US embassy cable - 05PARIS280

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR HOSTAGE WORKING GROUP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KPAO, PTER, IZ, FR 
SUBJECT: FRENCH EX-HOSTAGE DISCUSSES "PLANET BIN LADEN" 
 
REF: A. FBIS EUP20041227000250 
     B. PARIS 107 
     C. 04 PARIS 9048 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) Summary: Georges Malbrunot, one of two French 
journalists held hostage in Iraq for just over four months 
and released on December 21, recounted to Emboffs on January 
12 his experience in captivity and his surprise that his 
captors were not focused solely on combating Coalition forces 
in Iraq but rather, on the goals of radical Islam.  Though 
convinced at the outset of his captivity that the 
hostage-takers were only interested in Iraq, Malbrunot's 
thinking on this subject changed to the extent that the 
account he wrote of his captivity, which came out nine days 
after his release, is entitled "Malbrunot: I lived on Planet 
Bin Laden" (reftel).   End summary. 
 
2. (S/NF) Malbrunot, who works for the center-right daily 
newspaper Le Figaro, met with Emboffs at our request to 
discuss his captivity.  He and fellow ex-hostage Christian 
Chesnot, who works for state-supported Radio France 
Internationale, continue to be debriefed on the 
operational/technical details of their captivity by French 
intelligence, analysis of which will be sent through other 
channels. 
 
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ENGAGING THEIR CAPTORS 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) Georges Malbrunot and Christian Chesnot, two veteran 
French journalists reporting from Iraq, were kidnapped on 
August 20, 2004 by the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI).  According 
to Malbrunot, the two immediately stated in Arabic (both are 
fluent) that they were French journalists and had no 
connection with Coalition forces.  Luckily, no shots were 
fired and they were not physically harmed.  This contrasted, 
said Malbrunot, with treatment they witnessed of other 
hostages, including Macedonians, Lebanese and an official of 
Ahmad Chalabi's "INC" party (who Malbrunot said was later 
beheaded).  For example, they observed Lebanese hostages 
being blindfolded and shackled.  Though initially they were 
put in a small, dark room and made to sleep on the floor, 
their conditions soon improved and they were given blankets 
and food.  In keeping with the IAI's organized structure they 
observed throughout their captivity, they were told that 
their identity was being verified by a separate committee and 
that following this, their case would be judged by a "Islamic 
tribunal."  They were also questioned a number of times by 
IAI intelligence operatives.  At first, the IAI planned to 
execute their Syrian national driver, Mohamed al-Joundi, 
because of suspicion that he was a CIA spy sent to keep tabs 
on the two journalists and also due to a fake photo montage 
in Joundi's possession which showed him with an American 
general.  Malbrunot and Chesnot convinced their captors not 
to proceed with his execution, saying he was not a spy and on 
the contrary, was extremely anti-American, and had even 
turned down a scholarship to study in the United States. 
(Note: As reported ref B, Joundi has filed suit in French 
courts against U.S. military officials for alleged torture, 
while claiming that the IAI treated him well and was beyond 
reproach.  The suit is pending and awaits a judge's decision 
on whether to accept jurisdiction.  End note.) 
 
4. (C) In the first days of their captivity, Malbrunot and 
Chesnot believed that their captors were interested solely in 
"fighting the occupation," and that once it was clear to them 
that the French people and government were opposed to 
operations in Iraq, their liberation might be quick. 
However, the two eventually realized that the IAI was 
interested primarily in the goals of Salafism and other 
tenets of radical Islam, with Iraq being a target of 
opportunity because of the concentration and presence of 
Western forces.  It was around the time that the 
hostage-takers cited France's "veil" law (which forbids the 
wearing of 'ostentatious' religious symbols in French primary 
and secondary schools) as an impediment to the journalists' 
release that Malbrunot realized the IAI was not focused 
exclusively on the Coalition presence in Iraq.  Their captors 
often discussed their Islamic beliefs and told the two 
journalists that converting to Islam would increase their 
chances of being freed. 
 
