oo repeatedly declared that "all bilateral 
issues must now be coordinated through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs" (ref D).  However, he acknowledged that the 
U.S.-Burma joint opium yield survey was a logistical 
undertaking that required close coordination and he urged our 
direct contact with MAS chief Myint Swe. 
 
U.S. Bilateral Initiatives Fall to the Wayside 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7. (C) Subsequent efforts by Emboffs to contact Myint Swe, or 
his subordinates, to discuss the survey have failed.  Due to 
uncertain security issues in Wa territory, the 2005 opium 
yield survey would likely have been restricted to sites in 
Shan State outside of Special Region 2, the heart of poppy 
cultivation (ref C).  However, primarily as a result of a 
complete lack of response from MAS (or anyone in the GOB), it 
appears that the joint survey, scheduled for a ten-day period 
in late February, will not take place for the first time 
since 1997. 
 
8. (C) The MAS office has been similarly unresponsive to U.S. 
mission efforts to coordinate and execute the next phase of 
WWII remains recovery operations.  Scheduled to commence on 
February 1 in Kachin State, the six-week recovery operation, 
like the opium yield survey, is a significant logistical 
undertaking and requires GOB cooperation and support.  Due to 
a variety of GOB stalling tactics (ref A) and a lack of any 
significant response from MAS to mission inquiries, written 
requests, and diplomatic notes, the Department of Defense has 
delayed the February mission and plans no further recovery 
operations for the rest of FY05 (ref E).  However, in one 
exception to GOB stalling, MAS and Myint Swe have agreed to 
meet with DoD officials from Defense POW/Missing Personnel 
Office (DPMO) in early March to discuss overall U.S. 
objectives with remains recovery efforts. 
 
Comment: Un-Common Ground 
------------------------- 
 
9. (C) It is unclear whether the GOB's new military 
intelligence apparatus is under instructions to forgo 
cooperation with the U.S. and other missions or is simply 
incapable of carrying out the expansive functions of the 
former OCMI.  However, given the fate of Khin Nyunt and other 
former OCMI officers who once manned the regime's front lines 
with the international community, the new sheriffs in town 
(MAS) are clearly unwilling to take the risks apparently 
inherent in advocating to the SPDC hierarchy engagement with 
"those foreigners." 
 
10. (C) The cancellation of the 2005 opium survey and the 
delayed WWII remains recovery operations are setbacks to U.S. 
bilateral initiatives in Burma.  Other than low-level 
dialogue on law enforcement and counterterrorism issues, 
there are few issues that can be described as "cooperative" 
and, consequently, very little common ground on which to 
pursue more significant bilateral objectives in democracy and 
human rights.  Although the GOB may be willing to revisit the 
opium survey and remains recovery operations in 2006, and the 
coordination meeting scheduled for early March may kick start 
the latter, it will take considerable effort to regain lost 
momentum.  End Comment. 
Martinez