US embassy cable - 05ANKARA242

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ANKARA 000242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2025 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PREF, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: TRILATERAL TALKS ON PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 82 
     B. 04 ANKARA 6809 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (a), (b), (c), (d) 
. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) U.S., Turkish, and IIG officials met Jan. 11 in Ankara 
for trilateral talks on PKK/Kongra-Gel.  All sides agreed to 
our common resolve to defeat this organization, but the 
insurgency and Iraq's delicate transition all but rule out 
direct military action in the near term.  At U.S. suggestion, 
Turkey and Iraq will hold expert talks (possibly with the 
U.S. as well) after the Iraqi election to determine the 
current state of both countries' laws and procedures to 
cooperate effectively in arresting and extraditing 
PKK/Kongra-Gel members.  The Turks and Iraqis also agreed to 
establish a mechanism for sharing intelligence, though the 
Turks asked that for now the U.S. pass information to the 
Iraqis.  The Turks presented both the Iraqis and us with a 
non-paper of eight "non-military" requests for action, though 
most require significant police action and are likely not 
feasible in the short term.  They agreed to provide through 
other channels location information for PKK/Kongra-Gel media 
in northern Iraq as well as for PKK/Kongra-Gel's front office 
in Mosul. 
 
2. (C) Summary, cont.: In a bilateral U.S.-Turkish meeting 
the same day, the U.S. side pushed back against high Turkish 
expectations for action in northern Iraq given the 
insurgency.  The Turks did not push us as hard as they could 
have and seemed determined to produce a positive outcome. 
They said they were encouraged by what they heard from the 
Iraqis but doubted Iraqi capability and Iraqi Kurdish 
intentions.  Overall, the Turks are probably disappointed 
with the result of this meeting (as the senior military 
representative to the talks late told PolMilCouns), but 
hopefully will spin the admittedly limited results to mollify 
public opinion.  End summary. 
 
3. (SBU) On Jan. 11, Turkish, IIG and U.S. officials met in 
Ankara for the first trilateral meeting on PKK/Kongra-Gel. 
The U.S. delegation was led by EUR DAS Amb. Laura Kennedy, 
accompanied by Embassy Baghdad Pol-Mil Counselor Amb. Ronald 
Neumann,  Maj. Gen. Henry Stratman of MNF-I, and DCM. 
Special Coordinator for Iraq Amb. Osman Koruturk led the 
Turkish delegation; MFA Under Secretary Hamid Bayati led the 
IIG delegation.  (Full list of participants in para. 22.) 
The three delegations all made opening statements, followed 
by a TGS presentation on PKK/Kongra-Gel's current activities, 
followed by a discussion.  The Turks presented the Iraqis and 
us with a non-paper requesting eight "non-military" steps 
against the organization, and all three sides agreed to a 
positive press statement. 
 
Turkey Not Seeking Immediate Military Action 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) The Turkish side emphasized that it was not using this 
meeting to demand direct military action against the 
PKK/Kongra-Gel at this time.  In his opening statement, 
Koruturk was careful to thank the U.S. for what we have done 
as a Turkish ally against PKK/Kongra-Gel, and noted that the 
level and composition of the Iraqi and U.S. delegations was a 
demonstration of both countries' political commitment to this 
issue.  He said that the U.S. and Turkey have worked together 
to isolate this terrorist organization.  Defeating the 
PKK/Kongra-Gel, he added, would prove to the world that 
terrorism has no future as a route toward political aims. 
 
