US embassy cable - 05BERLIN48

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GERMAN REQUEST FOR MILAIR TRANSPORT OF GERMAN BORDER POLICE AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL TO BAGHDAD

Identifier: 05BERLIN48
Wikileaks: View 05BERLIN48 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Berlin
Created: 2005-01-07 11:02:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MARR ASEC IZ GM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR COATS 
DEPT FOR EUR/AGS, NSC FOR DAMON WILSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, ASEC, IZ, GM 
SUBJECT: GERMAN REQUEST FOR MILAIR TRANSPORT OF GERMAN 
BORDER POLICE AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL TO BAGHDAD 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel Coats.  Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
1. (SBU) Paragraph 3 below provides an informal translation 
of a diplomatic note from the German Foreign Ministry 
requesting USG agreement for transport of German Border 
Police (BGS) and Diplomats via US military aircraft (MilAir) 
between Ramstein Airbase and Baghdad. The BGS agents will be 
providing security for the German Embassy in Baghdad.  Use of 
commercial air traffic is not optional due to transport of 
required weapons and ammunition.  The Germans propose that 
the first such transport would occur during the week of 
February 14, 2005.  The FRG agrees to pay for the cost of 
transporting personnel, baggage and equipment. 
 
2. (C) There are several good reasons why we should give this 
request serious consideration: 
 
-- The German Federal Border Guards (GSG-9) have a long 
history of close cooperation with the USG.  They provided 
physical security for US military bases in Germany when US 
security forces were deployed to Iraq, thereby freeing 
thousands of US soldiers to conduct other tasks. 
 
-- Most USG flights into Baghdad transit or originate at 
Ramstein airbase in Germany.  An average of 3-5 aircraft 
(C-17s or C-5s, etc.) fly out of Ramstein each week en route 
to Baghdad.  USAFE advises that, given sufficient advance 
notice, it is possible to secure a block of 10-14 seats on 
flights from Ramstein to Baghdad. 
 
-- The Germans will pay for all transport costs.  Although an 
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement cannot be used 
since the personnel involved are not military personnel, an 
arrangement for payment can be established, as outlined in 
the Deputy Defense Secretary's Memorandum of December 11, 
2003.  Thus the transport of German personnel would not 
entail an additional uncompensated cost to the USG and could 
in fact be used to offset costs. 
 
-- In addition to the ability to offset USG costs, we would 
dictate when the Germans fly in order to ensure that the 
transport of FRG personnel and equipment does not conflict 
with USG operational requirements. 
 
-- The convoy route previously used between Baghdad and 
Kuwait has been closed.  Weight and security restrictions on 
commercial flights to Baghdad prohibit the transfer of 
weapons and equipment.  The leasing of a commercial aircraft 
solely for this purpose would be prohibitively expensive.  If 
Germany is unable to transport security personnel, ammunition 
and equipment to support its mission in Iraq in a cost 
effective manner there is a risk that they will close their 
Embassy. 
 
-- The loss of additional personnel in a situation similar to 
the April '04 ambush of a German diplomatic convoy from 
Kuwait to Baghdad, would place increased pressure on the FRG 
to justify their presence in Iraq, an operation that is 
already their most expensive overseas mission fiscally and 
one that is not popular domestically. 
 
-- It is in our interest to keep an active German diplomatic 
presence in Iraq.  The presence of a German Embassy is a 
symbolic demonstration of USG progress towards forging a new 
Iraq.  Closure or curtailment of operations of the German 
Embassy would undermine the perception that we are creating a 
more stable and secure Iraq. 
 
-- Even though the FRG has been difficult to work with on 
some issues, the Germans have made and are continuing to make 
significant indirect contributions to our efforts in Iraq by 
providing over-flight rights, unhindered use of our military 
facilities, base security and significant support for GWOT 
actions outside of Iraq.  Without FRG cooperation and 
contributions our operations in Iraq would be greatly 
impaired. 
 
-- The FRG is also supporting our efforts in Iraq by training 
Iraqi police and military personnel in UAE. The FRG is 
considering participating in a proposed EU police-training 
mission.  In addition, the FRG agreed to allow the NATO 
training mission in Iraq, although they have chosen not to 
participate. 
 