5. (C) Malbrunot's captors said openly that they considered 
Osama bin Laden their "chief" and that their long-term goals 
were the restoration of the Caliphate, the battle with the 
West, and the installation of Islamic regimes in Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia.  Also, the journalist was surprised at the 
extent to which bin Laden was a reference point for the IAI. 
The leader of the group guarding them had spent time in 
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, a fact that 
increased the amount of deference he received from others. 
Malbrunot did not believe that the Iraqis holding him and 
Chesnot had been secular under Saddam and only recently had 
taken up the banner of radical Islam.  Rather, he surmised 
that some were ex-Baathists who had kept their Islamist 
leanings hidden under Saddam.  Others were likely longtime 
Islamists who had already been active in places like Samarra, 
though kept under tight control by the former regime, 
especially in the 1990s as Saddam tried to boost his Islamic 
credentials.  Their knowledge of France appeared dated - they 
spoke of the French war in Algeria and French participation 
in the 1990 Gulf War Coalition, another sign of pro-Saddam 
sympathy among some IAI members.  Paradoxically, other IAI 
members (presumably anti-Saddam) suspected the US was allied 
with Saddam and would soon restore him to power.  When 
Malbrunot said that was unlikely, they remained skeptical. 
His captors often mentioned the presence and influence of 
non-Iraqis in the IAI, especially Saudis and Yemenis, but 
Malbrunot never saw anyone but those he believed by their 
accents to be Iraqi. 
 
6. (C) The hostage-takers did not focus on subjects such as 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the presence of U.S. 
troops in the Middle East outside of Iraq.  Instead, said 
Malbrunot, they were consumed with what he termed "the logic 
of destruction."  Oftentimes, they would disappear during the 
day and come back later only to explain that they had been 
very busy placing bombs against the "occupiers" or destroying 
pipelines.  They never discussed plans or ideas for Iraq 
following the withdrawal of Coalition troops.  Their 
single-minded focus, said Malbrunot, was destruction, both in 
Iraq and outside.  To this end, they spoke of "bringing the 
fight to Europe," although they did not specify whether they 
meant recruitment, fund-raising or operations.  They also 
discussed the need to isolate the U.S. by driving a wedge 
between it and Europe. 
 
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RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS 
--------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Malbrunot's captors boasted that the IAI had 15,000 - 
17,000 adherents, a figure that the journalist found 
exaggerated.  They said that other terrorist groups in Iraq, 
including Zarqawi's Ansar al-Islam, shared their goals and 
methods, but that they did not coordinate strategy.  When 
targets of opportunity and coordination existed - for 
example, during the Coalition move on Fallujah - the Islamist 
groups did cooperate, but only on an ad hoc and operational 
level.  Malbrunot said he had been told that the IAI 
leadership were all based in Baghdad and furthermore, his 
captors appeared to take instructions from the capital.  He 
added that the IAI hostage-takers spoke of other Salafist 
groups such as the GSPC in Algeria and the GICM in Morocco, 
and said they belonged to the same "family," although the IAI 
didn't appear to have taken on the anti-French focus of the 
North African terrorist groups. 
 
8. (C) The journalist's Sunni IAI captors told him that their 
enemies were Coalition forces, the Shiites and the Kurds, 
although their focus was on operations against the Coalition. 
 Within the Coalition, they did not differentiate between the 
U.S. and others; to the IAI, all were "dogs" and subject to 
immediate execution.  Malbrunot said the IAI showed contempt 
as well for Ayatollah Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr, and viewed 
President al-Yawer as the "Queen of England," i.e. above 
politics and treated differently, but with no power. 
 
9. (C) Malbrunot told Emboffs that he believes they were 
captured as targets of opportunity.  He had stopped by the 
side of a road to place a satellite phone call to France, and 
believes they were spotted by the hostage-takers at that 
point.  Furthermore, he believes that, in general, all 
hostages in Iraq are taken as the opportunity and 
circumstances arise, and that only those at the highest 
levels are specifically targeted.  He said the "top 3" 
targets for the IAI were Iraqi PM Allawi, Defense Minister 
Hazem Sha'alan and former Iraqi National Security Advisor 
Mowaffah al Rubaiye. 
 
