US embassy cable - 05AMMAN297

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 000297 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PRM AND NEA 
CAIRO FOR CHEYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2015 
TAGS: PREF, PREL, PTER, EAID, MOPS, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: NO MAN'S LAND REFUGEES FACE POOR SECURITY 
CONDITIONS 
 
REF: A. DECEMBER 6 AMMAN REFCOORD WEEKLY AREA REPORT 
     B. 04 AMMAN 7529 
     C. 03 AMMAN 4306 
 
Classified By: Charge David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Seven-hundred fifty asylum seekers formerly 
resident in Iraq have been in the no-man,s land at the 
Jordan-Iraq Al Karama border crossing since April 2003.  In 
the absence of concrete assurances that they will have 
somewhere to go after Jordan, the GOJ fears admitting them to 
a camp inside Jordan proper at Ruwaished would create another 
long-term refugee population.  UNHCR and its implementing 
partners are struggling to provide basic services after an 
insurgent attack targeted U.S. and GOJ installations in the 
no-man,s land.  GOJ border officials worry the refugee camp 
offers potential cover to insurgents, and are pressing their 
Interior Minister to move it to a more isolated location also 
within no-man,s land (NML).  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Amman and Baghdad-based regional refugee 
coordinators made a joint monitoring trip to UNHCR refugee 
camps on the Jordan-Iraq border December 15 to assess 
UNHCR,s operations, and to verify whether a second stream of 
refugees leaving the UNHCR's Al Tash camp near Ramadi are 
attempting to enter Jordan.  They discussed border security 
separately with Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate 
(GID) officials based at Karama, the Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordination Center (HACC) in Jordan, Amman-based UNHCR 
Jordan and UNHCR Iraq HQ Representatives, and Jordan,s 
Prince Rashid, Chair of GOJ implementing partner, the 
Hashemite Charitable Organization (HCO), December 16-27. 
Additional reports on the services UNHCR and its implementing 
partners are providing in both Jordan-Iraq border camps, and 
the root causes of the latest Al Tash outflow will be sent 
septel. 
 
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THE REFUGEES 
------------ 
 
3. (C) As reported in reftels, a core group of several 
hundred Iranian Kurds (mainly from Al Tash camp) -- along 
with smaller number of self-identified Iranian oppositionists 
and about 70 Arabs of various nationalities who were resident 
in Iraq before April 2003 -- have been seeking temporary 
asylum in Jordan. The GOJ admitted 386 of the Palestinians 
with family ties to Jordanians in August 2003.  It also 
allowed about 200 Palestinians without those ties to enter 
the UNHCR camp that was set up in Ruwaished in anticipation 
of hostilities with Iraq, along with a handful of Iranians 
that the GOJ wanted to monitor as suspected MEK.  However, 
Jordan has resisted admitting the Iranian Kurds because it 
regards them as a potential long-term refugee population.  As 
of December 27, NML was home to 664 Iranian Kurds, five 
Iranians claiming to be oppositionists, two Iranians with no 
political affiliation and 67 Palestinians, Iraqis and Arabs 
"returned" to the NML for various reasons detailed in 
reftels.  UNHCR keeps no political data on the non-Kurd 
Iranians but UNHCR,S Jordan Representative confided that one 
claims to be a royalist, one a communist, one a KDP-I 
supporter, one Fidayeen al Khalq (FKI) and one MEK.   UNHCR 
has found that only about 100 do not meet its profile for 
third-country resettlement, contrary to Ref. C.  Although 
UNHCR has started to secure third-country resettlement 
options for some of the Al Tash Kurds in NML (ref A), we and 
UNHCR Jordan assume the population will remain stable through 
mid-2005 due to a boycott that disrupted individual screening 
(para 5). 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
THE PROTECTION PROBLEMS AND NEW SECURITY THREAT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (SBU) UNHCR and its implementing partners in the NML camp 
-- the Jordanian Hashemite Charitable Organization (HCO), 
which took over management of all of the border camps in 
March 2003, and CARE, which provides community services -- 
were struggling to provide adequate protection for vulnerable 
camp residents, and some services for the larger camp, when 
refcoords visited December 15.  UNHCR's border field staff 
and its Amman-based Representative admit that poor security 
conditions have disrupted their operations for the past two 
months. The NML camp,s location in the 2-km wide strip 
between the Iraqi and Jordanian border posts at the Karama 
crossing has created a legal black hole, hampering UNHCR and 
HCO efforts to protect the camp,s residents, and to maintain 
some normal services.  NML camp, established under Jordan,s 
March 2003 MOU with UNHCR, is technically on Jordanian 
territory.  However, until three weeks ago (see para 5), the 
MOI maintained the camp was in Iraq, in order to quell 
growing fears in Jordan of a large refugee inflow.  UNHCR and 
HCO staff claim that they have struggled to keep refugees 
from selling food and commodities to the hundreds of trucks 
that queue at the border each day, despite the fact that one 
boy was killed after getting caught in a truck wheel.  UNHCR 
and HCO staff are also frustrated that GOJ prosecutors have 
determined that they cannot charge under Jordanian law three 
camp residents whom they believe committed rape, nor one 
Iraqi resident who was caught torturing a woman by suspending 
her upside down by wire from a tent pole. 
 
