US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA382

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 000382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, CO 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
IN 2004 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Although the Uribe Administration can boast 
important victories in 2004, including Congressional approval 
of presidential reelection legislation and the introduction 
of an accusatory criminal justice system, President Uribe's 
popularity -- which never fell below 65 percent all year -- 
did not translate into proportionate influence in the 
Congress or with the political parties.  Uribe's failure in 
October 2003 to translate personal popularity into approval 
of his political reform referendum, or victories for 
pro-Uribe candidates in departmental and local elections, 
cost him partisan political influence.  His focus on 
governance over consensus-building and politics made him 
appear insensitive to political pressures on others, leading 
to extreme partisan squabbling and distracting campaigns of 
political assassination-by-rumor. The partisan environment 
inhibited passage of key legislation on fiscal reform, the 
distribution of confiscated narcotrafficking assets, and the 
peace process.  At the institutional level, however, GOC 
entities made significant progress on human rights.  The 
political dynamic in 2005 will be set by the Constitutional 
Court's ruling on the validity of legislation authorizing 
presidential reelection, the initiation of unofficial 
campaigning for the 2006 Congressional and Presidential 
elections, and whether Uribe himself jumps into the fray of 
partisan politics.  Other key issues such as demobilization, 
Plan Patriota, and FTA negotiations, will continue on the 
agenda. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) The Uribe Administration scored major victories in 
2004, including Congressional passage of Constitutional 
reform to permit presidential reelection, adoption of a new 
anti-terrorism law (subsequently struck down by the 
Constitutional Court), and final approval of a new criminal 
procedure code that introduced an oral, accusatory criminal 
justice system. 
 
------------------------------ 
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CONGRESS 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Despite impressive popularity numbers, Uribe's 
standing with the public did not translate -- with the 
notable exceptions already mentioned -- into passage of 
important reforms by the Congress.  Even among the so-called 
"Uribistas," there were losses on such crucial matters as tax 
reform and the nomination of a new Constitutional Court 
justice.  One clear reason for these failures is that, by 
both historical precedent and institutional structure, 
Congressional leaders are largely insulated from voter 
pressures: a strong "list" system makes them more responsive 
to party leaders, who determine their places on national or 
local lists, than to voter preferences.  And the party 
leadership, whose positions do not depend on any popular 
vote, are even more isolated from popular pressure. 
 
4. (C) Another reason is the perception that Uribe seeks to 
jump the traditional political structures and go straight to 
the people, a prospect that the political parties found 
profoundly disturbing.  In this sense, traditional political 
elites view Uribe's popularity as threatening. 
 
5. (C) In 2004, this produced the worst kind of partisan 
squabbling, centered on the reelection issue, but extending 
throughout the political environment.  Ironically, although 
the criticism in the run-up to the October 2003 elections was 
that Uribe had failed to "play politics" sufficiently, 
criticism surrounding the reelection reform was that he was 
sacrificing the Administration's substantive agenda by 
"playing too much politics."  It also produced a year of "red 
herrings."  For instance, there was a major controversy, 
leading some members of Congress to recuse themselves 
temporarily from the reelection debate, over accusations that 
the Administration had appointed their friends and relatives 
to cushy diplomatic and other government posts.  And the 
government's rock-bottom deal to purchase an almost-new 
presidential jet sparked marathon Senate hearings and 
inquiries to the Embassy (although when the facts were known, 
the "scandal" withered). 
 
6. (SBU) More importantly, the rank partisanship on display 
in 2004 inhibited the ability of the Colombian polity to come 
to consensus on sensitive matters.  No major tax reform, no 
major pension reform, and no reform of constitutionally 
mandated resource transfers to the rural departments could be 
passed, in spite of a growing budget deficit.  (Three 
questions that were all part of the 2003 referendum.)  No 
decision on the management, use, or distribution of assets 
confiscated from narco-terrorists, after last year's law 
facilitating confiscation itself was adopted; so the assets 
are left to rot.  No decision on spraying in national parks. 
The Congress issued a shocking invitation to paramilitary 
leaders to address a joint session of the legislature (the 
Administration chose not to formally oppose it because of 
respect for the separation of powers).  The legal framework 
for paramilitary demobilization went unaddressed. 
 
