US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU439

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000439 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS, DS/OP/NEA, DS/ITA AND DS/ATA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2012 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, EAID, ASEC, NP 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH INSPECTOR GENERAL OF 
POLICE RANA 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 0379 
 
     B. (B) KATHMANDU 0410 
     C. (C) KATHMANDU 0184 
     D. (D) KATHMANDU 0209 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON MAHONEY.  REASON:  1.5(B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) In a Feb. 26 meeting with the Ambassador, Inspector 
General of Police Pradip SJB Rana blamed previous Nepali 
Congress Party governments for creating circumstances that 
led to the current Maoist insurgency.  Rana said he welcomed 
the deployment of the Royal Nepal Army in fighting the 
insurgency, but blamed the Home Ministry for not sufficiently 
supporting the police.  He requested USG assistance, 
including funding for training and equipment for a new 
hospital, to help the police meet the increased challenges 
they face.  He promised to increase security around the 
Coca-Cola facilities in Kathmandu and Narayangadh.  End 
summary. 
 
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RANA THANKS AMBASSADOR FOR SUPPORT; 
NOTES LACK OF SAME FROM GON 
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2.  (U)  In a Feb. 26 meeting with the Ambassador, Inspector 
General of Police Pradip SJB Rana expressed gratitude for the 
Ambassador's speech the previous day, which received 
front-page coverage in the local press (septel), condemning 
Maoist attacks against security forces in Achham and Salyan 
Districts (Refs A and B).  Rana told the Ambassador his 
remarks had given a "real morale boost" to the dispirited 
police, who lost 111 of their colleagues in the attacks.  The 
Ambassador extended his condolences for the men lost to the 
IGP, but noted that the police in both districts had fought 
bravely against overwhelming numbers of attackers from the 
other side.  In the past, Rana said, Maoists would typically 
overrun isolated police posts, either killing or forcing the 
surrender of all policemen at the site.  Over the past few 
months, however, the police have had some victories, either 
holding out (as in Salyan District) against the assault, or 
repelling the attackers (as in Panchthar District - Ref C). 
He added that while police had sustained heavy casualties 
during the Achham attack, police fighting in the District 
police headquarters were able to hold out against their 
attackers until morning. 
 
3.  (C)  Rana said it had been agreed that the Royal Nepal 
Army (RNA) will be given responsibility for coordinating all 
actions taken by all three branches of Nepal's security 
forces--the RNA, the Armed Police Force, and the civilian 
police.  Rana described cooperation received by the RNA so 
far as very good, contrasting it unfavorably with the 
perceived lack of support from his own Home Ministry.  He 
said he welcomed the involvement of the RNA in fighting the 
insurgency since the Nov. 26 declaration of the state of 
emergency.  Before the emergency, the Government of Nepal 
(GON) viewed the insurgency as strictly a police problem. 
"We were fighting alone for six years," he said, noting that 
655 policemen have died since the onset of the insurgency. 
Now, however, with the RNA and APF sharing responsibility for 
addressing the insurgency, it is now recognized as what it 
always was--a national problem. 
 
4.  (C)  In fact, Rana charged, the roots of the Maoists' 
uprising are political, arising from "the misbehavior of the 
government against them."  Some of the present-day Maoists, 
like Baburam Bhattarai, had tried participating in mainstream 
politics (Note:  as part of the United People's Front) in the 
early 1990s, but Nepali Congress harassment of UPF activists 
after they won nine seats in the 1991 elections drove them 
underground. 
 
5.  (C) Rana expressed frustration with the attitude 
displayed by civilian government employees during the Feb. 
22-23 nationwide strike declared by the Maoists (Ref B). 
High-ranking GON officials had criticized him for his failure 
to stop observance of the strike (or "bandh"), even though 
they themselves complied with the Maoist-imposed bans 
vehicular travel those days.  How are the police to 
discourage general observation of the strike when prominent 
Secretaries and Joint Secretaries of GON ministries 
 
SIPDIS 
themselves were seen walking, rather than driving, to work on 
bandh days, he wondered.  Although the police cannot force 
people to drive or to open their shops, senior GON employees 
could play a role by setting an example for the rest of the 
population, he suggested.  He agreed that an overall sense of 
fear in the wake of the violent attacks in Achham and Salyan 
had likely been critical in influencing the general 
public--including GON officials--to observe the strike. 
 
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AID NEEDED 
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6.  (SBU)  The GON has set up a provident fund for survivors 
of slain policemen that includes schooling for two children 
and a payment of USD 9,000 for the widow.  (Note:  The 
typical policeman's salary is approximately USD 54 dollars a 
month.)  Individual policemen also contribute out of their 
own pocket to a benevolent fund for families of policemen 
killed or injured in the line of duty.  Rana said he had 
already built a police hospital in Nepalgunj with the funds. 
Since his  resources covered only construction costs, 
however, the building is virtually empty, with little to no 
equipment or furniture.  He asked if the USG might be able to 
provide funding for this effort.  The Ambassador said he 
would look into the matter.  Rana also asked for continued 
USG support for police training, adding that no Nepali 
candidates have been given a seat at the FBI Academy over the 
past five years. 
 
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MORE SECURITY FOR COCA-COLA 
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7. (SBU)  Rana reported little progress in tracking down the 
perpetrators of two minor bombing incidents at Coca-Cola 
facilities in Kathmandu and Narayangadh (Ref D and previous). 
 He said he had recommended to the Managing Director that he 
hire ex-police or former RNA soldiers as security guards, 
rather than the inexperienced young men now employed.  The 
GON is also considering plans to provide an "industrial 
security police force" to businesses threatened by the 
insurgency.  At the Ambassador's request, he agreed to 
increase police security around the two facilities. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (C)  Rana seemed to take great pains to discount rumors 
of tensions--many of them due to competition for scarce 
budgetary resources--between the RNA and the civilian police, 
emphasizing instead his disenchantment with the GON.  His 
comments decrying the lack of civilian leadership, especially 
during the recent bandh, make him sound increasingly like his 
RNA counterpart, Chief of Army Staff Prajwalla SJB Rana. 
Reports of human rights violations by police have declined 
significantly since the IGP's sixteen-month tenure--a 
tangible indication that he is trying hard to improve the 
quality of an under-equipped, inadequately trained police 
force that has lost much of the public's esteem over the six 
years of the Maoist insurgency.  End comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
MALINOWSKI