5. (C) Though PKK/Kongra-Gel "is disintegrating," Koruturk 
added, Turkey estimates there are still 3,000-3,500 militants 
in northern Iraq, and that 200-250 of them control the 
Makhmour refugee camp.  PKK/Kongra-Gel is still planning and 
carrying out attacks in Turkey, and its two front parties in 
Iraq--the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party and the 
Democratic Establishment Party (aka Democratic Construction 
Party)--are on the ballot for the Jan. 30 Iraqi elections 
(ref b).  PKK/Kongra-Gel's continued presence in northern 
Iraq has taken on a "political dimension" within Turkey and 
resonates strongly with the public.  Koruturk urged all sides 
to work together toward an "action-oriented plan" to correct 
the Turkish public misperception of a double standard in the 
GWOT. 
We Agree: PKK/Kongra-Gel Is Our Common Enemy 
-------------------------------------------- 
6. (C) DAS Kennedy opened by emphasizing the common starting 
point for the discussion: PKK/Kongra-Gel is the common enemy 
of Iraq, Turkey, and the United States.  The U.S. is Turkey's 
closest ally in the fight against this organization.  We have 
designated it under its many names as a terrorist 
organization, provided more than $10 million to Turkey in 
anti-terrorism assistance, shared intelligence, successfully 
lobbied the EU to designate the PKK and its successors as 
terrorist organizations, and worked with other countries to 
deny funding for these terrorists.  The U.S. is committed to 
eliminating PKK/Kongra-Gel wherever it exists.  Kennedy 
emphasized that all three countries' public diplomacy must 
present a united front.  "Not to do so," she said, "provides 
aid and comfort to the enemy."  Finally, she noted that in 
order to finally defeat PKK/Kongra-Gel in Iraq, we must 
continue to work together on the overarching goal of a 
stable, democratic Iraq. 
 
7. (C) Amb. Neumann pointed out that the real key to victory 
will be the full return of sovereignty to a legitimate 
government in a stable Iraq.  The current reality on the 
ground is that we are engaged in a major struggle against the 
insurgency.  Jan. 30 elections will turn a page, but the 
struggle will continue and it will absorb our resources for 
some time.  There are still things we can do, however; the 
constraints upon us do not lessen our determination. 
PKK/Kongra-Gel knows that we will arrest them if they appear; 
this is likely what keeps them confined to Qandil Mountain. 
Yet the Turkish press routinely reports--completely 
erroneously--that we meet with these terrorists.  These 
reports feed the Turkish people's misapprehensions; we hope 
others will also deny these reports and thus diminish their 
impact. 
 
8. (C) IIG MFA Under Secretary Bayati stated that 
PKK/Kongra-Gel "is a real and common threat," and noted 
Iraq's objective to fight terrorism around the world.  Iraq 
seeks a better relationship with Turkey in all aspects, and 
thus the IIG believes this issue is of utmost importance. 
Bayati said that the IIG inherited terrorist groups in Iraq 
that Saddam had used to seek to destabilize his neighbors. 
Iraq's policy is not to allow any terrorist organization safe 
haven within its borders, but this can only be implemented 
once Iraq's forces are capable of enforcing this policy. 
Iraq wants to stop cross-border raids emanating from its 
territory, but it needs intelligence information from Turkey 
to do this.  On Makhmour, Iraq will seek to discourage 
PKK/Kongra-Gel activity in and around the camp and encourage 
a voluntary repatriation process for its residents.  In this 
regard, perhaps Turkey could extend its limited amnesty 
program.  Bayati added that it will be important to engage 
KRG authorities in this effort; he said that KRG has 
committed to follow whatever steps the Iraqi government 
agrees to. 
 
Turkish Military: Shutting Them Down Is Easy 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Following a short TGS brief on the current status of 
PKK/Kongra-Gel, the Turkish side responded to the U.S. and 
Iraqi remarks.  Brig. Gen. Kenan Husnuoglu said that we 
should not be complacent that PKK/Kongra-Gel is weakening. 
The Turks believe that its recruits among Iraqis increased in 
2004, as did its financial resources due to racketeering and 
extortion activities in northern Iraq.  PKK/Kongra-Gel does 
not expect its two front parties to be successful in the Jan. 
30 elections, he claimed; the organization rather looks at 
these parties "as an investment in the future."  Maj. Gen. 
Mehmet Eroz of TGS J3 averred that steps such as closing 
PKK/Kongra-Gel front party offices and preventing them from 
running in elections could be easily accomplished. 
 
