US embassy cable - 05ANKARA97

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000097 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR GENERAL ABIZAID FROM AMBASSADOR EDELMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MASS, TU, IZ, AF 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S JANUARY 11-12 
VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Our bilateral relationship with Turkey has 
become quite bumpy over the last years.  The comfort of our 
NATO Alliance has been tested by Turkish perceptions of our 
operations in Iraq, developments on the domestic scene, and 
the movement toward the EU.  Turkey shares our overall policy 
goals for Iraq, but is concerned about the possibility of a 
Shia-dominated government after elections as well as Kurdish 
aspirations for independence.  Turkey has been constructive 
in insisting on elections on time everywhere in the country 
and tells us it is reaching out to Sunnis to encourage their 
participation in the political process.  Iraq dominates our 
bilateral relations with Turkey; the Turks are bitter about 
our lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel, our arrest of 
Turkish SF personnel near Suleymania in July 2003, 
"aggressive" coalition military operations, and what they 
perceive as our excessive tilt toward Iraq's Kurds (including 
some disinformation via Iraqi Turkmen sources they are 
probably responsible for themselves).  Turkish leaders seem 
ready to believe the most outrageous and false reporting in 
the Turkish press about civilian deaths and coalition tactics 
in anti-insurgent operations.  Nonetheless, Turkey cooperates 
with our efforts in Iraq by allowing our tankers to refuel 
cargo flights on OIF and OEF missions, the use of Incirlik 
for rotation of troops out of Iraq, and by keeping open a key 
GLOC for coalition sustainment and goods for the Iraqi 
people.  Insurgents have killed about 70 Turkish truck 
drivers and contractors in Iraq, as well as five Turkish 
police officers transiting Mosul on Dec. 17; the latter event 
especially shocked the country.  In Afghanistan, the Turks do 
not participate meaningfully in OEF, but allow us to do some 
logistical support out of and move detainees through Turkey. 
They will take over the rotating ISAF command for the second 
time in February with about 1,600 troops.  End summary. 
 
Iraq: Still a Wedge Between Us 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Iraq impacts our entire bilateral relationship. 
Senior military commanders have worked hard to repair the 
damage caused by Turkey's failure to approve passage of the 
4th ID in March 2003 and our arrest of Turkish Special Forces 
personnel in Suleymania on July 4 of that year, and 
relationships at the top have improved.  Nonetheless, the 
relationship remains fragile.  The GOT shares our policy goal 
of a unified, prosperous, democratic Iraq at peace internally 
and with its neighbors, but our action in Iraq has always 
been unpopular in Turkey.  The images of violence, 
exaggerated stories of civilian casualties--including some 
information circulated by the Turkish-influenced Iraqi 
Turkmen Front--turn the Iraq issue into one that undermines 
the basic perception of common values, including among the 
Turkish military at many levels. 
 
3. (C) Concerns about the ethnic balance in and future of 
Kirkuk, Kurdish desires for independence, our lack of action 
against the terrorist PKK/Kongra Gel (hereon Kongra-Gel) 
camps in northern Iraq and perceived discrimination against 
Iraq's Turkmen population underpin Turkish attitudes on Iraq. 
 While the government took measures to reiterate the value of 
U.S.-Turkish relations, sensationalist, irresponsible press 
reports and statements by public figures feed perceptions 
that we caused massive civilian casualties, including in 
Fallujah; that we tolerate Kurdish designs to seize Kirkuk 
and break away; and that the U.S. acquiesces to (or supports) 
the PKK's presence in Iraq.  All of this continues despite 
continuing mission efforts to keep the GOT informed and to 
hold the GOT and the media to a strict standard of fact in 
their statements. 
 