10. (C) Malbrunot's captors were particularly interested in 
French domestic reaction to the two hostages.  They were less 
interested in the international reaction organized by the 
French government, to include statements condemning the 
hijacking by Arab governments and even Hezbollah (who the IAI 
considered as sharing their beliefs and doing a good job 
fighting Israel despite being Shiite).  Nevertheless, 
Malbrunot believed that the international pressure helped, in 
that it made it easier for the IAI to consider entering 
negotiations with the French government to release them and 
helped boost the group's ego given its raised profile. 
 
--------------- 
LESSONS LEARNED 
--------------- 
 
11. (C) The hostage-takers were remarkably at ease in their 
surroundings, said Malbrunot.  Even during periods when the 
journalists were transferred to different areas, they never 
seemed worried that they would be apprehended or discovered 
by Coalition forces.  One place they stayed was on a farm 
with a family sympathetic to the IAI.  Only at the end, when 
transfer was imminent, did the hostage-takers seem nervous. 
Malbrunot believed this was because of a constant paranoia 
regarding plots and double-crossing.  Despite all evidence to 
the contrary, the IAI accused Malbrunot and Chesnot multiple 
times of working with the CIA and even suspected at one point 
that the French Ambassador to Iraq was a CIA agent. 
 
12. (C) During the first days of their captivity, Malbrunot 
and Chesnot asked questions of their captors.  However, the 
reaction of the IAI guards was very negative, and the French 
journalists decided to remain quiet and only respond when 
asked direct questions.  This seemed to work better, and some 
of their captors even began volunteering information. 
Malbrunot believes that his and Chesnot's fluency in Arabic 
was key to building a rapport with their captors, though he 
speculated that such an ability would do nothing to help an 
American or UK hostage, who would be killed regardless.  Even 
though they had no doubt that if the order arrived, the IAI 
guards would execute them, the journalists' ability to speak 
Arabic cut through some of the initial and subsequent 
suspicions. 
 
13. (C) Without offering specifics, Malbrunot said he 
believes the French government paid a ransom to free them. 
He applauded the actions of the GOF and specifically, the 
DGSE (the French external intelligence service), saying that 
in hostage situations, even democracies like the U.S. and 
France have to engage with unsavory characters.  He raised 
the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980s to seek the release of 
U.S. hostages in Lebanon as a past example.  Only the UK does 
not negotiate with terrorists, said Malbrunot.  He also 
praised the GOF's so-called "turban diplomacy" in securing 
condemnation of the kidnapping from Islamic extremist groups 
and clerics as a wise and effective strategy. 
 
14. (C) In closing, Malbrunot said he remained a pessimist 
regarding Iraq.  Saying "Iraqis are very tough to occupy" and 
the U.S. had made too many mistakes, he believed that the 
situation had little chance of improving soon.  He especially 
criticized the decision to dissolve Iraqi intelligence 
agencies, given that they had kept close tabs on Islamists 
during Saddam's reign and subsequently, much of that 
knowledge was lost. 
 
15. (C) Comment: Many in France share Malbrunot's initial 
belief that the insurgents in Iraq are focused primarily in 
forcing the departure of Coalition troops from Iraq and 
motivated by nationalist aspirations.  Malbrunot's discovery 
that, on the contrary, he was on "Planet Bin Laden" was, as 
he said, a surprise.  It may also have been surprising to a 
France that often appears to react differently to radical 
Islam depending on its distance from it.  Within its borders, 
it reacts proactively, with speed and harshness.  Elsewhere 
in the world, it is much more equivocal.  (For example, FM 
Barnier's decision to meet last September with extremist 
cleric Yusufal Qaradawi, who later called for the killing of 
Americans in Iraq without drawing a French rebuke.) 
Malbrunot's realization of the true nature of the insurgency 
may not change French intransigence on Iraq, but it may 
demonstrate to his readers the stakes involved and the risks 
to France.  End comment. 
 
16. (U) Minimize considered. 
Leach