Turks Seek Extraditions, Closure of TV and Radio Stations 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
10. (C) Koruturk rejected extending limited amnesty at this 
time to PKK/Kongra-Gel terrorists.  Turkish citizens should 
be returned to Turkey for prosecution, third-country 
nationals should be sent home to face trial, and Iraqi 
PKK/Kongra-Gel members should "be isolated so they cannot 
threaten others," he said.  The Makhmour residents do not 
need an amnesty program, he pointed out, they need protection 
from PKK/Kongra-Gel intimidation.  Koruturk noted that 
PKK/Kongra-Gel is able to broadcast television and radio 
programs, and requested joint action to shut down these 
operations.  (NOTE: The Turks are working through other 
channels to provide us location and other specific 
information on PKK/Kongra-Gel media in northern Iraq.  END 
NOTE.)  Koruturk added that Interpol has identified 17 
PKK/Kongra-Gel leaders with Interpol "red warrants."  Iraq 
therefore has a legal obligation to arrest and extradite 
(sic) these people.  Bayati agreed with regard to those 
PKK/Kongra-Gel terrorists who are subjects of Interpol 
warrants, but the Iraqi Justice Ministry representative added 
that for other suspects Turkey would need to present evidence 
of their crimes to the relevant Iraqi authorities in order 
for the Iraqis to make arrests.  The same holds true for 
Turkish desires to close down offices of parties it claims 
are PKK/Kongra-Gel fronts: Turkey would need to present 
evidence.  On this point, Koruturk responded that the Turkish 
side would present such evidence to the Iraqis before they 
leave Ankara. 
 
Agreed Steps: Legal Talks, Intel Sharing 
---------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Amb. Neumann recommended that Iraqi and Turkish legal 
experts meet to determine the answers to these questions in 
terms of this kind of bilateral cooperation; the U.S. can 
assist with legal or other technical issues.  The Turkish and 
Iraqi sides agreed to this idea, and will hold such a meeting 
after the Iraqi elections.  (NOTE: Turkish MFA told us Jan. 
12 that they understand U.S. experts will also attend this 
meeting.  END NOTE.)  Koruturk noted that Iraq and Turkey 
signed a bilateral convention on judicial cooperation in 
1985; its experts may wish to review this treaty to see if it 
is adequate to deal with these issues.  Additionally, the 
Turkish and Iraqi sides agreed to establish an 
intelligence-sharing mechanism on PKK/Kongra-Gel.  The Turks 
asked, however, that until they establish such a mechanism 
the U.S. continue to facilitate the sharing of intelligence 
with the Iraqis. 
 
12. (S) DAS Kennedy welcomed the idea of a legal experts 
meeting (we had previewed this idea with the Iraqi 
delegation).  She added that the U.S. is compiling evidence 
in order to designate PKK/Kongra-Gel's front parties in Iraq 
as terrorist organizations, that we continue to work with 
Turkey and third countries to publicize the PKK/Kongra-Gel 
threat and cut off funding, recruitment, training, and 
transit in and through these countries.  We believe 
Turkish-Iraqi intelligence-sharing would be valuable, and 
reminded the Turks that we have in the past made certain 
offers for enhanced surveillance that the Turks may wish to 
reconsider.  We also seek more information from the Turks and 
others on PKK/Kongra-Gel broadcasting and other activities in 
Europe and elsewhere.  Finally, as an EU candidate now ready 
to begin accession negotiations, Turkey is in a renewed 
position of strength to bring PKK/Kongra-Gel activities in 
Europe to the EU's attention.  We will work together with 
Turkey in these efforts. 
 