7. (C) At an institutional level, however, government 
entities made significant progress on human rights issues. 
The GOC increased its dialogue with NGOs, the UN, and foreign 
governments; senior-level meetings with local and 
international human rights organizations included over 40 
hours of discussions on the UNHCHR's 27 human rights 
recommendations.  The Ministry of Interior and Justice's 
protection program assisted 667 individuals in 2004 including 
members of NGOs, labor unionists, mayors and other vulnerable 
populations.  The Prosecutor General created an internal 
anti-corruption unit, requiring polygraphing for those in 
sensitive narcotics and internal affairs units and dismissal 
for those suspected of corruption. The start of a transition 
to an accusatory justice system modeled on the U.S. system 
should increase the speed and transparency of judicial 
proceedings.  Improvement in the military justice system will 
also be a priority in 2005. 
 
8. (C) Although less than two percent of human rights 
violations were attributable to government security forces, 
most Colombian NGOs -- which generally lean to the left -- 
remained critical of GOC efforts.  And recent instances of 
presumed human rights violations by members of the armed 
forces, such as the August murders of three trade unionists 
in Arauca, show that there is still a need for further 
improvement in their protection of human rights.  Yet, public 
approval ratings for the armed forces and police remained 
higher than of any other major national institution, 
including the Roman Catholic Church. 
 
9. (C) Failure of political consensus behind Uribe also made 
the Administration vulnerable to political 
assassination-by-rumor.  Uribe's so-called "Minister of the 
Presidency" (his closest advisor), the Secretary General of 
the Presidency, the Deputy Prosecutor General, and a Vice 
Minister of Defense were all hounded from office by reports 
-- all trivial -- of conflict of interest.  Elite special 
interests exercised enormous influence on more narrow 
questions:  humanitarian exchange of hostages and extradition 
were two key examples. 
 
--------------- 
LOOKING TO 2005 
--------------- 
 
10. (C) It is difficult to know how this dynamic will play 
out in 2005.  One key variable will be a decision by the 
Constitutional Court on reelection, presumably in the spring. 
 (It may turn out that the failure of Uribe's Congressional 
supporters to promote the Administration candidate for the 
Court, potentially creating a 5-4 majority against the 
constitutional amendment to allow Uribe a second term, will 
be the single most important decision of 2004.)  Another key 
variable will be the beginnings of the presidential and 
congressional campaigns for elections in 2006 (congressional 
elections in March; first-round presidential elections in 
May).  If Uribe can run, he may also try to influence local 
and congressional elections.  The reelection reform would 
allow the sitting president, for the first time in over fifty 
years, to actually engage in political campaign activities, 
albeit for a limited period prior to election day.  If the 
Constitutional Court prevents his running, Uribe has told us 
that election of the right successor will be a high priority. 
 A third variable will be whether Uribe is seen as descending 
into partisan politics, or continues to focus on governance; 
the temptation will be for the former but his popularity is 
based on the latter, especially regarding security. 
 
11. (C) Finally, there are the specifics: 2005 will be a big 
year for the GOC, to include the demobilization of perhaps 
10,000 more paramilitaries; the continuation of "Plan 
Patriota" and other operations against terrorist leadership; 
busting more narcos and eradicating/seizing their drugs; 
confronting persistently high unemployment rates; possibly 
initiating an ELN peace process and, perhaps, beginning 
meaningful overtures to the FARC; concluding negotiations of 
an FTA with the U.S.; dealing with the issue of U.S. and 
Colombian hostages; implementing the new accusatory justice 
system and improving the military justice system; and 
managing prickly relations with Venezuela. 
WOOD