5. (SBU) As reported in ref A, UNHCR Jordan Representative 
Sten Bronee believes that this "climate of lawlessness" 
contributed to a boycott of non-essential camp services by 
the self-appointed Iranian Kurd camp committee organized to 
pressure UNHCR to focus their efforts exclusively on 
third-country resettlement.  The boycott was enforced by 
blocking entry of UNHCR and CARE staff to the camp by means 
of  physical threats.  MOI refused UNHCR,s request to post 
security at the camp until late November, when HCO intervened 
after camp residents threatened to extend their strike to 
essential food, water and medical services.  The Iranian Kurd 
camp committee agreed to allow UNHCR staff to reenter the 
camp on November 26, after border officials explained to them 
that their verbal and physical threats violated Jordanian 
law.  According to Bronee, MOI also agreed at that time to 
extend to NML the security cost sharing arrangement it 
currently has with UNHCR in Ruwaished camp in order to 
establish a permanent national police presence to monitor the 
camp perimeter and to guard UNHCR offices during resettlement 
screening interviews.  UNHCR Jordan has secured funding from 
UNHCR Geneva to cover these costs, but is still awaiting a 
proposal from the Ministry of Planning. 
 
DECEMBER 3 ATTACK 
----------------- 
 
6. (C) Threats to nearby Jordanian border security offices 
and U.S. military facilities have also disrupted services in 
the NML camp, located in a 120,000 square meter rectangle 
approximately 1.5-km from U.S. Marine and Army units posted 
at the border.  Heavy traffic, including large convoys 
supporting the U.S. effort in Iraq, runs on the busy 
Amman-Baghdad highway through the Al Karama crossing.  One 
side of the perimeter fence is located less than 100 feet 
from the highway.  The vulnerability of this location was 
demonstrated December 3, when two suicide car bombs, 
originating in Iraq, targeted U.S. and GOJ installations in 
the no-man,s land.  The first vehicle detonated near the 
U.S. Marine position on the Iraqi side of the frontier.  The 
second, which failed to explode, ran off the road about 50 
feet from the NML camp fence.  According to GID officials at 
the border, the second driver was aiming for a line of oil 
tankers at the checkpoint queuing to leave Jordan.  The 
driver fled into the NML camp where he was captured with the 
help of the refugees.  U.S. Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordination Center border liaison officers told refcoords 
December 16 the failed attack could have caused significant 
damage and loss of life in the camp.  The Jordanian Director 
of General Intelligence at the Karama Border crossing, Lt. 
Col. Al Sharafat (strictly protect), explained that Jordanian 
officials must perform thorough screening because the Dulaimi 
tribal officials who monopolize positions in the Iraqi border 
services in this part of Iraq are corrupt and do not search 
the hundreds of vehicles leaving Iraq daily, putting the camp 
and his own facilities in danger.  Al Sharafat, who has been 
at Al Karama for the last two years, said the current 
security situation was the worst he had seen. 
 
7. (C) The Marine position 1.5-km east of the camp has 
engaged in three firefights with insurgents in the last 
month.  Refugees also told visiting refcoords that two 
strangers dressed in black had infiltrated the camp the 
previous night.  UNHCR suspects the incident may have been a 
robbery as one of its storage facilities  was ransacked, but 
GID took the report seriously enough to shut down the border 
for several hours.  The camp residents fear retaliation for 
their role in apprehending one of the December 3 attackers. 
Female residents organized a peaceful demonstration at the 
entrance for two weeks after the December 3 VBIED attack 
asking for improved security.  Rather than pressing for 
third-country resettlement, all female residents who 
approached refcoords requested that camp safety be improved. 
 
