US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI227

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AID TO THE TIGERS: ON THE SAME PAGE

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI227
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI227 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-01-10 13:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL AEMR EAID MASS PTER SOCI CE BG IN India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, AEMR, EAID, MASS, PTER, SOCI, CE, BG, IN, India-SriLanka 
SUBJECT: AID TO THE TIGERS: ON THE SAME PAGE 
 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  In a January 7 meeting with MEA Director 
(Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives) Taranjit Singh Sandhu, 
PolCouns explained the USG position on tsunami disaster 
relief for Tiger controlled areas in Sri Lanka, including the 
US intention not to deploy military forces to LTTE areas. 
Sandhu responded that the GOI had taken a similar track, and 
expressed surprise at the contrast between the reality of US 
involvement in Sri Lanka and what had been reported in the 
Indian media.  On the future of GOSL-LTTE relations, Sandhu 
was optimistic that some good could come of the disaster in 
that it might force the two sides to cooperate.  PolCouns 
reiterated the need for greater information sharing on 
Bangladesh.  End Summary. 
 
Tigers? 
------- 
 
2.  (C) Sandhu remarked that his sense after sifting through 
all the speculation surrounding the damage the LTTE may have 
sustained from the tsunami, was that the Tigers did receive a 
blow, but not so much to their Sea Tigers headquarters.  He 
thought that probably one or two bases had been wiped out, 
adding that casualty figures have been kept very quiet, but 
the figure of two to three hundred LTTE deaths is "nonsense." 
 
 
GOI Aid to the LTTE 
------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The GOI has "no problem" with Indian assistance 
flowing through the GOSL to LTTE areas, Sandhu explained, 
adding that suggesting New Delhi's help should be cut off 
from the Tamil insurgents would be to acknowledge a separate 
Tamil Eelam.  He noted, however, that New Delhi found 
"unacceptable" the LTTE statement that aid should be given 
directly to the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization.  PolCouns 
explained that the USG approach was similar, adding that we 
have conveyed the message that US relief could be channeled 
through others, but that no US military deployments or 
military relief projects would take place in Tiger controlled 
areas. 
 
4.  (C) PolCouns also clarified the extent of the US military 
presence in Sri Lanka which has attracted considerable media 
attention in India, including suggestions that the GOI needs 
to check US intrusion in India's "backyard."  Sandhu seemed 
surprised to learn that the widely reported figure of 1,500 
US troops in the country was incorrect, and that the USG was 
going to refocus some military assets on Indonesia because 
India was doing a very good job of providing assistance to 
Sri Lanka.  (Note: We have heard from others that the Indian 
Embassy in Colombo has been a source of some of these 
alarmist reports about US military plans for Sri Lanka.) 
Sandhu responded that it was "wishful thinking" on the part 
of the LTTE that a disaster relief turf war would drive a 
wedge between the US and India.  Sandhu was also unaware that 
conversations between Washington and New Delhi had taken 
place through the core group before any US military movement 
into Sri Lanka.  Characterizing NSA JN Dixit's death as a set 
back to Indian diplomacy, Sandhu commented that this was 
especially true of policy towards Colombo, because Dixit (who 
had been Ambassador there) knew the country so well. 
 
In the Long Term 
---------------- 
 
5.  (C) Sandhu predicted that the tsunami could have long 
term political implications in Sri Lanka.  What at one time 
seemed like critical issues in the conflict seem irrelevant 
in light of the much larger issue of surviving the disaster, 
he explained.  Neither the GOSL or the Tigers are in any 
position to resume armed conflict, he observed, and they may 
be "forced" to cooperate.  If both sides see the current 
situation as an opportunity, he continued, that could be the 
"silver lining" in this tragedy.  He added, parenthetically, 
that Foreign Minister Natwar Singh had canceled his scheduled 
mid-January trip to Sri Lanka. 
The Other Neighbor 
------------------ 
 
6.  (C) With a meeting between PM Manmohan Singh and 
Bangladeshi PM Khaleda Zia postponed until the SAARC Summit 
is rescheduled, Sandhu told PolCouns he has not yet seen "the 
light at the end of the tunnel" in New Delhi-Dhaka relations. 
 He remarked that New Delhi has yet to concur with the 
proposed February 7 date for the SAARC meeting, and expressed 
puzzlement at Dhaka's insistence on pushing ahead with the 
Summit at a time when three of the region's governments were 
reeling from the tsunami.  PolCouns used the opportunity to 
further encourage more GOI information sharing on the issue 
through any channel, including the CTJWG.  Sandhu agreed "in 
principle" and offered to take the suggestion higher. 
MULFORD 

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