4. (C) You will be coming to Turkey less than three weeks 
before the Iraqi elections, elections that both we and the 
Turks believe are crucial to the future of Iraq and the 
region.  Whether the elections proceed smoothly or not, the 
Turks have grave concerns about Iraq's future.  They worry 
about long-term U.S. staying power in Iraq, that events in 
Iraq will spiral out of control, and that Ankara could be 
faced with either a Shia-dominated government that they 
assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an intensified 
movement toward an independent Kurdish state emanating from 
northern Iraq, or both.  Turkish leaders will seek your 
assurance that the USG, and our military, remain committed to 
ensuring a stable--and unified--Iraq.  Turkey has thrown its 
full support behind holding Iraqi elections on time.  FonMin 
Gul told Deputy Secretary Armitage Jan. 3 that any delay in 
elections would worsen the security situation, throw Turkey's 
Iraq policy into disarray, and force Turkey to re-assess its 
approach. 
 
PKK/Kongra-Gel: Another Sticking Point 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Coincidentally, you will also arrive here on the same 
day the U.S., Turkey, and Iraq will hold our first trilateral 
discussion on border security, specifically PKK/Kongra-Gel. 
Senior Turkish military leaders tell us that they understand 
that we are not now able to take action against this 
terrorist organization.  They remind us, however, of the need 
to show resolve and to stand with Turkey in working on ways 
to render the PKK/Kongra-Gel ineffective.  (NOTE: We also 
know that the military uses our lack of action against 
PKK/Kongra-Gel to needle the current government, which it 
dislikes, and claim it cannot deliver, either.  END NOTE.) 
We hope these talks will produce some results to indicate 
that the U.S., Turkey, and Iraq are working together to 
fulfill President Bush's pledge that Iraq will no longer be a 
base for terrorist operations against Turkey.  This is all 
the more important since PKK/Kongra-Gel uses northern Iraq as 
its command and control base and its terrorists infiltrate 
into Turkey from Iraq and murder Turkish security personnel 
and civilians.  The GOT knows that there is no substantive 
connection between your visit and these talks, and we will 
also work with the press to avoid this confusion. 
 
Turkey Hurt By Insurgency 
------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Though Turkey has lost about 70 truck drivers and 
contractors to insurgent attacks in Iraq, Turk were 
especially shocked when on Dec. 17 AIF murdered five Turkish 
police officers (and an Iraqi driver) who were driving 
through Mosul on their way to Baghdad to provide security for 
the Turkish embassy there.  Task Force Olympia personnel 
killed two of the terrorists, treated the Turkish WIA, and 
helped repatriate both the five bodies and the WIA Turk back 
home.  This incident was a cause for national mourning and 
angst, and the entire state apparatus from the President and 
Prime Minister to the CHOD and National Police Chief turned 
out for the funeral.  After the DCM admonished DCHOD General 
Basbug concerning initial outrageous press reports and a 
Turkish General's irresponsible and uninformed comments, 
implying the U.S. was responsible for the deaths, Turkish 
leaders and senior officials have gone out of their way to 
express their appreciation privately for TFO's efforts 
(including a warm letter from CHOD GEN Ozkok to GEN Myers). 
However, publicly they remain silent.  We have tried to use 
this tragic incident to point out to the Turks that coalition 
operations against AIF are seeking to prevent the very 
attacks that have resulted in the deaths of their police 
officers and truck drivers.  Even privately, Turkish leaders 
seem unable or unwilling to acknowledge this point, though it 
is true that since this incident both officials and the press 
seem to have toned down the anti-American rhetoric...a bit. 
 
Not All Bad News... 
------------------- 
 
7. (C) Despite our policy differences, Turkey has provided 
valuable assistance and cooperation, for which you should 
express appreciation.  Ankara offered to send peacekeeping 
troops to Iraq in October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik 
Air Base for tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions 
for both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF), authorized the transit of U.S. troops from 
Iraq on rotation out, and permits the transit of supplies for 
our forces and humanitarian goods (since its inception until 
the end of CY 04, over $2.5 billion worth of coalition 
sustainment and humanitarian assistance).  The GOT has 
reached out to all major Iraqi groups to encourage 
participation in elections on January 30.  Turkey is also 
active in reconstruction efforts, including providing 
electricity for Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi 
diplomats and, as its contribution to the NATO training 
mission, Iraqi security forces. 
 
