US embassy cable - 05PARIS285

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SUA CONVENTION: FRANCE NOT FULLY ON BOARD WITH U.S. NONPROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS

Identifier: 05PARIS285
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS285 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-01-14 14:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL KTIA PHSA EWWT FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000285 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NP/RA EYTHAN SONTAG; L/NP JULIE HERR AND L/LEI 
DENISE MANNING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PREL, KTIA, PHSA, EWWT, FR 
SUBJECT: SUA CONVENTION: FRANCE NOT FULLY ON BOARD WITH 
U.S. NONPROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS 
 
REF: A) STATE 4828 B) 1/10/05 SONTAG-RECINOS E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, REASON 1 
.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) We delivered January 11 ref A points on proposed U.S. 
nonproliferation amendments to the Convention against the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA) January 11 to Veronique Vouland, MFA deputy 
director for disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation.  She 
and Hugues de Longevialle, MFA desk officer following SUA, 
noted that the MFA's legal department had the lead on this 
issue and that their legal experts were in contact with their 
U.S. counterparts.  The disarmament bureau has an advisory 
role, especially on nuclear proliferation aspects, they added. 
 
2. (C) Vouland and Longevialle said that French interagency 
consultations on formulating a French position and a response 
are ongoing.  Initial reaction, however, is that the U.S. 
proposals would need further refinement as there are several 
aspects they viewed as unclear.  Vouland asked whether the 
U.S. planned for additional amendments and suggested that 
additional meetings, beyond the January 17 COMAR meeting, 
would be needed.  In terms of our demarche, they shared the 
following points, which they noted were not exhaustive: 
 
-- Defining dual usage:  a dual usage list would by 
definition vary, which raises questions of how to define the 
list and how to criminalize the transport of materials 
intended for manufacture or delivery of prohibited weapons. 
There will be a need to define clearly what is and isn't 
transportable, Longevialle stated.  Additionally, he made the 
point that the final list or product would need to conform to 
the NPT. 
 
-- Non-state actors:  while reiterating that the legal 
experts would have a final say, Longevialle observed that an 
agreement could only target the proliferator or transporter 
and could not sanction the destination country. (Note: 
Vouland and Longevialle did not directly address the issue of 
non-state actors, but did state that it was important to find 
a way to indict those that do not fall within legal 
categories/definition.) 
 
3. (C) In a final comment, Vouland volunteered that France 
shares our view on the Canadian proposal dealing with 
transport of nuclear materials.  The proposal would 
criminalize certain types of cases that ought not to be so 
defined, she concluded. 
Leach 

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