-- If we grant the request, it will symbolize a renewed 
spirit of cooperation.  Given that the first transport has 
been requested for the week of February 14, just before the 
Bush-Schroeder Summit on February 23, the agreement could be 
presented as a simple, painless and cost free "deliverable" 
at the upcoming Summit and would offer a far greater return 
than any resulting inconvenience. 
 
3.(SBU) Unofficial Translation: 
 
Foreign Office 
GZ: 301-320.21 IRQ 
 
Verbal Note 
 
The Foreign Office has the honor to submit to the Embassy of 
the United States of America the following request: 
 
The Foreign Office refers to the circular note of the Iraqi 
Foreign Ministry from June 11, 2003 to foreign missions, in 
which it stated "that the Coalition Provisional Authority has 
announced that members of Foreign Liaison Offices in Iraq 
enter and remain in Iraq at their own risk.  The Coalition 
Provisional Authority cannot,(, guarantee the safety or 
security of a foreign liaison mission or its personnel."  At 
the same time, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry pointed out in its 
circular note that "Foreign liaison officials may bring into 
Iraq and/or maintain their own security forces(". 
 
Notwithstanding the basic position regarding the status of 
foreign missions in Iraq, the Federal Government carries out 
its own security measures in Baghdad as well as upon entry 
and departure.  Members of the Federal Border Police have 
been protecting the real estate of the German Embassy in 
Baghdad and the German diplomats working there. 
 
The diplomatic personnel of the German Embassy in Baghdad, 
including the officers of the Federal Border Police, 
currently use civil airlines for entry to and departure from 
Baghdad.  Due to the security provisions required by the 
airlines, it is not possible to take along excess baggage, 
and, in particular, weapons and ammunition.  Therefore, in 
light of the above-described position of the Iraqi Foreign 
Ministry, the Federal Government cannot sufficiently provide 
adequate security measures. 
 
Recent developments in the security situation in Iraq have 
increased the risks for the employees of the German Embassy 
in Baghdad.  Without optimal security measures, the long-term 
presence of the German Embassy in Baghdad would be put into 
question. 
 
Therefore the Federal Government requests the Embassy of the 
United States of America and responsible U.S. Government 
Ministries or Agencies to permit United States Air Force 
transport of security personnel assigned to the German 
Embassy in Baghdad on military aircraft flights from Ramstein 
to Baghdad. 
 
The Federal Border Police rotates its security personnel at 
the German Embassy in Baghdad every three months.  The next 
rotations will take place in February and May 2005, 
respectively.  The rotation will be organized in two 
contingents of five officers each.  Due to the required 
transfer of tasks on site, the timeframe for each rotation 
phase takes up to two weeks.  The following schedule is 
planned for the personnel rotation in February 2005: 
Departure of five officers from Germany in the 7th calendar 
week (as of February 14, 2005), about a week later (as of 
February 21, 2005) another five officers should depart, and 
on the same day, five other officers should return to 
Germany.  A week later (as of February 28, 2005), a return 
flight for the remaining five officers should be scheduled. 
The personnel exchange would then be completed. 
 
The officers are taking along baggage with a total weight of 
150 kg per person.  This includes command and control and 
operational equipment (including weapons and ammunition). 
 
The Foreign Office proposes that prior to each planned 
personnel exchange, Referat 107 of the Foreign Office will 
inform the Embassy of the United States of America, or 
another entity to be named by the Embassy of the United 
States of America, about all details of the planned exchange. 
 The Foreign Office would appreciate receiving information on 
points of contact, on the - from your perspective - required 
time of notification for each request from the Foreign 
Office, and on any further details that may be required from 
the Foreign Office. 
 
In addition to the officers, exchange, transportation of 
unaccompanied command and control equipment would be 
appreciated in individual cases, for example, if essential 
equipment fails, provided that it can,t wait until the next 
rotation of personnel. 
 
As a matter of course, the Foreign Office is willing to pay 
the transportation costs of the officers and the baggage. 
 
      In light of the situation in Iraq the Foreign Office 
would appreciate a swift response. 
 
      The Foreign Office avails itself of this opportunity to 
renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the 
assurances of its highest consideration. 
 
 
Berlin, December 15, 2004 
 
 
To the 
Embassy of the 
United States of America, Berlin 
 
COATS 

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