US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE74

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, NL, CU, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/CUBA/EU: EU LIKELY TO CHANGE POLICY 
HOPING TO FORCE CUBA'S HAND 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 48 
 
     B. STATE 4900 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Following up reftels demarche, Poloff met January 13 
with Jan Jap Groenemeyer (MFA, Cuba Desk), who confirmed the 
January 31 GAERC would likely approve relaxing the EU's June 
2003 measures to encourage more positive movement from the 
Cubans; the EU Presidency is drafting "conclusions" for that 
meeting now.  Noting the Cubans are "stubborn and proud," he 
was surprised they had already "defrozen" relations with the 
all EU missions in Havana despite the fact that the June 2003 
measures were still technically in place.  Spain continued to 
lead on the issue; impetus for a change in EU policy had come 
from the GOS, which wanted to reverse the Aznar June 2003 
measures and in doing so had attracted adherents to the 
argument that the current EU strategy was not working, he 
said.  (They have not attracted the USG, Poloff countered.) 
For the time being, consensus remains an important EU goal 
vis-a-vis Cuba.  Groenemeyer added that when the EU changes 
the policy as expected, we should look for high level visits 
to Havana, at the Commissioner/Minister/Director General 
level, at which time the EU would raise human rights concerns 
in detail.  The first test for a new EU position related to 
national days would be the March 25 commemoration of Greek 
national day. 
 
2.  (C)  Groenemeyer expected that the GAERC would call on 
the Cuban government to release the rest of the 75 jailed 
dissidents.  "The Cubans know they have to do something,"  he 
said.  From experience, however, he expected them to respond 
with half-measures, releasing some but not all, thereby 
presenting the EU with a dilemma when they revisit the 
situation in June.  At that time, he could anticipate that 
harder line EU members (like the Dutch) would want to say "I 
told you so" and demand a return to a tougher EU stance.  One 
such response, Groenemeyer revealed, could be the publishing 
of an EU "black list" of Cuban officials prohibited from 
traveling to the EU, an idea he said the Dutch presented 
earlier this year but that had been set aside as "before its 
time." 
 
3.  (C)  The dissidents should anticipate "greater access to 
the EU" out of the a revised EU policy.  Havana based Heads 
of Mission (HOMs), chaired by the Dutch representing the EU 
Presidency, would meet soon to devise strategies for 
deepening dialogue, Groenemeyer said.  When pressed for 
reaction to the USG's ref B points, he would not comment 
specifically on all of them but promised to fax them directly 
to the Dutch rep in Havana for placement on the agenda of 
discussions there.  He thought it unlikely, however, that the 
EU would agree to invite USINT reps to the monthly meetings 
of the EU's human rights working group in Havana.  It could 
give the Cubans an excuse to continue arguing that "the EU is 
just in the pocket of the USG."  Poloff disagreed, saying 
that appearances of a common USG/EU stance against Castro 
could have obvious benefits.  Groenemeyer suggested that a 
"good cop" EU twinned with a "bad cop" USG might be more 
effective. 
 
4.  (C)  Turning to broader issies, Groenemeyer said the EU 
continued to look beyond immediate sanctions.  He observed 
that the stricter USG controls (e.g., limits on remittances) 
seemed to be having a negative impact on the Cuban economy 
but not on Castro, "who does not give a damn about Cuba, sits 
in his palace, and dreams about trips to North Korea."  With 
this in mind, the EU has in addition to the "June measures" 
its Common Position on Cuba, and Groenemeyer hoped the USG 
would keep the two EU tracks separate. The June measures were 
short term, a reaction to a GOC outrage designed to show 
support for the dissidents.  Longer term, the "Common Policy" 
aims to lay the groundwork for an eventual peaceful 
transition post-Castro and strives to improve the economic 
well-being of Cubans now. The EU will review its Common 
Policy, also in June but separately from the review of the 
short term measures.  EU HOM's in Havana will report on the 
conditions in the country, and these reports will form the 
basis for the EU's review of the Common Policy, he said. 
SOBEL