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| Identifier: | 05BRASILIA91 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BRASILIA91 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Brasilia |
| Created: | 2005-01-10 14:15:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | ECIN ETRD PREL ECON BR Trade |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000091 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR NSC FOR MIKE DEMPSEY DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/EOLSON USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/MWARD SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECIN, ETRD, PREL, ECON, BR, Trade SUBJECT: MERCOSUL SUMMIT: NO PARTY, BUT NO FUNERAL EITHER REF: LIMA 5732 1. (SBU) Summary and introduction. Diplomatic restraint enabled the 27th Mercosul presidential summit to conclude on December 17 without incident, but widespread dissatisfaction with meager economic benefits flowing from the bloc, and bitter trade disagreements between Brazil and Argentina clouded the event. Limited trade agreements with India and the Southern Africa Customs Union were finalized; new associate members Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador were welcomed. However, tough issues on reforming the Protocol of Ouro Preto and on eliminating exceptions from the Common External Tariff were set aside. The trade initiatives that were announced, such as the eventual elimination of double CXT applications, will have no immediate impact. Held in Ouro Preto, Brazil to mark the tenth anniversary of the 1994 Protocol of Ouro Preto, the GoB had hoped for a strong reaffirmation of the Mercosul ideal. While President Lula asserted that Mercosul is a "destiny," the lack of political will to remove final impediments to formation of a customs union and lingering doubts over the pact's economic importance continue to cloud Mercosul's future. End summary and introduction. The Return to Ouro Preto ------------------------ 2. (U) The 27th Mercosul Summit in Ouro Preto, Brazil concluded on December 17, 2004 without incident, but intra-bloc differences clouded the affair. The meeting marked the 10-year anniversary of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which provided a permanent framework for establishment of Mercosul's customs union and institutions, and the turnover of the 6-month pro tempore presidency from Brazil to Paraguay. President Lula was joined by the presidents of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina, despite earlier doubts about President Kirchner's participation following President Lula's rejection on December 8 of the Argentine demand that Mercosul adopt a trade safeguard mechanism. The Presidents of Mercosul Associate Members Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela also attended, as well as the President of Panama, who conveyed an interest in his country becoming an Associate Member. 3. (U) As the highlight of Brazil's presidency, the GoB had hoped the summit would provide a stronger reaffirmation of the Mercosul ideal of regional integration. Mercosul has been a top priority for the Lula administration and despite frustration in Brazil's private sector and in some government quarters, particularly within the Ministry of Development and Trade, the GoB's commitment to the bloc so far has been unwavering. President Lula presented a stirring defense of Mercosul and suggested naysayers were exaggerating its difficulties. He underscored Brazil's commitment to the bloc when he declared "Mercosul is more than an option, it is a destiny." 4. (U) While reiterating the political importance of Mercosul, other leaders' public remarks revealed frustration with the bloc's inability to move forward in a decisive, effective and equitable way to form a genuine customs union, let alone the long-term goal of a common market. President Kirchner admitted that the regional bloc is essential for Argentina, but warned that "the benefits can't be all in one direction," in a veiled reference to his country's trade frictions with Brazil (septel). The economic asymmetries among the bloc's members and the lack of consistency in Mercosul trade policy, including the exceptions- riddled Common External Tariff (CXT), were seen as continuing concerns. Former Argentine President Duhalde, in his capacity as president of the Mercosul Commission of Permanent Representatives, complained that only 30 percent of the measures approved by Mercosul have been approved by national legislatures. Timid Advances on Trade and Integration --------------------------------------- 5. (U) Given the strained atmosphere, the GoB's ambitious agenda for the meeting had to be scrapped. Leaders did not discuss changes to the Ouro Preto Protocol, despite Brazil's preparation of a package of reforms, including a proposal to change the Mercosul decision-making mechanism from consensus to majority- voting. Other fundamental, yet sensitive issues, such as revision of the CXT and the bloc's automotive policy, were also put aside for the sake of a convening a "successful" meeting. The lack of clear advances in eliminating exceptions to the CXT raised doubts among Brazilian commentators about Mercosul's ability to establish a customs union in accordance with the bloc's Objective 2006 program adopted in July 2003. 6. (U) While Foreign Minister Amorim defended the Ouro Preto outcome as marking an important moment in "consolidating Mercosul," most summit initiatives have been characterized as timid. For instance, the announced regulations for the Government Procurement Protocol merely harmonize regulations issued pursuant to bilateral agreements that already enable businesses in the four countries to compete for government procurement contracts at the federal level on an equal basis. Furthermore, the new regulations are not yet final, but must be approved by national legislatures. Likewise, a fifth round of services negotiations resulted only in "progress" toward converging norms for financial and construction services. 