ISF Capabilities 
---------------- 
 
13. (C) Maj. Gen. Stratman noted that the ISF's ability to 
deal with PKK/Kongra-Gel is not necessarily a distant 
prospect.  He described how the recent surge in the 
insurgency has prompted the plus-up of coalition forces in 
northern Iraq.  Additionally, Iraqi National Guard and police 
are entering Mosul in strength to reestablish control for 
Jan. 30 elections.  In taking on the insurgents in Najaf and 
Fallujah, we went in heavily with coalition forces assisted 
by ISF, took down the insurgency, and left ISF in place to 
maintain law and order.  We will deploy the same model in 
Mosul.  Overall, the ISF are made up of 25 battalions; in six 
months this will increase to 45.  These battalions are 
similar to the Turkish Jandarma in terms of capability.  In 
this scenario, the Iraqi (and MNF-I) ability to act in 
northern Iraq on actionable intelligence will be increasing 
in the near term.  Providing security in and around Makhmour 
would be a suitable mission for ISF under the incoming Iraqi 
Transitional Government. 
 
Bilateral Turkish-U.S. Meeting 
------------------------------ 
 
14. (C) In a bilateral meeting later Jan. 11 between the U.S. 
and Turkish delegations, the Turks took a somewhat harsher 
line.  While Koruturk said that "of course it is wrong" to 
say that the U.S. is doing nothing to deal with 
PKK/Kongra-Gel, he stated that this is the Turkish public 
perception.  This perception also includes the belief that 
the U.S. is passing off the problem to the Iraqis.  Noting 
that this issue comes up in every discussion of U.S.-Turkish 
relations, he urged us to work with the Iraqis and Turks to 
take the steps outlined in the Turkish non-paper.  He added 
that in his view the Iraqi delegation showed solid resolve to 
cooperate on this issue.  DAS Kennedy rejoined that the GOT 
must help in this regard; its officials must reach out to 
journalists and discount ridiculous stories that we are 
working with PKK/Kongra-Gel, for example.  The GOT should 
seek to shape public opinion by extensive backgrounding; 
Koruturk agreed this is important. 
 
15. (C) Amb. Neumann urged the Turks to proceed with 
technical legal discussions, and pointed out one possible 
pitfall the Turks should be aware of.  Under new Iraqi law 
Iraqi authorities can only detain suspects if they have a 
legal case against them.  Thus MNF-I keeps a number of 
detainees--clearly people we do not want released yet not 
people against whom we can yet make a case in court--because 
the Iraqis could not hold them themselves.  Thus the Turks 
need to explore in advance whether the Iraqis will be in a 
position to detain PKK/Kongra-Gel suspects, even if the are 
indeed the subject of an Interpol warrant.  DAS Kennedy 
pointed out that in terms on intelligence sharing, the Turks 
will need to identify clearly to us what information we 
should share with the Iraqis and what Turkey would prefer we 
do not share.  The Turks agreed. 
 
16. (C) MFA DG for Security Affairs Hayati Guven emphasized 
that there are high expectations among Turkish officials and 
the Turkish public regarding these talks and the need for 
U.S. action in northern Iraq.  He noted that the first thing 
Minister Gul asked about the trilateral talks was what 
concrete proposals resulted.  Amb. Neumann responded firmly 
that Turkey must measure its expectations against the war we 
are currently fighting in Iraq.  We have had to send five 
battalions to Mosul to deal with an insurgency that has left 
200 dead bodies in the streets to intimidate the population. 
Insurgents have murdered both the Deputy National Police 
Commissioner and the Governor of Baghdad Province in the past 
week.  We have had to increase our presence in Iraq from 
130,000 to 160,000 troops.  If we fail in Iraq Turkey will 
have a much bigger problem next door than it currently does. 
If Turkish expectations are unreasonable, we will get into a 
cycle where we cannot help each other. 
 
17. (C) The U.S. side requested several items.  First, noting 
our current activity in Mosul, Amb. Neumann asked that the 
Turks provide ASAP as much information as possible on 
PKK/Kongra-Gel terrorists who are active there.  (Note: The 
Turks claimed they did not have significant information on 
their Mosul activities, but will endeavor to try.  END NOTE.) 
 Second, DAS Kennedy asked that Turkey share information on 
its discussions with the Europeans on PKK/Kongra-Gel 
activities so that we can coordinate our approaches.  Kennedy 
also requested that Turkish counterterrorism officials keep 
the IMU/Islamic Jihad a priority focus as these individuals 
are targeting the U.S. in Central Asia.  The Turks agreed to 
do so. 
 
