US embassy cable - 05ANKARA78

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, MARR, TU, IR, IZ 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S JAN. 3 MEETING WITH TURKISH 
DEPUTY PM/FONMIN GUL 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Deputy Secretary underscored U.S. support 
for Iraqi elections on schedule; dismissed Gul's assertions 
that the U.S. favors Kurdish rather than Turkish concerns; 
and noted what Syria needs to do against former Iraqi 
regime elements if it wants better relations with the U.S. 
Gul emphasized Turkey's shared interest in seeing Iraqi 
elections on schedule; underscored Turkey's "closeness" 
with Sunni Arabs and the need to get them to participate; 
spoke enthusiastically about Turkey's warm relations with 
Syria and influence on Syrian developments; and urged more 
U.S. support for ending Turkish Cypriot isolation.  End 
summary. 
 
Iraqi Elections: Hold Them On Schedule 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Deputy Secretary led off by underscoring Allawi's 
determination to proceed with Jan. 30 elections in Iraq 
despite Sunni Arab reluctance.  The USG continues to urge 
that the Sunni Arabs not repeat the Shi,as, historic 
mistake 
of depriving themselves of a voice by boycotting Iraqi 
elections in the 1930's. 
 
3. (C) At the same time, the security situation in the 
Baathist Triangle, including Mosul, remains very difficult; 
Turkey's liaison units should be in a position to brief 
Ankara on the measures Task Force Olympia may have to 
take.  In addition, the Deputy Secretary underscored how 
bluntly he had expressed to KDP Chief Barzani the USG view 
that the KDP should stop trying to delay Kirkuk provincial 
elections; it appeared Barzani understood the seriousness 
of our message.  Deputy Secretary added that he had 
delivered the same clear message by phone to Talabani. 
Turkey can also help by delivering a strong message to Arab 
countries participating in the Jan. 6 Amman neighbors' 
meeting. 
 
4. (C) Gul responded that he regretted the recent failure 
of both Turkey and the U.S. to engage in meaningful 
bilateral consultations.  We need to demonstrate again that 
we are strategic partners, that we look to the long-term 
health of our relationship, and that we recognize we need 
each other. 
 
5. (C) Turkey wishes success for the U.S. in Iraq since 
Turkey and the U.S. share the same objectives, Gul 
claimed.  Turkey suffered terribly during the previous 
Iraqi regime.  Any delay in elections would worsen the 
security situation, throw Turkey's Iraq policy into 
disarray, and force Turkey to re-assess its approach. 
Therefore, it is important to support the Jan. 30 
elections.  If Iraq wants foreign soldiers to leave then 
this is the plan to achieve that goal.  Otherwise, Turkey 
and Iraq's other neighbors, including Iran, don't want the 
Coalition forces to leave.  But the U.S. can't remain for 
ever. 
 
Sunni Arabs 
----------- 
 
6. (C) The problem is the Sunni Arab boycott, Gul 
continued.  The Turks and Sunni Arabs have a traditional 
closeness, he declared.  The Sunnis appreciate Turkish 
religious values more, are less politicized in their 
religiosity and more open to a secular system.  Indeed, 
they have more in common with the West than the others in 
Iraq.  Admittedly, at the same time the Iraqi dictator 
arose from the Sunnis.  Thus all is a question of 
psychology: we should understand that the Sunni Arabs are 
angry and frustrated. 
 
7. (C) Yet we should convince them to participate, Gul 
stated.  Turkey is doing everything it can, and the GOT has 
invited all the Sunni religious leaders to Ankara for 
consultations, Gul averred.  Among them is the 
leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, Muhsin Abdul Hamid. 
(Note: Post has heard Abdul Hamid's name mentioned as a 
conduit to Sunni radicals that Gul's colleague, and foreign 
policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu used in fall 2004 to spring 
kidnapped Turkish workers and truck drivers.  End note.)  Gul 
claimed Abdul Hamid is "a clean man whose Islamist identity 
corresponds to that of the people, but who is rational, not a 
dreamer."  Some MPs from 
ruling AKP studied with Hamid and are convinced he can be 
reasoned with, Gul claimed.  However, he has not yet 
responded to the Turks' invitation.  Gul added that he would 
insist to his Arab colleagues at the Jan. 6 
neighbors' meeting in Amman that everyone support elections 
as scheduled. 
 
Gul: The Kurdish Problem 
------------------------ 
 
8. (C) Barzani is another problem, Gul asserted.  The U.S. 
is aware of all that Turkey has done for Barzani, all the 
concessions Turkey has made in the past ten years, even 
though Turkey saw the danger that he would use Turkish help 
to build his own power infrastructure.  The Kurds need to 
persuade themselves that they are part of Iraq; they 
shouldn't be allowed to damage the process of building a 
united Iraq.  This is why Turkey is sensitive.  It's true 
that people in Turkey's southeast feel kinship ties to the 
Kurds in northern Iraq, but "we" (Turks) also have 
relatives among the Turkmen and among Caucasian peoples. 
More than 100,000 Kurds have been sent to Kirkuk; we are 
disturbed.  Therefore, Barzani shouldn't spoil the 
balance.  In the 1950's through 1970's 90% of Kirkuk city 
center was Turks (sic).  Modernization brought others into 
the city, but Turkey objects to organized attempts to 
change the balance.  In this regard, Turkey appreciates 
that the U.S. recognizes a higher population figure for the 
Turkmen than before. 
 
9. (C) Deputy Secretary noted that Saddam also changed the 
demographic balance, bringing Arabs and others into 
Kirkuk.  In any event, in answer to the Deputy Secretary's 
question Barzani had said there are no problems in his 
relations with Turkey and he reiterated the same goals for 
Iraq as the U.S. and Turkey have.  How did Gul evaluate 
Barzani's assessment? 
 
10. (C) It's not just the Kurds who have suffered, Gul 
responded.  The Kurds shouldn't monopolize the Iraq 
question.  Because of Barzani's resistance there is still 
only one border opening between Turkey and Iraq, whereas 
the Iraqi-Iranian border is wide open and there are four or 
five crossings with Syria.  Turkey is an open society and 
the citizenry is closely questioning the GOT why so many 
trucks are waiting at the border to cross into Iraq.  The 
U.S. takes Barzani's interests fully into account but 
doesn't take Turkey's enough into account, he contended. 
Turkey is not against the Kurds.  In the past, Turks, Kurds 
and Sunni Arabs were all united against the Shi,a.  We don't 
need artificial problems, he concluded.  Moreover, Gul 
said, the MFA is extremely disturbed by a report from the 
Turkish security services that the Pentagon has sponsored a 
public opinion poll in eastern and southeastern Turkey 
asking whether respondents want to secede and who should be 
their president if they do so.  How could the Pentagon do 
such a thing on Turkish soil?  Anti-Americanism is already 
on the rise in Turkey.  If such activity leaked to the 
press it would be exceptionally damaging.  Gul asked his 
staff to pass details to the Embassy. 
 
11. (C) Deputy Secretary rejoined that Gul's 
characterization of the U.S. approach is unfair; the U.S. 
takes Turkey's concerns into account.  The Turks should put 
themselves in President Bush's position: the U.S. has 
150,000 troops in Iraq and some are dying nearly every 
day.  We have the same interests in success.  Concerning 
the reported poll, it makes no sense that the U.S. would be 
associated in any way with such a venture; we would look 
into it as soon as the Turkish side could give us 
information.  With regard to anti-Americanism, the U.S. has 
noted many bad statements coming from many quarters in 
Turkey. 
 
12. (C) Gul retreated, answering the Deputy Secretary's 
final remark by placing all the blame on a "mistaken 
statement" equating the Fallujah operation with genocide by 
the AKP chairman of the parliamentary human rights 
committee. 
 
Syria 
----- 
 
13. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted his lengthy Jan. 2 
conversations with both President Assad and FM Shara.  While 
Syria has taken some measures to return Iraqi funds moved by 
the Baathis to Syria and has somewhat strengthened its border 
with Iraq against infiltration into Iraq by foreign 
insurgents, former Iraqi regime elements still have 
unimpeded entry and exit.  Syrian authorities have a good 
idea who is in their country and the Deputy Secretary noted 
he had told Assad amelioration of U.S.-Syrian relations 
depends on Syria's getting tougher on this score: the road 
to better relations with Syria runs through Baghdad.  Assad 
and Shara seemed to get the message, although Shara was 
repeatedly vague when the Deputy Secretary pressed him on 
whether he would attend the Amman meeting.  How did Gul 
assess the Syrians? 
 
14. (C) Gul replied that Turkey's relations with Syria are 
very good.  Turkey will have an indirect but tangible 
effect in bringing change to the Syrian regime.  Therefore, 
Turkey needs to continue to engage systematically, and help 
the Syrians to help themselves and to help the peace 
process.  At the same time, Gul asserted, Turkey has told 
its interlocutors to be careful with terrorist 
organizations: in this world of electronic surveillance, no 
one can hide anything any more.  Transparency is necessary. 
 Trying to be clever is merely a sign of weakness.  The 
world is changing and Syria needs to take lessons from what 
is happening in its immediate region.  Gul claimed that, in 
response to these Turkish points, he sees more 
understanding on the part of the Syrian leadership. 
 
15. (C) So far, the Syrian regime trusts us, Gul continued, 
and we are very open.  The people of Syria are very happy 
with the improvement in relations with Turkey.  Thus Turkey 
is in position to pass any messages to the Syrian 
leadership the U.S. might wish.  Gul's staff noted he could 
approach Shara in this way at the Amman meeting and Deputy 
Secretary suggested that Gul mention two points: (1) the 
 
SIPDIS 
U.S. is looking for active, not passive Syrian assistance 
in moving against former Iraqi regime elements; and (2) 
there is a window of opportunity in the peace process after 
Jan. 9 and we will need the support of the new Palestinian 
leadership to end violence. 
 
Cyprus and Armenia 
------------------ 
 
16. (C) Turning to Cyprus, Gul lamented that it had not 
been easy to respond to President Bush's call for Turkey to 
be courageous and to support the Annan Plan.  Yet despite 
Turkey's decision to change its policy, to be a problem 
solver, it is the Greek side which is being honored and the 
Turkish side which is being punished.  If the U.S. doesn't 
take the lead to end the Turkish Cypriots' isolation the 
Greek side will continue to insist on its policy. 
 
17. (C) When the Deputy Secretary asked whether Gul 
couldn't see all that the U.S. is doing, Gul retreated half 
way, acknowledging that he has seen helpful U.S. actions, 
but immediately adding that, if the U.S. wants a 
settlement, then the Greek Cypriots must also compromise. 
The U.S. needs to tell the Greek Cypriots that if they do 
not show movement, then the U.S. will do more for the 
Turkish Cypriots.  Likewise, Turkey wants to solve the 
question of Armenia, but, again, Turkey can't compromise or 
sacrifice unilaterally.  Gul thanked the U.S. for its strong 
support for Turkish EU accession. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
18. (C) On Afghanistan both agreed Turkey's re-assumption 
of ISAF command is important; both agreed that the 
narcotics problem is both very serious and difficult to 
bring under control. 
 
19. (U) The Deputy Secretary approved this cable. 
 
20. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN