US embassy cable - 05ANKARA198

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MAIN OPPOSITION CHP LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE -- IS CHP CHAIRMAN BAYKAL FINISHED?

Identifier: 05ANKARA198
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA198 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-01-12 08:09:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PINS TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: MAIN OPPOSITION CHP LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE -- IS CHP 
CHAIRMAN BAYKAL FINISHED? 
 
REF: A. 04 ANKARA 6841 
 
     B. 04 ISTANBUL 01729 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons 1.4 
(b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Istanbul Sisli Mayor Mustafa Sarigul's 
challenge to Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz 
Baykal is the most serious challenge to Baykal's leadership 
in recent years.  Yet Sarigul's bid is more than just the 
struggle between two men for the control of the second 
largest political party in Turkey.  It is also a struggle 
over the relationship between "social democracy" in its 
Turkish variant and Turkish "secularism".  In either event, 
as long as CHP remains in opposition we see no willingness to 
change its cheap, paranoid anti-American rhetoric.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) The CHP extraordinary party convention, ostensibly set 
for 29 January, is billed as a final showdown between CHP 
leader Deniz Bakyal and CHP Sisli Mayor Mustafa Sarigul.  The 
two men have been fighting for control of the party for 
several months, with Sarigul leading political rallies around 
the country and Baykal accusing Sarigul of corruption. 
Fourteen CHP deputies called for Deniz Baykal's resignation 
last week in the aftermath of the decision by the CHP Supreme 
Disciplinary Board (YDK) to reject Baykal's corruption 
charges against Sarigul.   Baykal responded by accusing 
Sarigul of bribing the YDK; claiming that corruption is rank 
within the party -- thereby simultaneously undermining his 
own claim to the party leadership and further denigrating the 
party's image in the eyes of the public -- and calling for a 
special party convention. 
 
3. (C) Sarigul's challenge to Baykal is more than just the 
struggle between two men for the control of the second 
largest political party in Turkey.  It is also a struggle 
over the future of "social democracy" as understood in 
Turkey, especially the relationship between that movement and 
Turkish "secularism".  Baykal, his inner circle, and the 
majority of CHP parliamentary deputies are left-of-center, 
elitist, "secular" politicians who are uncomfortable with the 
presence of Islam in the public sphere (ref A).  Thus, 
according to CHP internal opposition figures like Istanbul MP 
Hasan Aydin and former CHP Secretary General Ertugrul Gunay, 
the party has alienated itself from the majority of Turkey's 
voters, who are generally more conservative and who resent 
CHP's scornful attitude toward visible manifestations of 
Islam.  Indeed, they note, this is a chronic problem, given 
that CHP has been unable to win more than 20 percent of the 
vote since 1977. 
 
4. (C) Sarigul, in contrast, portrays himself in a carefully 
choreographed way as an observant Muslim and he won over 70 
percent of the vote in his race to become mayor of the mixed 
"secular" and more pious Sisli in March 2004 (ref B).  He has 
asserted to his supporters that if he were elected leader of 
the party, CHP would win over 40 percent of the vote in the 
next parliamentary election and become the majority party in 
Turkey.  (Comment.  Absent an unforeseen meltdown in ruling 
AK Party it is impossible for Sarigul to turn CHP's fortunes 
around so quickly, but it is widely believed that CHP cannot 
recover broad support as long as Baykal remains as the leader 
of the party.  End Comment.) 
 
5. (C)   Sarigul very publicly attends Friday noon prayers. 
He has very publicly spent municipality funds to fix up 
Muslim, Jewish, and Christian religious facilities in his 
municipality.  He has also used municipality funds to take 
religious groups on tours of Islamic sites in Edirne and 
Konya.  Aydin claims -- without giving any details -- that 
Sarigul has support among members of two leading Turkish 
religious societies, the Naksibendi brotherhood and the lodge 
of Fethullah Gulen.  Sarigul's supporters see him as CHP's 
observant but "secular" answer to PM Erdogan.  His critics, 
however, claim he is arrogant, untalented, corrupt, and 
overly authoritarian. 
 
