US embassy cable - 05SANAA76

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CDA DELIVERS IRAQ ELECTIONS DEMARCHE, DISCUSSES SA/LW PROBLEM

Identifier: 05SANAA76
Wikileaks: View 05SANAA76 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2005-01-10 14:57:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PTER PGOV YM PARMS DEMARCHE COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

101457Z Jan 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, YM, PARMS, DEMARCHE, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: CDA DELIVERS IRAQ ELECTIONS DEMARCHE, DISCUSSES 
SA/LW PROBLEM 
 
REF: A. STATE 275109 
 
     B. SANAA 9 
     C. 03SANAA 2790 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
1. (C) Summary.  CDA delivered ref A demarche to Principle 
Deputy Foreign Minister al-Dhabbi on January 8.  In addition 
to the Iraqi elections, discussions focused on relations 
between the ROYG and its opposition in Parliament and media, 
the al-Khaiwani case, proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons (SA/LWs) and ROYG failure to release visiting General 
Abizaid's communications equipment from the airport on 
January 3.  End Summary. 
 
--------------- 
Iraqi Elections 
--------------- 
 
2. (C) CDA delivered ref A demarche points to Prime Deputy 
Foreign Minister Dhabbi on January 8, emphasizing the need 
for ROYG support for the political process in Iraq.  Dhabbi 
listened to the message without comment, but affirmed that 
the ROYG plans to send election observers.  (Comment: 
President Saleh advised visiting General Abizaid that the 
elections should be postponed pending greater dialogue with 
Sunni elements to ensure their participation in the 
elections, ref B.  While a public statement of support for 
the January 30 date is not likely, MFA officials affirm ROYG 
policy is to support the political process in Iraq, saying 
that the alternative would be disastrous for the entire 
region.  End Comment). 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
ROYG - Opposition Relations are "Boiling..." 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Dhabbi told CDA that that the government's relations 
with opposition elements are extremely tense.  He attributed 
tensions to ROYG efforts to push through tough but necessary 
economic reforms and said the opposition is taking advantage 
of public apprehension about the cost of reforms by "playing 
a very negative role."  Our relations with the opposition are 
"boiling," Dhabbi complained, "and at the same we are trying 
to fight terrorism and arrest terrorist suspects."  Implying 
that the ROYG takes considerable heat from the opposition for 
its partnership with the U.S. in the GWOT, Dhabbi raised the 
reason he had asked for this meeting: "When diplomats and 
foreigners talk frequently to opposition leaders and 
journalists, he told CDA, "you give them the impression that 
they have your support."  CDA responded that the Embassy 
maintains relationships and has routine contact with members 
of the opposition and the press as a matter of course, and 
that we would continue to do so.  Dhabbi replied that he 
understood, but complained that when U.S. diplomats meet 
with, for example, the press syndicate and discuss the case 
of jailed journalist Khaiwani (ref C), "they take this to 
mean you support them against the government." 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Khaiwani Prosecuted According to the Law 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Dhabbi confided to CDA that he personally, along with 
others in the ROYG, did not agree with the jailing of 
Khaiwani, however, the as-Shura editor was tried and 
imprisoned according to the law.  The DFM said that the ROYG 
was working on amendments to the Press Law, including banning 
the arrest of journalists for expression, but said it would 
take some time for a new law to be drafted and approved.  CDA 
responded that the Embassy's position on Khaiwani's continued 
imprisonment was clear -- "it's a bad idea.  Those calling 
for Khaiwani's release do have our moral support even if we 
have so far refrained from making a public comment on the 
issue."  CDA told Dhabbi that the U.S. remains concerned 
about the Khaiwani case, as well as the arrest, detention and 
intimidation of other journalists.  He told Dhabbi that these 
events represent a government crackdown on the media dating 
back to the al-Houthi insurgency last summer.  It is damaging 
to Yemen's reputation in the international community, advised 
CDA, and may affect qualification for the MCA and other 
international development assistance programs. 
 
------ 
SA/LWs 
------ 
 
5. (S) CDA raised U.S. concerns about SA/LWs proliferation in 
Yemen, pointing out that despite Saleh's repeated pledges, 
arms dealers continue to pursue weapons deals on behalf of 
the ROYG that far exceed the needs of the Yemeni Armed 
Forces.  Dhabbi said that following A/S Bloomfield's meeting 
with Saleh last September, the President declared it illegal 
for dealers to buy weapons from eastern European or FSU 
countries.  Nevertheless, pressed CDA, this practice is 
occurring as we speak, and the only reason to bring in excess 
arms into Yemen is to sell them on the regional black market. 
 These weapons end up in terrorist hands, said CDA, and the 
USG remains prepared to help Yemen close this revolving door 
and get control of its weapons smuggling problem.  Dhabbi 
agreed the issue must be tackled. "Those people," he said, 
"are making fortunes regardless of the damage to Yemen." 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Abizaid's Luggage/Communications Equipment 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) CDA told Dhabbi that although the General's meetings 
with President Saleh and ROYG military officials went quite 
well, the visit was in many ways dominated by the refusal of 
the Yemeni authorities to clear the party's communications 
equipment.  CDA characterized the incident as disturbing, 
demonstrating the level of the ROYG's mistrust for the U.S. 
Dhabbi said he had heard about the incident after General 
Abizaid had departed, and that there seems to have been some 
confusion over the unusual amount of equipment accompanying 
Abizaid.  CDA said that it was not unusual at all for General 
Abizaid to have his personal communications equipment when 
overnighting off base.  CDA added that General Abizaid will 
be reluctant to make another overnight visit to Yemen in the 
near future. 
 
7. (C) Dhabbi disputed that the luggage fiasco was intended 
as a political message from the highest levels of the ROYG, 
it was, he insisted the unfortunate result of the Yemeni 
bureaucratic "mentality."  We are not accustomed to anyone 
but the President traveling with such equipment, he said. 
Dhabbi suggested that next time the Embassy work face-to-face 
with the MFA, in addition to submitting all the necessary 
paperwork to customs authorities.  CDA responded that we 
would do so, however, we do interpret the decision to hold 
the luggage and equipment as emanating from the highest 
levels of the ROYG, and that it was not taken well here or in 
Washington and may well have unfortunate repercussions. 
 
8. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Noman, a western-leaning 
reformer, agreed it was an appalling incident.  In a January 
9 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief he reported that both FM Qirbi 
and Presidential Advisor Iryani were in the room with 
President Saleh when he gave the green light to release all 
of Abizaid party's luggage and equipment.  Noman said that 
according to Iryani, Saleh's words were, "let it all in, just 
make sure that it all leaves with him."  Noman said it was 
possible, however, that the President said this only to 
appease Qirbi and Iryani, or that someone else later 
convinced him to reverse his decision.  Noman agreed with 
Dhabbi's assessment that it is ultimately a problem of 
"mentality." 
 
9. (C) Comment.  Post has become accustomed to occasional 
injunctions against meeting with the opposition, injunctions 
which reflect increased sensitivity on behalf of the ROYG to 
the activism of the opposition and the impact of this 
activism on Yemen's international image.  ROYG's acting out 
against the opposition by trying to intimidate the media, and 
letting their suspicions of the USG get the better of them by 
holding up a VIP's personal luggage and equipment is self 
defeating and harms both their image and interests in the 
international community.  End Comment. 
KHOURY 

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