US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE44

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, EZ, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECH POSITION ON EU CUBA POLICY 
 
REF: STATE 4900 
 
Classified By: Polec Counselor Michael Dodman for reason 1.4 b+D 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Czech MFA appreciates reftel effort to 
remind European capitals of the real issues at stake in the 
EU debate over its common Cuba policy.  Czech efforts are 
currently focused on establishing a meaningful format for the 
structured EU dialogue with the opposition.  The Czech 
reading of internal EU debate in Havana since the partial 
unfreezing of relations is not encouraging:  COMs focused 
neither on the substance of dialogue with the opposition, nor 
the need to rebuff Castro's attempt to split EU member 
states.  The Czechs expect little progress at tomorrow's 
COLAT meeting, but promise to withhold Czech approval at the 
GAERC meeting unless the new measures have substance behind 
them.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Polec Counselor met with Czech MFA Americas Department 
Director Edita Hrda on Jan 10 to deliver reftel points in 
advance of the Jan 11 EU COLAT meeting.  Hrda welcomed the 
specific proposals in the U.S. paper and was especially in 
favor of the suggestion to invite U.S. and other missions in 
Havana to work with the EU.  She appreciated that the U.S. 
paper was being delivered to all member states.  Hrda said 
she had low expectations for the upcoming COLAT meeting, 
which she will send her deputy to attend.  She expressed 
great frustration with both the form and substance of the 
internal EU debate, including: 
 
-- Luxembourg has limited ability to moderate the debate. 
The Presidency's Cuba expert is, according to Hrda, an 
officer at the Luxembourg embassy in the Hague; Luxembourg 
has no mission in Havana, so the Dutch will continue to 
represent the Presidency there, preventing the Dutch from 
taking a more forceful position in internal debates (although 
Hrda also noted in passing that the Czechs no longer consider 
the Dutch to be their "partner" on this issue). 
 
-- The first meeting of EU COMs in Havana took place the day 
after Castro's partial unfreezing of relations with EU 
missions.  Hrda termed this meeting a huge disappointment to 
the Czechs.  She summarized the readout from the Czech 
mission:  the planned agenda was completely jettisoned; the 
Spanish and most other EU members discussed their happiness 
with Castro's decision and steps they planned to take to 
normalize relations; the Czechs and the Poles expressed 
frustration and tried to focus COMs on the mandate (from the 
December COLAT meeting) for them to prepare a format for the 
new dialogue with dissidents; the Dutch were essentially 
silent, except to note the need to force the Cubans to 
unfreeze relations with the remaining member states and the 
Commission (a point helpfully seconded by Portugal). 
 
-- In the end the Dutch did circulate (but did not discuss) a 
draft proposal for the structured dialogue, which Hrda 
dismissed as a non-starter.  The Dutch proposal calls for 
quarterly meetings with COMs from the EU Troika, does not 
specify the topics to be discussed nor call for a 
sufficiently broad participation from dissidents.  Hrda 
stated clearly that the Czech government will not authorize 
FM Svoboda to support the December COLAT conclusions at the 
late-January GAERC meeting unless the Czechs are satisfied 
that the new measures are at least as significant as the 
previous EU common position. 
 
3. (C) In terms of next steps, the Czechs have prepared their 
own draft proposal for the structured dialogue.  It calls for: 
 
-- all EU COMs meeting four to six times per year with a 
group of five to six opposition leaders (to be selected in 
consultation with dissident groups), at EU embassies or 
residences, with an agenda covering "political orientation of 
different groups; long-term vision of their role in the 
transformation; presentation of their opinions on substantial 
issues of Cuban political development and points of view on 
cooperation with the EU at the present stage, during the 
transformation process and after the transition to democracy." 
 
-- monthly meetings of all EU mission political counselors 
with a rotating group of up to ten opposition leaders or 
relatives of political prisoners, at EU embassies on a 
rotating basis, covering "political orientation of different 
groups and their activities; information on development in 
regions; detailed information on persecution by government 
bodies; information on the health conditions of political 
prisoners, development of their lawsuits in the period before 
judgment." 
 
The GOCR intends to share this proposal with what Hrda termed 
the Czechs' "partners" -- specifically the Poles (whom Hrda 
singled out as having been increasingly supportive of the 
Czech position), Slovaks, Slovenians, and Germans.  Hrda 
promised to study reftel points to determine which could be 
incorporated into the Czech draft. 
4. (C) In response to Polec Counselor's question, Hrda said 
the MFA is united in its approach to the EU's Cuba policy. 
She noted that there had been some concerns from her 
colleagues who manage EU affairs on a daily basis that a 
Czech position in opposition to that of many larger members 
states could hurt Czech interests (she noted specifically 
threats Czech diplomats claim to have received from the 
Spanish that the CR would "pay a price" for its position) but 
said that all the important players on the question (she 
listed FM Svoboda, DFM Kolar, MFA Political Director 
Schneider and MFA DG for Bilateral Relations Bombasova) were 
in favor of the principled approach Hrda continues to 
recommend. 
HILLAS