6. (C) Baykal's ability arbitrarily to manipulate CHP rules 
and machinery makes it more difficult to predict the outcome 
of the current struggle.  Erol Cevikce -- a former CHP State 
Minister and longtime Embassy contact on intra-CHP politics 
who correctly predicted two weeks ago that the YDK would not 
convict Sarigul -- estimates that 700-800 of the 
approximately 1,200 party delegates are currently in the 
pro-Baykal camp.  He also believes, however, that the wind is 
blowing in Sarigul's favor.  Cevikce claims that Sarigul will 
muster 30,000 supporters to rally outside the party 
convention hall and pressure the delegates to back Sarigul. 
Cevicke also believes that the delegates' own political 
ambition may aid Sarigul.  Many delegates want to be elected 
to parliament or other public offices, where they anticipate 
they can benefit from Sarigul's pork barrel largesse, and 
they believe that their chances are dim as long as the 
unpopular and elitist Baykal remains the leader of the party. 
 
7. (C)  Cevikce also noted that -- despite Baykal's public 
statement and press reports to the contrary -- the party 
administration has not yet officially announced an 
extraordinary party convention, raising the possibility that 
Baykal's announcement was just a ruse to expose would be 
challengers.  Cevicke suggested that Baykal may be planning 
additional political maneuvers -- such as purging the YDK and 
having a new YDK remove Sarigul from the party -- before 
calling a new party convention to deal with remaining 
challengers to his leadership. 
 
8. (C) There is also the possibility of a dark horse 
candidate emerging at the party convention.  Several 
candidates have been mentioned in the press, including Kemal 
Dervis, Ertugrul Gunay, Hursit Gunes, Zulfu Livaneli, Haluk 
Koc, and Hikmet Cetin.  Dervis, a former World Bank VP and 
Economy Minister 2001-mid-2002, and Hikmet Cetin, an 
establishment Kurdish baron who is currently NATO civil 
representative to Afghanistan and is a former speaker of 
parliament and FonMin, have publicly declared that they are 
uninterested in leading CHP.  Moreover, Dervis has 
consistently shown himself inept at party politicking or at 
broadening his appeal beyond the urban "elites" in Western 
Turkey. 
 
9. (C) In separate meetings with us, Ertugul Gunay and Haluk 
Koc carefully avoided commenting on whether they seek the 
chairmanship.  Gunay, the party's former secretary general, 
is clearly dissatisfied with Baykal's leadership and believes 
the party must respect the religious beliefs of the majority 
of Turks, but did not endorse Sarigul in his meeting with us. 
 Koc, the deputy party leader in parliament, was clearly and 
uncharacteristically nervous and unwilling to discuss 
internal politics.  He also suggested that he might soon 
return to academia.  (Note.  Koc's nervousness may be a 
further indicator of how unstable the current political 
situation is within the party.  End Note.) 
 
10. (C) Cevikce, Cetin, and Omur Kumbaracibasi (former CHP 
minister) are working together to advance the case for former 
CHP mayor of Gaziantep Celal Dogan, according to Cevikce 
(strictly protect).  If they are unsuccessful in advancing 
Dogan's cause, then they will try to "clear the road for 
Sarigul" because it is easier to use Sarigul to get rid of 
Baykal and then remove Sarigul "three months later" than it 
will be to remove Baykal if he survives the current crisis, 
according to Cevikce. 
 
11. (C) Comment: Sarigul is adept at pumping up his image in 
some of the press but is deprecated as a phony by the 
broadest range of our contacts.  He has tried to use his 2004 
participation on an IV program to portray himself as backed 
by the U.S., a false impression that has gained currency 
among the chronically paranoid courtiers around Baykal (e.g., 
former ambassador Onur Oymen) but one we have worked to 
dispel among others in CHP and more generally.  In the end, 
we do not foresee any diminution in CHP's cliche-ridden 
anti-Americanism as long as the party is in opposition.  End 
comment. 
EDELMAN 

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