US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN44

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

ARMENIA SEEKS USG PERMISSION TO SELL WEAPONS TO IRAN

Identifier: 05YEREVAN44
Wikileaks: View 05YEREVAN44 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Yerevan
Created: 2005-01-12 12:42:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PARM PREL AM IR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T YEREVAN 000044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM, EUR/PRA AND EUR/CACEN 
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP/EURASIA (LATIF) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2015 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, AM, IR 
SUBJECT: ARMENIA SEEKS USG PERMISSION TO SELL WEAPONS TO 
IRAN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Evans for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (U) This telegram contains an action request.  Please see 
para 7. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
2.  (S/NF) On January 11, Armenian Defense Minister Serzh 
Sargsian asked the Ambassador what the U.S. view would be on 
a potential weapons sale to Iran.  Sargsian said that the 
GOAM is under increasing pressure from Iran, which recognizes 
Armenia's isolation.  He reiterated Armenia's dedication to 
ongoing cooperation with the U.S. to combat terrorism and the 
proliferation of WMD.  The Ambassador responded that the U.S. 
still viewed Iran as the number one state sponsor of 
terrorism.  He thanked Sargsian for approaching the USG 
before it made any decision and said he understood Armenia's 
need to tend its relations with Iran.  He agreed to pass on 
the request, but said that Washington's view of any transfer 
of weapons to Iran would certainly be negative.  End Summary. 
 
3.  (S/NF) Armenia's Defense Minister sought a one-on-one 
meeting with the Ambassador following a January 11 meeting on 
other defense-related issues (septel).  Sargsian told the 
Ambassador that the GOAM had been approached by Iran 
regarding the sale of an anti-air missile system.  Sargsian 
characterized the S-75 system as antiquated, surplus 
equipment and noted that Armenia had just decommissioned a 
couple of them; proceeds from the sale would be welcome as 
the MOD budget is facing shortfalls. (Note: open sources 
state that the S-75 or SA-2 Guideline was converted by Saddam 
Hussein's Iraq into a short-range ballistic missile.  End 
Note.)  Sargsian stressed that the system was "defensive." 
 
4.  (S/NF) Sargsian said that Armenia was under increasing 
pressure from Iran to expand relations.  Armenia's borders 
with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain closed and Armenia is 
dependent on Iran as a source of imports.  Sargsian explained 
that for an extended period when access to goods via Georgia 
was limited because of unrest, Iran was Armenia's lifeline. 
Sargsian said that Iran's ambassador in Yerevan sought to 
meet with him almost every two weeks and was stepping up the 
pressure for the MOD to visit Tehran. 
 
5.  (S/NF) Sargsian said that Armenia remained committed to 
working with the USG to combat terrorism and was cooperating 
with the U.S. on the border with Iran to contain the spread 
of WMD.  Armenia will continue to ensure full transparency 
with the U.S. in its relations with Iran. 
 
6.  (S/NF) The Ambassador thanked Sargsian for bringing the 
potential weapons sale to our attention before a deal was 
concluded and agreed to forward it immediately to Washington 
for consideration and response.  But the USG continued to 
consider Iran as the number one state sponsor of terrorism 
and a U.S. approval of a weapons sale to Iran would be 
extremely unlikely. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
7.  (S/NF) Request Department guidance on how to respond to 
Sargsian, including a description of how ILSA would affect 
Armenia should the GOAM decide to proceed with the sale. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (S/NF) While Sargsian's approach shows a certain degree 
of naivete or at least unfounded optimism, his readiness to 
vet this sale with us also demonstrates that he values the 
relationship with the USG.  While we anticipate Washington's 
negative reaction to this sale, we note that, at present, 
Armenia has little choice but to develop its relationship 
with Iran.  If we approach this relationship with some 
understanding, we should be able to maintain some leverage. 
We want to encourage Armenia to maintain her policy of 
transparency regarding relations with her southern neighbor, 
and would like to forestall her sliding into an even more 
intimate embrace with Tehran. 
EVANS 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04