...But Turks Dragging Their Feet on Further Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8. (C) That said, recent requests to increase our use of 
Incirlik AB (e.g., establish a logistics air hub, support 
EUCOM's request to increase training deployments) have been 
delayed as Turkish officials consider them part and parcel 
with the idea that we might seek to move F-16s permanently to 
the base as part of the Defense Posture Review Initiative. 
Turkish military leaders have told us that they support the 
use of Incirlik as a cargo hub, but that the decision now 
rests with the civilian leadership.  You may want to remind 
your civilian interlocutors (especially FonMin Gul) that the 
cargo hub--which we requested of the GOT over six months 
ago--would be of vital operational assistance to the success 
of OIF and OEF. 
 
Support for the GWOT 
-------------------- 
 
9. (C) The public and official preoccupation with Iraq 
overshadows the positive cooperation we have in other aspects 
of the GWOT: Since 9/11 and the November 2003 Istanbul 
attacks, our traditional intelligence and law enforcement 
cooperation has improved.  Our militaries coordinate 
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their 
abilities to protect important energy transportation routes. 
Turkey subscribes to every arms control arrangement it is 
eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security 
Initiative.  Ankara has been supportive of international 
efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA, 
although they are more inclined to persuasion than coercion. 
The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training Center 
provides counterterrorism and other training to personnel 
from PfP partner countries.  The military has recently 
established a NATO Center of Excellence for the Defense 
Against Terrorism that will provide more specialized training 
opportunities for both NATO partner nations and Allies.  And 
Turkey will again assume the command of ISAF in February for 
a six-month period, during which they will significantly 
increase their contribution (up to about 1,600 troops) to 
this important NATO mission. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
10. (C) While Turkey has only token participation in OEF, it 
maintains a constant presence of about 220 soldiers in ISAF. 
Starting next month it will begin another six-month stint as 
rotating commander of ISAF.  During the spring and summer of 
2004, we succeeded in getting Turkey to commit to provide a 
PRT, but NATO planners, the U.S., and other Allies sent mixed 
signals to the Turks on where their PRT might serve, and the 
Turks withdrew their offer.  Now that NATO is seeking PRTs 
for Phase II, we are gently probing the Turks to again 
consider the issue. 
 
Your Meetings 
------------- 
 
11. (U) The GOT has confirmed meetings for you with Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gul, Deputy CHOD General Ilker Basbug, and 
Chairman of the Turkish National Security Council Ambassador 
Yigit Alpogan.  Regrettably both Prime Minister Erdogan and 
CHOD General Ozkok will be out of the country during your 
visit. 
 
Gul 
--- 
 
12. (C) Gul was serving as Prime Minister during the leadup 
to the March 1, 2003 parliamentary vote denying the use of 
Turkey for OIF, and he was seen within the ruling AK Party as 
working directly to ensure the motion did not pass.  He 
remains a difficult interlocutor for us on Iraq.  Despite his 
seemingly good English and apparently amiable demeanor, Gul 
has Islamist origins and is at best uncomfortable with the 
U.S. presence in the region.  During his Jan. 3 meeting with 
Deputy Secretary Armitage, Gul accused the U.S. of favoring 
the interests of the Iraqi Kurds over those of Turkey and 
Iraq's Turkmen population.  That said, he has maintained the 
Foreign Ministry's generally constructive approach to Iraq, 
including outreach to Iraq's Sunni politicians to encourage 
their participation in January elections as well as claiming 
that Turkey is using its influence to get the Iranians and 
Syrians to cease their support for terrorism in Iraq. 
 
Alpogan 
------- 
 
13. (C) Amb. Alpogan took over in Oct. 2004 as the first 
civilian Secretary-General in the seventy-year history of 
Turkey's National Security Council, an executive foreign 
policy body composed of the President, the Prime Minister and 
other key ministers, and senior military officers.  Previous 
Secretaries-General had been four-star Army generals. 
 
SIPDIS 
Alpogan is reforming the organization's heavy reliance on the 
armed forces, creating a mixed organization of professional 
diplomats as well as military officers.  As with your other 
interlocutors, he will likely be focused on Iraq, but will 
also be interested in a broader discussion on other countries 
in your AOR. 
 
14. (C) Points to Emphasize With Gul and Alpogan: 
 
--Appreciate you working together with us as elections 
approach in Iraq. 
 
--Appreciate also your outreach to Sunni parties to encourage 
their participation, which is vital not just to the election 
but to the future of a unified Iraq. 
 
--We are working hard to ensure that Iraqi Kurds remain part 
of a unified Iraq.  An independent Kurdistan is not in either 
of our interests. 
 
--For example, we have pressed them hard on participating in 
governorate council elections in Kirkuk. 
 
--Understand that the insurgency has taken its toll on your 
citizens, including your truck drivers and more recently the 
five Turkish police officers murdered in Mosul. 
 
--Insurgents want to discourage Turkey from carrying out a 
constructive role in Iraq; we cannot let them win. 
 
--As we did during the Talafar and Fallujah operations, we 
will do our best to share real-time information both here in 
Ankara and with your LNOs in Iraq. 
 
--The wildly exaggerated and just plain wrong reporting in 
the Turkish press about our operations (especially in 
Fallujah)--regrettably repeated by some Turkish leaders--can 
strain our partnership.  Urge you to correct the record where 
possible. 
 
--The terrorists we go after in such operations are the same 
people who kill your citizens in Iraq. 
 
--Understand that the government is still considering our 
request to use Incirlik Air Base as a cargo hub for OIF and 
OEF.  When can we expect a response? 
 
--Appreciate Turkey again assuming command of ISAF next 
month.  Your command period will cover Afghanistan's 
parliamentary elections, a key milestone. 
 
--NATO is still lacking enough PRTs to cover Phase II needs. 
Would Turkey again consider offering a PRT, perhaps after 
your ISAF command ends in August 2005? 
 
Basbug 
------ 
 
15. (C) Basbug is an experienced commander, comfortable with 
and accessible to foreign guests.  Though he and his military 
colleagues are distrustful of the current moderate Islamist 
government, TGS stood aside and kept silent in the runup to 
the EU's Dec. 17 decision to begin accession negotiations 
with Turkey this year.  The Turkish armed forces share the 
GOT's concerns about Iraq, and are deeply suspicious of the 
aspirations of both Iraq's and Turkey's Kurds.  While 
Turkey's military leaders used to raise our inaction again 
Kongra-Gel in nearly every meeting with U.S. officials from 
mid-2003 to mid-2004, of late they have not mentioned this 
issue very much; they have stopped asking when we will take 
action.  This lack of communication does not mean their anger 
is allayed.  Basbug especially will likely note the 
coincidence of your visit here with the trilateral Kongra-Gel 
talks. 
 
16. (C) Points to Emphasize With Basbug: 
 
--Understand that the insurgency has taken its toll on your 
citizens, including your truck drivers and more recently the 
five Turkish police officers murdered in Mosul. 
 
--Insurgents want to discourage Turkey from carrying out a 
constructive role in Iraq; we cannot and will not let them 
win. 
 
--As we did during the Talafar and Fallujah operations, we 
will do our best to share real-time information both here in 
Ankara and with your LNOs in Iraq. 
 
--Appreciate Turkey again assuming command of ISAF next 
month.  Your command period will cover Afghanistan's 
parliamentary elections, a key milestone. 
 
--NATO is still lacking enough PRTs to cover Phase II needs. 
Would Turkey again consider offering a PRT, perhaps after 
your ISAF command ends in August 2005? 
 
--(IF RAISED) Understand your frustration that Kongra-Gel 
remains in place in northern Iraq.  We need to work together 
with the Iraqis to take steps to weaken the organization so 
that it cannot threaten you or Iraq. 
 
17. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
18. (U) Kabul minimize considered. 
EDELMAN