18. (C) The Turks closed by expressing serious concern about 
the credibility and willingness of the KRG to assist in 
taking down PKK/Kongra-Gel as well as concern that the ITG 
may still not be in a position to take effective steps in 
this area.  Finally, they added that a U.S. failure in Iraq 
will be a failure for the West and thus also for Turkey. 
While Turkey believes the U.S. must win, "there is still no 
excuse for a double standard." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
19. (C) As he did with trilateral discussions on trucker 
security, Koruturk ran this meeting professionally and cut 
off his own delegation members when they wandered into 
unrelated areas.  He also took pains to thank the U.S. for 
what we have done to deal with PKK/Kongra-Gel.  His comments 
suggest that--as we have noted for some time--the GOT is 
feeling public pressure that it has not delivered on its 
pledge to push us to take kinetic action against 
PKK/Kongra-Gel.  (NOTE: Throughout the talks the senior 
Turkish military representative--TGS Deputy J3 Maj Gen Mehmet 
Eroz--took a notably tougher line with us on PKK/Kongra-Gel. 
TGS also uses the absence of U.S. action as a stick to beat 
up the moderate Islamist ruling AK Party, which it thoroughly 
dislikes.  END NOTE.)  At the same time, the Turks feel 
genuine frustration that the U.S. pledged to take action 
against PKK/Kongra-Gel in Iraq and has so far failed to do 
so.  In that sense, the Turks will likely be disappointed 
with the limited outcome of this meeting.  The trilateral 
meeting was a Turkish effort to manage widespread criticism 
on this subject, but the pressure for action in Iraq will 
certainly continue.  How the Turks proceed next in the short 
run may very well depend on how the press and the Turkish 
people respond to the outcome of this meeting and others to 
come.  End comment. 
 
Turkish Non-Paper 
----------------- 
 
20. (C) Koruturk presented both sides with a non-paper 
listing eight "non-military" steps the U.S. and Iraq could 
take against PKK/Kongra-Gel.  We note that almost every item 
would require significant law enforcement action on the part 
of the already-stretched ISF. 
 
BEGIN TEXT (note: internal paragraph numbering) 
 
NON PAPER 
 
1. PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorist elements in Iraq who are Turkish 
citizens shall be repatriated to Turkey; first and foremost 
the members of the leadership. 
 
2. It is crucial that these PKK/KONGRA-GEL members not be 
allowed to enter any third country, not to be granted asylum 
and be repatriated to Turkey.  To that effect, the United 
States of America shall support the Turkish representations 
in the capitals of third countries. 
 
3. PKK/KONGRA-GEL members who are Iraqi citizens shall be 
disarmed and barred from affiliation with any political 
institutions and/or political activity in Iraq. 
 
4. PKK/KONGRA-GEL members who are citizens of a third country 
shall be expelled from Iraq. 
 
5. PKK/KONGRA-GEL members should not be allowed to join the 
Iraqi public entities and state institutions. 
 
6. All mass media activities of the terrorist organization, 
including radio and TV broadcastings shall be prevented. 
 
7. Necessary precautions shall be taken to put an end to the 
safe haven that the PKK/KONGRA-GEL is benefiting in Iraq and 
the terrorist organization shall be denied any logistic and 
financial support. 
 
8. The dissolution of the Makhmur Camp in Iraq shall be 
treated as a part of the process of elimination of 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL from Iraq.  PKK/KONGRA-GEL members in the 
aforementioned Camp shall be treated as stipulated above in 
order to allow the rest of the residents to express their 
free will for return to Turkey. 
 