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CARE AND UNICEF UNWILLING TO WORK IN NML 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Camp staff are also increasingly unwilling to travel 
through the Al Karama border crossing.  CARE has suspended 
its work in the NML until the Jordanian authorities improve 
security.  They explain that without diplomatic status they 
feel particularly vulnerable queuing at the crossing to reach 
the camp.  Sten Bronee also told refcoord December 21 that he 
suspects that the two loan ICMC and ICRC staff seconded to 
his office, who were working as resettlement officers at the 
border, broke their assignments early as a result of the 
deteriorating conditions at the NML.  UNICEF provides primary 
and intermediate schooling for children in Ruwaished camp, 
but has long refused to work in the NML because Jordan does 
not clearly recognize it as Jordanian territory. 
 
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THE GOJ,S RESPONSE 
------------------ 
 
9. (C) The GOJ is increasing security at NML camp in response 
to the December 3 attack.  National police 
requested by UNHCR are patrolling the camp perimeter, and 
border officials are digging a trench with a dirt berm two or 
three meters high on the highway shoulder to control access 
to the camp.  Border officials have also started construction 
on a new checkpoint that would move vehicle inspections about 
500 yards further away from the camp.  However, Lt. Col. Al 
Sharafat revealed that border officials fear the NML camp 
could offer cover to future attackers, and have sent a 
recommendation to the Interior Minister to shift the NML camp 
5 km south, to an isolated location also within no man,s 
land.  He privately expressed doubts the 5-km move would 
improve the situation.  While moving the camp might mitigate 
the impact of an explosion on the highway, it would not, in 
his opinion, remove the residents far enough to be out of the 
reach of insurgents who might want to target the camp, 
intimidate its residents, or use it as a staging point. The 
HCO Camp Manager of NML said a forced relocation would plunge 
camp management into another standoff with residents; he 
recalled that following flooding last summer, the refugees 
had protested relocating the camp to higher ground as an 
attempt to "stabilize" them in the no-man,s land. 
 
10. (C) UNHCR Jordan,s Representative told Amman Refcoord 
December 21 that he opposes, on security and financial 
grounds, the proposal to move the NML Camp within the 
no-man's land.  Bronee explained that he is eliminating nine 
positions because UNHCR Geneva cut his requested operational 
budget (which comes from the special Iraq appeal) by 29%.  He 
said that it cost UNHCR $113,000 to relocate the NML camp 
last summer.  While Bronee added that Jordan should be 
pressed to uphold fully its first asylum responsibilities, 
his contentious relationship with Interior Minister Habashneh 
limited his effectiveness.  Bronee said that the Minister of 
Planning might be a possible alternative.  COMMENT: We will 
continue to encourage UNHCR Jordan to use this approach.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
--------------------- 
THE POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
--------------------- 
 
11. (C) In a December 27 meeting, Prince Rashid told Amman 
refcoord that he had used the December 3 attack to press King 
Abdullah to allow him to identify a safer location for the 
NML camp, noting that transfer to Ruwaished would be the most 
logical and cost effective solution but would require careful 
handling to achieve.  He explained that he had meant to press 
the issue earlier, but had been consumed setting up HCO,s 
ongoing operations in Bam and Darfur and had already been 
accused by a senior GOJ official of "appointing himself 
Governor of Ruwaished."  However, Rashid said he felt 
compelled to intervene in the situation because of the 
"personality conflict" between Interior Minister and UNHCR's 
Representative.  Rashid argued that the Interior Minister is 
"willing to listen to reason, but must have a face-saving 
option."  He proposed arranging a joint meeting with the PM, 
the MOI and the HCO 
to discuss the NML camp,s relocation the first week of 
January. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
12. (C) UNHCR, HCO and refcoords in the NEA region believe 
the NML arrangements are neither adequate nor were intended 
to be long-term.  Recent security concerns, and the fact 
UNHCR can no longer support two 
separate border operations with special Iraq appeal funding, 
suggests that a way must be found to resolve the lingering 
problem at the NML camp.  Earlier hopes UNHCR would 
reestablish operations inside Iraq and open a camp in 
northern Iraq to support the NML population no longer appear 
realistic.  We share Prince Rashid,s assessment that senior 
Jordanian officials will not agree to admit the NML refugees 
into Jordan proper without concrete assurances that they will 
be re-settled in third countries or returned to Iraq by a 
date certain.  Therefore, our focus should be on insisting 
that UNHCR develop a more realistic strategy on camp 
management. 
 
13.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
HALE