7. (U) During the summit, Paraguay finally relented under pressure from Brazil and Uruguay to one of the more important initiatives -- to eliminate double application of the CXT on goods entering one of the member countries for final destination in another. However, for the near-term this will have no economic effect; set to commence in 2005, the initiative will only cover goods whose applied tariff is zero, as an MFN rate or through a tariff preference regime. The result is one less bureaucratic process for these imports, but status quo for all others. 8. (U) The Mercosul partners committed to formulate by 2008 a mechanism for the gradual elimination of double tariff application on goods with applied tariffs above zero. But whether this effort will come to fruition is less than certain given Paraguay's sensitivity; tariff revenues reportedly account for approximately 18 percent of that country's tax revenue. Paraguay's Foreign Minister Rachid was quoted as saying three conditions would have to be met before double tariffs could be eliminated: 1) creation of a computerized customs system for tracking products; 2) establishment of a single customs code; and 3) formation of a fund to transfer a part of the CXT collected to Paraguay. (Note. Elimination of the double duty has been a key demand of the European Union in its free trade negotiations with the Mercosul.) 9. (U) Finally, leaders announced their intent to create a Fund for Structural Convergence, though no financing commitments were made. The fund, slated to come into existence in 2006, is supposed to provide financing for projects to reduce regional structural differences and lift the competitiveness of the Uruguayan and Paraguayan economies; a definitive proposal for establishment of the Fund isn't expected until May 2005. Trade Agreements Inked ---------------------- 10. (U) Representatives from India and the Southern Africa Customs Union (including South Africa's Trade Minister) were on-hand in Ouro Preto to finalize partial trade preference agreements with Mercosul, which the Brazilian private sector views as shallow accords with little commercial consequence. The agreements aren't expected to expand trade substantially; the agreement with India covers only 902 products, about 450 for each side, for which tariffs are reduced by 10 to 100 percent, with 20 percent as the norm. The agreement with the SACU covers 1,907 products (approximately 1,000 for each side), with tariff reductions ranging from 20, 50 and 100 percent. Nonetheless, Mercosul leaders, particularly President Lula, count these as important accomplishments and steps in a broader process of strengthening economic and political relations with these strategically important developing countries. 11. (U) Much ado was also made as Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia joined Bolivia, Chile and Peru as Mercosul Associate Members. Note, associate membership only requires signature to Mercosul's democratic clause and a free trade agreement with the bloc; Associate Members may participate in the bloc's political consultations, but are not required to comply with any internal rules or adhere to the bloc's negotiating positions. The free trade agreements with the Andean community countries were again lauded as providing the base for the launch of the South American Community of Nations on December 8 in Cuzco, Peru (reftel). However, Bolivia's President Mesa raised concern about unfocused efforts at regional integration, stating that "we have to be brief and eliminate what could be a confusion of roles, a repetition of objectives and a duplication of efforts." 12. (SBU) Perhaps to buoy Mercosul's image as a dynamic and sought after trade partner, the GoB invited a number of diplomatic representatives to the Mercosul Council of the Common Market meeting the day before the summit. By and large the invitees represented countries that are engaged to some degree in trade discussions with Mercosul. These range from discussions to seek closer commercial relations generally, to the launching of trade negotiations. Representatives from the following countries attended: Panama, Mexico, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, India, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Canada, Australia, China, Egypt, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Switzerland. The EU delegation received a faxed invite four days prior, but was unable to send a representative. (The USG did not make the list. During a December 20 conversation with Sao Paulo Consul General, Sao Paulo Federal Deputy Joao Herrmann, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, lamented the USG absence in Ouro Preto, suggesting that it demonstrated the failure of both sides to place appropriate emphasis on the bilateral trade relationship.) On the Political Side... ------------------------ 13. (U) In keeping with recent efforts to expand Mercosul's political dimensions, leaders directed the Mercosul Joint Parliamentary Commission to formulate procedures for the installation of a Mercosul Parliament in 2006. The body may initially have members that are appointed, with gradual evolution toward a more representative body. Other announcements included: establishment of a high-level meeting to discuss human rights within the Framework Agreement on Regional Security Cooperation; agreement to develop a Mercosul passport; agreement to establish funds for cooperation in education and promotion of artistic expression; agreement on the transfer of convicts; and the promise to establish a high-level group to study employment growth. Comment ------- 14. (SBU) The inability of Mercosul leaders to once again grapple with basic deficiencies that are compromising Mercosul's development as a customs union has stoked skepticism in Brazil's private sector regarding the bloc's viability and usefulness (septel). Nonetheless, commitment to Mercosul runs deep within the ruling PT, most importantly with President Lula himself. Continuing trade difficulties not withstanding, the GoB will continue to push for more, not less, integration within Mercosul, and as the big country in the bloc will seek to keep the project alive. As one editorial noted, while the summit wasn't a party, it wasn't a funeral either. Danilovich
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