Ankara, 11 January, 2005 
 
END TEXT 
 
Joint Press Statement 
--------------------- 
 
21. (U) BEGIN TEXT 
 
JOINT PRESS RELEASE 
(Ankara, 11 January 2005) 
 
A tripartite meeting was held among delegations comprising 
high level representatives of the Republic of Turkey, the 
United States of America and the Republic of Iraq in order to 
discuss the essentials of cooperation towards the termination 
of the terrorist threat against Turkey originating from 
Northern Iraq, and elimination from the region of the 
terrorist elements causing this threat.  Delegations included 
civilian and military authorities of the three countries 
attending the meeting. 
 
Both Iraqi and Turkish delegations agreed to have future 
meetings and bilateral cooperation regarding the fight 
against terrorist groups including the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 
 
The United States welcomed this enhanced bilateral 
cooperation between Turkey and Iraq and underscored its own 
commitment to also work bilaterally with Turkey and third 
countries to combat the PKK/KONGRA-GEL around the world. 
 
In this first tripartite meeting on cooperation aimed at 
realizing the aforementioned objective, the parties endorsed 
the need for effective international cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism, discussed the measures that are needed for 
the elimination of the terrorist organization PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
and its affiliates in northern Iraq, and agreed that the 
formulation and implementation of those measures be monitored 
through continuing tripartite meetings at appropriate levels. 
 
END TEXT 
 
List of Participants 
-------------------- 
 
22. (U) U.S. Delegation: 
 
EUR DAS Amb. Laura Kennedy 
Pol-Mil Counselor Amb. Ronald Neumann, Embassy Baghdad 
Maj. Gen. Henry Stratman, MNF-I 
DCM Robert Deutsch, Embassy Ankara 
Brent Hartley, Acting Deputy Coordinator, S/CT 
Doug Silliman, Deputy Director, EUR/SE 
Tom Spang, Counterterrorism Analyst 
Stephen Epstein, NEA/I 
Lisa Heald, OSD 
LTC Eric von Tersch, JCS J5 
LTC Robert Hopkins, EUCOM J5 
LTC Michael Groen, EUCOM Intelligence Planner 
Jeremiah Howard, Senior Pol-Mil Officer, Embassy Baghdad 
MAJ Ryanovic, MNF-I 
MAJ Leiberger, MNF-I 
COL Rick Ramirez, ODC Turkey 
LTC Larry Allan Elza, ODC Turkey 
CPT Jude Register, ODC Turkey 
Charles O. Blaha, Deputy Political Counselor, Embassy Ankara 
LTC Thomas Mooney, Liaison Officer to Turkish Special Forces 
in northern Iraq 
LTC Randy Smith, Asst. Army Attache, Embassy Ankara 
David Burger, Pol-Mil Officer, Embassy Ankara 
James Sopp, Political Officer, Embassy Ankara 
 
Turkish Delegation: 
 
Amb. Osman Koruturk, GOT Special Representative for Iraq 
Amb. Selahaddin Alpar, MFA Director General for U.S. and the 
Americas 
Amb. Hayati Guven, MFA Director General for Security Affairs 
Maj. Gen. Mehmet Eroz, TGS/J3 
Brig. Gen. Kenan Husnuoglu, TGS/J2 
Tunc Ugdul, MFA Deputy Director General for Multilateral 
Affairs 
Suna Ilicak, MFA Deputy Director General for the Americas 
Selim Akyildiz, General Directorate of Security Head of 
Department 
Cemal Uzgoren, Turkish National Intelligence Organization 
Huseyin Avni Botsali, MFA Head of Iraq Department 
 
Iraqi Delegation: 
 
Hamid Bayati, MFA Under Secretary 
Amb. Taha Sukur Mahmoud, MFA 
Lt. Gen. Mohammed Naksibendi, Ministry of Defense 
Sabah Jassim Mohammed, MFA 
Vedat El Kaysi, Ministry of Justice 
Zine Jafer Hassan, MFA 
Hisham el Shebib, Prime Ministry 
Iraqi Ambassador to Turkey Sabah Omran 
DCM Abdullah Munthir, Iraqi Embassy in Ankara 
Omer Merani, KDP Representative in Ankara 
KRG Representative 
23. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Kennedy, Amb. Neumann, 
and Maj. Gen. Stratman. 
24. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN