US embassy cable - 05ANKARA82

S E C R E T  ANKARA 000082 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2025 
TAGS: MOPS, PTER, PREL, PREF, IZ, TU, EUN, AM, CY, RS 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JAN. 11 U.S.-TURKEY-IRAQ TALKS ON 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
 
REF: A. 04 STATE 201785 (NOTAL) 
     B. 04 STATE 208448 (NOTAL) 
     C. 03 ANKARA 6231 (NOTAL) 
     D. 04 ANKARA 509 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Embassy appreciates the participation of our 
colleagues from Washington, Baghdad, and EUCOM in Jan. 11 
trilateral (U.S.-Turkey-Iraq) talks on the PKK/Kongra-Gel. 
On. Jan. 5, Turkish MFA provided us with a rough outline for 
the talks themselves.  In this message we hope to lay out 
what we believe are issues the U.S. side may want to 
consider, or perhaps propose as action items at the talks. 
While Kongra-Gel's command and control structure is located 
in northern Iraq, we should acknowledge that they use other 
countries for logistical and financial support.  We should 
address these items as well, if only to point out to the 
Turks and the Iraqis that the issue goes beyond just their 
two countries.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) MFA Iraq Desk Director Avni Botsali told PolMilOff 
Jan. 5 that the GOT will not submit a written agenda for the 
talks.  Instead, the Turkish HOD, Special Coordinator for 
Iraq Koruturk, will briefly introduce a TGS presentation on 
PKK/Kongra-Gel.  The three HODs will then make opening 
remarks, followed by an open discussion of the issues.  The 
Turks then hope for a set of agreed minutes.  He added that 
the GOT hopes that at the talks the U.S. side will 
demonstrate serious intent to "help alleviate the 
frustration" many official Turks feel regarding 
PKK/Kongra-Gel's continuing presence in northern Iraq.  He 
also expressed concern that--according to the Turkish Embassy 
in Baghdad--the IIG only seemed to be sending MFA officials 
to these talks.  Botsali said that if the U.S. side can share 
any information on our plans for the talks, the Turks would 
be most appreciative.  He believes the talks will begin 
between 1030 and 1100 on Jan. 11.  Koruturk will offer a 
lunch at the appropriate time, followed by further discussion 
as needed.  Botsali did not believe the talks would last 
until COB Jan. 11.  The Turks will host the talks in a hotel 
conference room in an Ankara suburb. 
 
3. (C) Turkish officials acknowledge that the insurgency has 
made it difficult for both MNF-I and the IIG to take kinetic 
action against PKK/Kongra-Gel.  However, faced with a 
constant stream of soldiers being killed in renewed anti-PKK 
operations in Turkey's southeast and the deep concern among 
intelligence officials that the PKK has infiltrated major 
Turkish cities in order to open a new terrorism front, the 
Turks insist that we make good on our word--delivered at the 
highest levels--that we will act.  Although the handover of 
sovereignty to the Iraqis more than six months ago means that 
the IIG is in the driver's seat on policy towards terrorists 
on Iraqi soil, our Turkish interlocutors still expect U.S. 
participation in anti-PKK actions. 
 
PKK/Kongra-Gel in Iraq 
---------------------- 
 
4. (S) Given the apparent lack of Kongra-Gel terrorist action 
inside Iraq, the political challenges faced by the IIG and 
the security situation that has stretched the Iraqi Security 
Forces, it is not surprising that the IIG is reluctant to 
take action now.  Per ref a instructions, however, we can 
attempt to persuade the Iraqis to take certain minimal steps 
to show the Turks that the IIG takes the issue seriously. 
Per reftel, these include: 
 
--Close the offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Solutions 
Party in Iraq, and declare this "party," a front for the PKK 
terrorist organization, illegal. 
 
--Issue arrest warrants for PKK/Kongra Gel terrorists and 
leaders who may be in Iraq and, when they are arrested, 
either return them to Turkey for prosecution or prosecute 
them under Iraqi law. 
 
--Join the Kurdish Regional Government in high level public 
statements that the IIG will not permit the PKK to operate or 
have safehaven in Iraq. 
 
--Begin patrolling around Makhmour camp to discourage 
PKK/Kongra-Gel activity in the camp. 
 
5. (S) Additionally, the cable instructed Embassy Baghdad to 
tell the IIG: "The U.S. and MNF-I will work with you on ways 
to implement such actions."  We need to be prepared to 
discuss what we are prepared to do--and when--to help 
operationalize this.  Finally, the IIG and IECI seem prepared 
to permit two PKK/Kongra-Gel front parties, including the 
Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party, to participate in Jan. 
30 elections.  This is surprising and steps to prevent it 
would still be appropriate. 
 
6. (S) Discouraging PKK/Kongra-Gel activity around Makhmour 
Camp is not something to be done in a vacuum.  Most residents 
of the camp are Turkish citizens who fled to Iraq in the 
1990s during the worst of the fighting with PKK/Kongra-Gel 
within Turkey.  While the Turks want to close the camp and 
bring its citizens home, it is concerned that PKK/Kongra-Gel 
routinely infiltrates Makhmour.  In Jan. 2004, Turkey, UNHCR, 
and the IGC (with CPA support) negotiated an agreement to 
close the camp and voluntarily repatriate its residents to 
Turkey (ref d).  The deal fell through, however, because the 
Turks insisted that Secretary Powell sign a letter of 
guarantee, including a commitment to take the steps necessary 
to stop PKK/Kongra-Gel infiltration.  We were not then (and 
likely are still not) in a position to provide such a 
guarantee to the Turks.  If the Iraqis were to provide this 
security (perhaps with MNF-I support), it could finally lead 
to the long-overdue closure of this camp and an orderly, 
voluntary repatriation process under UNHCR auspices. 
 
PKK/Kongra-Gel Outside of Iraq 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (S) While northern Iraq may be PKK/Kongra-Gel's main 
command and control center (and Turkey its main target), this 
terrorist organization is active in other countries.  We 
defer to Washington's expertise, but based on our information 
we believe we need to be prepared to address--or perhaps 
offer an action plan--for dealing with the following: 
 
--PKK/Kongra-Gel presence in and utilization of Cyprus and 
Armenia 
 
--Russia as a transit hub or support for PKK 
 
--Ref b indicates that DoD was to provide additional 
information to State regarding television stations that are 
likely PKK/Kongra-Gel fronts, with an eye toward demarching 
the Belgians and Danes.  Can we report progress on this 
issue?  France closed a forerunner of Roj TV; is there 
information there that can help persuade the Danes? 
 
--PKK financing operations in Europe, as well as PKK front 
offices there 
 
--We understand that a PKK training camp was raided by the 
Dutch not long after the Van Gogh murder.  Do we have info to 
share on PKK methodology and other intel we can share with 
Turkey and/or Iraq? 
 
--Previous U.S.-Turkish talks on the PKK (ref c) discussed 
the full range of tools of statecraft to be deployed against 
the PKK/Kongra-Gel.  Any further progress we have made 
outside Iraq in providing intelligence and law enforcement 
assets per that undertaking (that we can share) would be 
helpful. 
 
The lists above are by no means exhaustive or complete.  We 
hope they will be useful food for thought for addressees. 
 
8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
 
EDELMAN