US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA162

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 000162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER, SNAR, PHUM, ASEC, CO 
SUBJECT: 2004 COUNTER-TERRORISM WRAP-UP 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) In spite of limited air mobility and ground 
support/fixed wing aircraft and the challenge of supporting 
some 17,000 troops of Plan Patriota operating in hostile 
jungle, the security forces made great advances in 2004, 
re-taking 11 FARC-run villages and destroying over 400 FARC 
camps.  Elsewhere in the country, the police and military 
maintained an unprecedented high operational tempo against 
all illegal armed groups, which led to the capture of several 
important terrorist commanders and hurt active combat units. 
Interservice cooperation is improving, and the recently 
appointed high command is one of the most skilled and 
U.S.-friendly in Colombian history.  Desertion and 
demobilization programs have removed approximately 10,000 
terrorists from the battlefield.  End Summary. 
 
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Plan Patriota 
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2. (C) Plan Patriota phase 2B (a more than 17,000 troop 
effort targeting the FARC in southern Colombia) operations 
destroyed 420 FARC encampments, occupied 11 formerly FARC-run 
villages, killed or captured almost 500 guerrillas, and 
clearly brought the fight to the enemy.  The FARC is spending 
more of its time thinking about its own preservation than 
coordinating offensive operations.  The group failed to pull 
off a major attack in Bogota in 2004.  Plan Patriota troops 
seized nearly 250,000 kilograms of FARC rations, over 200,000 
gallons of fuel, 500 vehicles, and numerous other supplies. 
Almost 300 kilograms of cocaine, five HCL labs, and 1,277 
hectares of coca have been destroyed.  Occupying troops also 
have found FARC code books, financial information, and other 
strategic paperwork that provide valuable intelligence.  GOC 
operations have forced senior FARC leaders to withdraw 
rapidly (they even reportedly captured Secretariat member 
Mono Jojoy's trademark black beret).  In one case, they found 
evidence that the U.S. hostages had recently been kept in a 
destroyed camp (GOC forces remain committed to the hostages' 
safety, but a chance encounter remains possible). 
 
3. (C) The military is struggling with the logistical 
challenge of supporting 17,000 troops in the vast, hostile 
area of operations.  Limited air mobility and ground 
support/fixed wing aircraft are serious constraints.  GOC 
forces are taking casualties, and there are few resources 
available to MEDEVAC wounded soldiers from increasingly 
remote areas.  Sixty-seven Colombian soldiers have been 
killed and 328 wounded in combat since phase 2B began in 
February.  Landmines are one of the leading causes of deaths 
and injuries.  The security forces are enduring more than 
1,600 long, painful cases of leishmanaisis from jungle 
living.  Half of an entire mobile brigade had to be taken out 
of operations to recover from the disease.  Plan Patriota 
leadership is revamping the soldiers' leave schedule and 
improving medical assistance in the field to address the 
problem. 
 
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Elsewhere in the Country 
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4. (C) Military and police set records for operations against 
high value targets, active combat units, and support elements 
of all three terrorist organizations, the FARC, ELN, and 
paramilitaries. 
 
5. (C) The most important commanders killed or captured 
during the year included: 
 
--FARC General Staff Member Ricardo Palmera, "Simon Trinidad" 
(extradited to the U.S. on December 31), 
 
--FARC drug-runner/financier Omaira Rojas-Cabrera, "Nayibe 
Rojas Valderrama" or "Sonia," 
 
--FARC Teofilo Forero Mobile Column (TFMC) operations chief 
Humberto Valbuena, "Yerbas" (replacing "El Mocho," killed in 
2003), 
 
--FARC international liaison chief Rodrigo Granda, 
 
--ELN senior field commander Jose Ramiro Velez, "El Viejo," 
and 
 
--Erminson Cabrera, brother of FARC General Staff member 
"Fabian Ramirez" and suspected replacement for Sonia. 
 
--Jose Maria Barros Ipuana, "Chema Balas," believed to be one 
of senior AUC commander Jorge Tovar's deputies and implicated 
in a massacre of 12 indigenous people in April. 
 
6. (C) Operations against paramilitary groups are at record 
highs.  For example: 
 
- Over 530 paramilitaries were killed and 4,450 were captured 
in 2004, an increase of approximately 80 and 60 percent, 
respectively, compared to 2003, according to the GOC. 
 
- When AUC Commander Jorge Tovar kidnapped a former senator, 
the GOC ordered the authorities to arrest Tovar wherever they 
could find him, including inside the concentration zone in 
Cordoba Department. 
 
- The GOC refused to accept known drug trafficker Juan Carlos 
Sierra as an AUC negotiator and ordered the authorities to 
arrest him. 
 
- During operation "Santuario" in September, the military 
killed and captured hundreds of members of the Self-Defense 
Forces of Casanare (ACC), which is not participating in peace 
talks and was responsible for a large percentage of the 
violence on the eastern plains. 
 
7. (U) Violence indicators nationwide are improving. 
According to the National Police, murders decreased by 16 
percent in 2004 (22,700 in 2003 and 19,010 in 2004), 
kidnapping fell 44 percent, terrorist acts fell 42 percent, 
and extortion fell 15 percent in 2004. 
 
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Interservice Cooperation a Priority 
----------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Despite resource shortages and the service-centric 
approach of former Army commander General Carreno, which 
forced each service to look out for its own interests, 
interservice coordination improved in 2004.  With the naming 
of General Castellanos to head the Army, Colombia perhaps now 
has the most professional, internally cooperative, 
U.S.-friendly high command in its national history, and for 
the first time is experimenting with a joint operational 
structure in the traditional divisions, to mimic the success 
of U.S. combat commands.  The military created a joint 
Caribbean Command and a joint intelligence coordination 
center, both of which are headed up by U.S.-friendly generals 
with proven track records. 
 
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Deserters and Demobilizations on the Rise 
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9. (C) The various deserter and demobilization programs have 
now removed about 10,000 active terrorists from the field 
(more than 6,000 individual deserters from all groups, about 
1,000 paramilitaries from 2003 collective demobilizations, 
and close to 3,000 paramilitaries from late 2004 
demobilizations) since President Uribe took office in 2002. 
The AUC peace process also is sowing deep divisions among the 
paramilitary leadership and forcing them to distinguish 
between drug traffickers and bona fide members of the 
movement.  AUC commanders Carlos Castano and Miguel Arroyave, 
both wanted in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges, were 
killed or forcibly disappeared by fellow paramilitaries. 
However, the lack of an adequate legal framework to deal with 
those accused of violent crimes, the institutional weaknesses 
of the demobilization process itself, and the inability of 
the security forces to significantly increase their presence 
in areas of demobilization are all threats to the process. 
 
 
WOOD