US embassy cable - 05SANAA36

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MASS, IZ, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SALEH 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
1. (C) Summary.  USCENTCOM Commander General Abizaid met with 
President Saleh on January 4.  Discussions centered on Iraqi 
elections, regional security, and U.S.-Yemen cooperation in 
the GWOT.  Both agreed that U.S.-Yemen joint security efforts 
should continue and increase in the new year, with Abizaid 
pressing for enhanced information sharing, particularly on 
fighting al-Qa'ida. Discussions with Ministry of Defense and 
Yemeni Coast Guard officials were useful in specifying areas 
for bilateral military cooperation. Failure to clear the 
General's communications equipment through airport security, 
however, pointed to continuing opaqueness of the ROYG's 
Political Security Organization (PSO). End Summary. 
 
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Iraqi Elections: Engage the Ba'thists 
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2. (C) Getting right to the point, President Saleh advised 
General Abizaid that the Iraqi elections be postponed, 
warning that holding elections now guarantees a Shia-heavy 
government and, therefore, he said, a divided society.  "It 
is no shame, advised Saleh, to talk with the Sunni Ba'thist 
opposition." He proposed that the U.S. engage in dialogue 
with Iraqi Ba'thists and other Sunni supporters of the 
insurgency with to goal of holding "a more balanced election 
in the future."  By isolating the Iraqi Ba'thists Saleh 
continued, "you force them into the Zarqawi camp."  General 
Abizaid responded that the U.S. is willing to talk to anyone 
in Iraq with the exception of al Qa'ida, Zarqawi and other 
terrorists.  To postpone the elections, however, would be a 
victory for terrorism.  Saleh reiterated the need to bring 
the Iraqi Sunnis and Ba'thists inside the tent and suggested 
that the USG employ Syrian Ba'athists to facilitate such a 
dialogue.  Saleh also  offered his own good offices to 
establish such contacts, suggesting that his Iraqi ex- 
Ba'thist military advisors could serve as conduits to 
Ba'thists inside Iraq."think about it," he said, "and let me 
know if I can help."  Despite his view that elections should 
be postponed, Saleh confirmed that the ROYG would be sending 
Yemeni election observers to Iraq for the January 30 
elections in coordination with the Canadian government. 
 
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CT Cooperation 
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3. (S) Abizaid told Saleh he had just had a useful meeting 
with Minister of Defense Alaiwa and Chief of Staff Qassemi in 
which he expressed his support for continued and increased 
security and counter-terrorism cooperation in 2005.  Saleh 
agreed, saying that he hoped U.S.-Yemen joint efforts in the 
GWOT as well as economic and military cooperation would 
expand.  Abizaid referred to earlier ROYG requests for 
intelligence sharing, saying that the U.S. remained ready to 
provide such assistance.  (Note:  Saleh had requested U.S. 
military aircraft reconnaissance flights over the areas of 
the al-Houthi rebellion.  After interagency agreement, 
however, the ROYG declined the assistance saying the 
insurgency had already been put down. End Note). Emphasizing 
the importance of ROYG intel-sharing to our joint security 
interests, Abizaid assured President Saleh that the U.S. 
would continue to be forthcoming.  General Abizaid 
complimented the ROYG (and the MOI in particular) on recent 
CT related arrests and pressed for full information sharing 
and coordination with the USG Embassy on those arrests. 
 
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Did you pack all that luggage yourself? 
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4. (S) Belying the friendly and useful discussions General 
Abizaid had with ROYG officials at MOD, YCG (details septel) 
and President Saleh, was a standoff at Sanaa airport between 
the General's staff and airport officials over the clearance 
of the General's luggage and communications equipment through 
customs. Embassy high level contacts managed to get the 
traveling party's personal luggage released, but not the 
communications gear. Airport officials insisted that they 
needed a letter from President Saleh personally to allow the 
equipment in - a permission which is not routinely required 
and which was impossible to obtain on such short notice. 
(Comment: The Deputy Director of the President's office told 
CDA that he personally appealed to General Gamesh, the crusty 
old guard Director of the Political Security Organization 
(PSO) in this matter. That Gamesh did not authorize the 
release of the equipment is not surprising, given the lack of 
transparency and trust we regularly experience in our 
dealings with this organization. More troubling, is the 
possibility that Saleh himself may have been informed of this 
situation and failed to give his instructions to resolve it. 
End comment). 
 
KHOURY