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| Identifier: | 05PARIS285 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05PARIS285 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Paris |
| Created: | 2005-01-14 14:34:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | KNNP MNUC PARM PREL KTIA PHSA EWWT FR |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000285 SIPDIS STATE FOR NP/RA EYTHAN SONTAG; L/NP JULIE HERR AND L/LEI DENISE MANNING E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PREL, KTIA, PHSA, EWWT, FR SUBJECT: SUA CONVENTION: FRANCE NOT FULLY ON BOARD WITH U.S. NONPROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS REF: A) STATE 4828 B) 1/10/05 SONTAG-RECINOS E-MAIL Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, REASON 1 .4 B/D 1. (C) We delivered January 11 ref A points on proposed U.S. nonproliferation amendments to the Convention against the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) January 11 to Veronique Vouland, MFA deputy director for disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. She and Hugues de Longevialle, MFA desk officer following SUA, noted that the MFA's legal department had the lead on this issue and that their legal experts were in contact with their U.S. counterparts. The disarmament bureau has an advisory role, especially on nuclear proliferation aspects, they added. 2. (C) Vouland and Longevialle said that French interagency consultations on formulating a French position and a response are ongoing. Initial reaction, however, is that the U.S. proposals would need further refinement as there are several aspects they viewed as unclear. Vouland asked whether the U.S. planned for additional amendments and suggested that additional meetings, beyond the January 17 COMAR meeting, would be needed. In terms of our demarche, they shared the following points, which they noted were not exhaustive: -- Defining dual usage: a dual usage list would by definition vary, which raises questions of how to define the list and how to criminalize the transport of materials intended for manufacture or delivery of prohibited weapons. There will be a need to define clearly what is and isn't transportable, Longevialle stated. Additionally, he made the point that the final list or product would need to conform to the NPT. -- Non-state actors: while reiterating that the legal experts would have a final say, Longevialle observed that an agreement could only target the proliferator or transporter and could not sanction the destination country. (Note: Vouland and Longevialle did not directly address the issue of non-state actors, but did state that it was important to find a way to indict those that do not fall within legal categories/definition.) 3. (C) In a final comment, Vouland volunteered that France shares our view on the Canadian proposal dealing with transport of nuclear materials. The proposal would criminalize certain types of cases that ought not to be so defined, she concluded. Leach
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