US embassy cable - 05MADRID109

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, SP, NATO 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: NO DECISION YET ON ISAF STAGE II 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
REF: STATE 02743 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRS BOB MANZANARES; REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel points to Deputy National 
Security Adviser Maria Jesus Alonso on 1/11, following up on 
recent Embassy calls on Alonso and other GOS officials to 
encourage Spanish participation in ISAF Stage II through 
leadership of a PRT.  Poloff stressed the importance of the 
issue to the USG and to NATO of Spanish participation at a 
substantive level.  Poloff said that the USG had been 
confused by mixed signals regarding Spain's readiness to 
participating in NATO expansion into western Afghanistan.  On 
the one hand, we understood from our GOS interlocutors in 
Madrid that President Zapatero has made no decision regarding 
the scope and nature of the Spanish deployment in ISAF II and 
that Spain's new requirement of "consultations" with 
Parliament prior to new deployments presented a further 
political complication.  However, in NATO/ISAF councils, 
Spanish officials indicated a readiness to proceed with new 
deployments, including a possible PRT.  Specifically, Spanish 
officials on a recent scouting mission to Afghanistan seemed 
prepared to support a doubling of the Spanish deployment to 
1,000 troops and perhaps to take on a PRT in Qaleh-ye and/or 
the Herat FSB.  The USG took this to mean that Spain is 
leaning towards leading a PRT. 
 
2. (C) Alonso said that Spain understood its commitment to 
the NATO mission in Afghanistan and would continue to 
participate in that mission.  She emphasized that the 
composition of Spanish forces would be based primarily on the 
recommendations of the MFA and MOD.  While she hadn't yet 
seen the recommendations of the Spanish team that visited 
Afghanistan January 7-10, she said their input would be 
important in operational terms.  Alonso said she did not 
expect the requirement for consultations with Parliament to 
be a problem, except with respect to timing since Parliament 
does not reconvene until the first week in February.  She 
cautioned, however, that the GOS had to bear in mind public 
skepticism of Spanish involvement in virtually any military 
mission, which Afghanistan certainly was despite the 
humanitarian component.  Also, she suggested that Spain's 
recent deployment to support tsunami relief operations in 
Indonesia (594 troops, five airplanes, two helicopters, a 
medical unit, and several ships) had stretched Spanish 
manpower and resources, which might present a problem GOS 
planners hadn't forseen with repect to the GOS contribution 
to Afghanistan.  The mission in Indonesia is currently 
expected to last two months. 
 
3. (C) Poloff also delivered reftel points to MFA Deputy 
Director General for Foreign Policy Felix Costales and noted 
our confusion regarding Spain's position on leading a PRT. 
Costales said that a PRT would be a very new type of project 
for the GOS and that there were ongoing internal discussions 
regarding the composition of a Spanish-led PRT.  Most 
importantly, Spain did not want a primarily military PRT such 
as those led by the U.S. and the UK, but instead wanted to 
emphasize the humanitarian aspect of such a mission.  Like 
Alonso, Costales noted that Spain's delivery of aid and 
assistance to victims of the tsunami disaster presented a 
possible complication for Spain's contribution to ISAF Stage 
II. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
4. (C) We have heavily lobbied the GOS at all levels of the 
MOD, MFA, and the President's staff to lead a PRT and/or 
other important missions in Afghanistan.  General B. B. Bell 
made a strong pitch to Spanish officers on the margins of a 
1/10 visit to his NATO counterpart in Madrid.  While the GOS 
military is clearly anxious to take on a larger role, their 
political leaders are far more cautious.  In a recent meeting 
with Charge, National Security Adviser equivalent Carles 
Casajuana was adamant that no new Spanish deployment could 
move forward without Parliamentary approval.  Spain's 
contribution to tsunami relief operations is a new twist and 
could tempt the GOS to further delay a tough decision on its 
participation in ISAF II.  We will continue to push the GOS 
hard on this issue, but recognize that their strong aversion 
to operations that could result in military casualties is a 
very significant impediment.  Zapatero's officials are well 
aware that the popularity of his government is based mainly 
on his reversal of former President Aznar's unpopular 
decision to deploy Spanish forces to Iraq.  The GOS does not 
want to give the opposition a similar opportunity. 
MANZANARES