US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO94

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000094 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, AEMR, EAID, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Tsunami 
SUBJECT: TFXO01:  GOVERNMENT/LTTE RELIEF COORDINATION 
REPORTEDLY GOOD, DESPITE BAD PRESS 
 
REF: COLOMBO 0017 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Coordination between Government and Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) relief efforts on the ground, 
especially in the east, remains adequate, according to UN and 
foreign diplomatic sources, despite recent allegations and 
counter-allegations in the local press of obstructionism 
and/or mismanagement.  Reports of uneven aid distribution 
seem more likely to be attributable to Government 
inefficiency and logistical constraints, or to deliberate 
misinformation, than to a calculated effort to target relief 
to a particular community.  Tamil radio broadcasts on January 
11 reported the LTTE had no objection to U.S. military 
participation in relief work in Sri Lanka.  The Embassy has 
been unable to verify speculation in the local press that the 
December 26 tsunami killed Tiger leader Prabhakaran.  End 
summary. 
 
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MUDSLINGING, BICKERING FOLLOWS 
POST-TSUNAMI GOODWILL 
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2.  (U) The devastation of the December 26 tsunami evoked 
rare expressions of camaraderie and communal harmony in a 
country torn by 21 years of ethnic insurgency.  In a public 
address on December 28 Chandrika Kumaratunga underscored the 
need for all ethnic groups to work together, saying, "We must 
all stand together.  It is not possible for any one community 
alone to rebuild this country."  Not to be outdone, 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief Prabhakaran 
sounded a similarly high-minded note when he was quoted on 
the LTTE Peace Secretariat website the following day offering 
condolences to "our Muslim and Sinhala brethren in the 
Sinhala coastal areas . . . who have lost kith and kin and 
are in deep sorrow."  A January 2 interview on the pro-LTTE 
website TamilNet with Bhanu, the LTTE Eastern military 
commander, carried unconfirmed reports of Sri Lanka Army 
soldiers who had been dragged into the sea by the tidal wave 
being saved by LTTE cadres, as well as uncharacteristic words 
of praise for Special Task Force (STF) aid to civilians and 
coordination with the LTTE. 
 
3.  (SBU) These initial calls for amity seem to be wearing 
thin, as more customary accusations and counter-allegations 
of malfeasance are beginning to surface more frequently in 
the local press.  By the second week after the disaster, 
local English and Sinhala media were carrying largely 
unconfirmed stories of LTTE interference in relief efforts in 
the north and east, while the Tamil media were alleging 
Government mishandling/rerouting of relief supplies intended 
for Tamil communities in the north and east.  Pro-LTTE 
sources have also claimed that the Marxist Sinhalese Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Government's largest coalition 
partner, has commandeered supplies for Tamil communities and 
redirected them to Sinhalese communities in the south and 
Trincomalee.  Representatives of Muslim communities in the 
east, on the other hand, have complained to emboffs of spotty 
and unreliable aid distribution in their constituencies.  As 
usual, the truth behind these much-hyped stories is difficult 
to determine.  In response, the Human Rights Commission has 
appointed a panel, headed by Ceylon Bank Director Lionel 
Fernando, to monitor distribution of relief in the north and 
east. 
 
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COORDINATION IN EAST SEEMS ALIVE AND WELL 
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4.  (C) Despite the grousing in the media, contacts in the 
INGO and diplomatic community indicate that coordination 
between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the LTTE, at 
least in the east, is adequate, although some jockeying for 
authority/credit/responsibility still occurs.  In Trincomalee 
(where the Sinhalese, Muslim and Tamil populations are 
roughly equal), for example, the pro-LTTE Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) and the Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) participate side by side with the JVP in the 
GSL-appointed district coordinating committee, which is 
headed by the Government Agent.  According to USAID/OTI staff 
in the district, the coordinating committee appears to be 
working well, and assistance is reportedly flowing well, even 
into LTTE-controlled areas.  (Indeed, since much of the 
LTTE-controlled area in Trincomalee lies along the coast, 
Tiger territory is reportedly getting a substantial amount of 
the aid available.)  While there have been no significant 
complaints of GSL or LTTE malfeasance or obstructionism at 
the district level, there have been some reports of 
bottlenecks in distributing aid to individual 
communities--snafus that seem more likely attributed to 
systemic GSL inefficiencies and logistical constraints than 
to any intentional design to bypass particular groups. 
(Note:  One exception appears to be the Sinhalese nationalist 
JVP.  An aid worker in Trincomalee recounted stories of the 
JVP diverting aid intended for Tamil communities, which are 
concentrated along the coast, to Sinhalese Buddhist 
communities farther inland.  End note.)  The World Food 
Program representative reported attending a recent meeting in 
Batticaloa in which he observed the Government Agent and an 
LTTE representative working out the details of delivering and 
distributing aid in Tiger-controlled areas.  Diplomatic 
colleagues in several European missions reported similar 
stories. 
 
5.  (C)  In an effort to reduce pilferage and improve 
security, control of camps for people displaced by the 
tsunami was recently turned over to the Sri Lankan 
 
SIPDIS 
military--a move that routed the TRO from its secure position 
within camps in the east and ruffled LTTE feathers.  The TRO, 
local government officials and other NGOs had been working 
together well in the camps, an INGO representative declared. 
Another source in the aid community reported that the LTTE 
had been carrying on active recruiting in the camps, which 
house a number of orphaned children who could be particularly 
vulnerable to such pressure.  While the TRO has not been 
banned from the camps, Major General Sumit Balasuriya, the 
Sri Lanka Army General Officer Commanding in Trincomalee, has 
set new ground rules for TRO operation, e.g., the 
organization may not show pro-LTTE films, distribute 
propaganda or spend the night in the camps. 
 
