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| Identifier: | 05ABUJA59 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ABUJA59 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2005-01-14 15:08:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL KAWC SU NI DARFUR |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 000059 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2015 TAGS: PREL, KAWC, SU, NI, DARFUR SUBJECT: OBASANJO ON SUDAN TRIBUNAL CONCEPT REF: STATE 8981 Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 1. (C) Ambassador presented the Sudan Tribunal Concept demarche to the Foreign Ministry and National Security Advisor, and then to President Obasanjo, on January 14. After explaining where he was going on the Darfur talks (below), Obasanjo asked how it would be decided who would be prosecuted by the Tribunal. While Obasanjo was friendly during the entire conversation, he clearly said that "how suspects will be identified, arrested and brought to the Tribunal must be answered before we move forward." 2. (C) "Rwanda (the ICTR) was easy, as everyone involved agreed there had been a genocide," Obasanjo explained. "If the UN Darfur Commission of Inquiry (COI) decided that there had been genocide in Darfur, then the COI could identify those to be pursued, he continued, "But if the COI did not, how would suspects be procured for the court?" It was the key to the process and to AU involvement, Obasanjo said, because Sudan is a member of the AU and has never denied arming the Janjawiid. Disarming the Janjawiid would be difficult enough as it was, as the GOS was naturally protective of the Janjawiid for having helped GOS forces against the rebellion. ON THE NEXT ROUND OF DARFUR TALKS 3. (C) Obasanjo said that he had been in Darfur and met with President Bashir on January 8, and then flew to Libreville where Darfur was at the top of the AU peace and security summit agenda. He had stopped in Libya on the way, and made the point (again) to Qadhafi that everything done on Darfur politically must be within the Abuja talks framework. Qadhafi at the time was meeting with around 400 notables from Darfur, and kept Obasanjo waiting for an hour -- for the first time. Obasanjo said he would stop in Libya again on January 27 or 28 just before the AU Summit in Abuja to find out what Qadhafi had been up to since, and would be prepared to engage on the Tribunal at that point (assuming his question on how suspects would be identified had been answered by then). 4. (C) Obasanjo said he has decided to hold off re-starting the Darfur talks until the first week of February, to give SPLA leader Garang an opportunity to use his good offices with the various Darfur parties. Obasanjo said he was thinking of holding the next round of talks outside Abuja (although within Nigeria), to get the rebels away from the press. Without that distraction, he believed all sides might be able to come to agreement in about four weeks. He thought a four week period from the first week of February might also fit well with the north-south agreement implementation schedule in Sudan. Obasanjo had heard from Garang that the SPLA leader would go to Khartoum only after the new constitution had been passed by the National Assembly, which Garang thought would be in April, and Obasanjo thought holding the Darfur talks from the first week of February would allow them to feed into the constitution-making process. 5. (U) Minimize considered. CAMPBELL
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