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SOME COOPERATION AT CENTER; 
SITUATION IN NORTH STILL HAZY 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) The extent of destruction and the number of 
casualties in LTTE-controlled areas in the north remain 
difficult to assess.  Accounts on the LTTE website likely 
underreport the degree of destruction and numbers of deaths 
among Tiger cadres.  In the tsunami-affected northern 
districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, where the LTTE 
wields complete control, the opportunities for interaction 
and coordination between the GSL and Tigers are minimal. 
Wallaya Pura, UNHCR Representative, a.i., said her 
organization has asked the Sri Lankan Air Force to allow an 
aircraft provided by a foreign donor to fly relief supplies 
into LTTE-controlled territory in the north.  So far, Pura 
said, the GSL has not responded.  (Note:  The Director of 
Operations for the Air Force told DATT on January 12 that he 
was not aware of such a request.  End note.)  A positive 
reply would be a true litmus test of the GSL's 
much-reiterated willingness to cooperate, in Pura's view. 
7.  (C) The LTTE's monolithic authority, if nothing else, 
streamlines relief operations.  According to UNDP Resident 
Representative Miguel Bermeo, LTTE-run relief efforts are 
more efficient than their GSL-run counterparts.  However 
efficient these operations may be, that the LTTE has made 
overtures to the GSL to improve coordination at the central 
level, as President Chandrika Kumaratunga told the Ambassador 
in a January 6 conversation, suggests that the task of 
reconstruction is too great for the LTTE to handle alone.  On 
January 12 Peace Secretariat head Jayantha Dhanapala told the 
Ambassador and DCM that the government began reaching out to 
the LTTE immediately after the disaster.  Dhanapala said that 
he had participated in several working-level meetings with 
the LTTE on relief coordination, which he described as 
progressing well, on such subjects as rehabilitation of the 
coastal area. 
 
8.  (C) Amid much speculation in the local media that the 
LTTE would protest U.S. military participation in relief 
efforts, a Tamil-language radio broadcast on January 11 
reported Tiger sources asserting that the LTTE has no 
objection to U.S. forces' presence in Sri Lanka for relief 
purposes.  In an interview with AFP on January 11, Tiger 
political chief Thamilchelvan expressed similar sentiments, 
stating that U.S. military participation is "understandable 
in a situation of human disaster."  (These statements track 
closely with Reftel comments made by the LTTE Peace 
Secretariat head last week.)  Local Sinhala media have also 
 
SIPDIS 
recently begun speculating that LTTE chief Prabhakaran might 
have been killed when the tidal wave hit Mullaitivu.  (Note: 
Prabhakaran is habitually reclusive; his absence from the 
public scene over the past two weeks does not necessarily 
indicate death or injury.  On the other hand, Sri Lankan 
military sources have told DATT that Prabhakaran was known to 
have been in Mullaitivu, which suffered extensive damage from 
the tsunami, on December 25.  End note.) 
 
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ANNAN ASKED NOT TO GO NORTH? 
----------------------------- 
 
9. (C) The January 7-8 visit of UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan spurred a minor brouhaha after the GSL turned down a UN 
suggestion that he visit Tiger "headquarters" to review 
relief efforts in the north.  President Kumaratunga indicated 
to the Ambassador on January 6 that the GSL, worried that the 
visit would give the Tigers legitimacy as a quasi-separate 
state, was working actively to discourage the request.  Peace 
Secretariat head Dhanapala told the Ambassador and DCM on 
 
SIPDIS 
January 12 that a UNSYG visit to LTTE territory was a 
fundamental sovereignty issue on which the GSL would not 
waver.  He was quite critical of UN efforts to make it 
happen.  Publicly, however, the GSL has denied reports that 
it scotched the request, asserting instead that the UN 
decided on Annan's itinerary independently.  UNDP's Bermeo 
told emboffs privately that he viewed the GSL's rejection as 
a "lost opportunity." 
 
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COMMENT 
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10.  (C) The unprecedented magnitude of the natural 
catastrophe elicited unprecedented expressions of mutual good 
will and pledges of cooperation from the GSL and LTTE.  Now 
that the initial shock is over, a sense of normalcy is slowly 
returning--and with it, unfortunately, the usual bickering, 
accusations and recriminations that characterize Sri Lankan 
political discourse.  For the Tigers, accusing the GSL of 
mismanagement makes financial, as well as political, sense. 
The humanitarian disaster--and the (unproven) claim that the 
GSL is not providing for Tamils--will likely prove a better 
fundraising theme among the Tamil diaspora than the peace 
process, and the Tigers have every reason to continue harping 
on it.  Behind the rhetoric, however, coordination appears 
largely to be working well at the local level.  This--along 
with the LTTE/GSL quiet effort to improve communication at 
the central level--indicate that the Tigers may have been 
harder hit by the tsunami than they are willing to admit 
publicly.  Before the disaster, the peace process had been 
stalled for so long and the parties had adopted such 
uncompromising positions that many observers were beginning 
to look for signs of rigor mortis.  If nothing else, the 
tsunami, despite its dreadful human toll, could provide a 
 
SIPDIS 
face-saving pretext for a fresh start back to the peace 
table, but it will not happen anytime soon.  The modest yet 
successful collaboration reported between the GSL and LTTE at 
the local level, if steadily continued, could offer a useful 
foothold from which to make the first step. 
 
LUNSTEAD