US embassy cable - 05AMMAN119

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SENATOR KERRY'S JANUARY 4 MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH

Identifier: 05AMMAN119
Wikileaks: View 05AMMAN119 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2005-01-06 08:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

060827Z Jan 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ZFR ZFR - DISREGARD AMMAN 000119 AND MCN'S, CABLE WILL 
BE RESENT UNDER A NEW MRN AND MCN'S - ZFR ZFR - DISREGARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2010 
TAGS: PREL, JO 
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY'S JANUARY 4 MEETING WITH KING 
ABDULLAH 
 
 
Classified By: Charge David Hale, Reasons 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1.  (C) Senator John Kerry (D-MA) met for nearly an hour with 
King Abdullah on January 4.  Deputy Prime Minister Muasher 
(as acting Foreign Minister), Royal Court Minister al-Rifai, 
and Palace Media advisor Bahous joined Nancy Stetson and 
Charge in the meeting, which focused almost exclusively on 
the critical milestones facing the Middle East in January, 
with Palestinian and Iraqi elections. 
 
2.  (C) The King anticipated that the election of Abu Mazen 
would bring to office a strong partner for Israel, who could 
be counted on to work outstanding security issues.  The King 
hoped the international community would move quickly to 
provide the tangible support Abu Mazen needed to demonstrate 
to the Palestinian people that moderation would bring 
rewards.  The Israelis needed to help as well by easing up on 
closures and curfews and releasing more Palestinian tax 
revenues.  During UK Prime Minister Blair,s recent private 
visit to Aqaba, the King had explored the possibility of 
bringing the date of the London conference forward, so there 
was no lag after the elections for spoilers to exploit. 
However, he understands complicated logistics had dictated 
the March date.  The King expressed guarded optimism about 
the opportunities emerging on the Israeli-Palestinian front. 
When asked, Muasher described the results of the Taba talks 
on final status as ideal, but far removed from Israeli Prime 
Minister Sharon's thinking.  He feared Sharon was not 
prepared to move beyond the end of phase two of the roadmap 
) a Palestinian state with provisional borders in control of 
50 percent of its territory ) not a viable situation.  The 
King expressed confidence in the President's expression of 
determination, during his December visit to Washington, to 
move forward on the two state vision.  As he had with the 
President, he emphasized to Senator Kerry why the viability 
of a Palestinian state is of such critical importance to 
Jordan; failure to reach that aim will resuscitate old claims 
of "Jordan is Palestine."  If steps are not taken urgently to 
achieve a viable Palestinian state, "facts on the ground" 
could soon make the goal unattainable.  The King described 
renewed Arab efforts, led by Egypt and supported by the 
Saudis, to highlight the importance of the Beirut 
Declaration, especially in the run-up to this Spring's 
regular Arab League summit. 
 
3. (C) Asked if there was linkage between developments in the 
West Bank/Gaza and Iraq, the King said the two situations 
feed off each other in the public mind.  To the extent that 
progress toward a solution of the Palestinian problem 
addresses Arab frustration, then the greater the strength of 
forces of moderation as they fight terrorism and extremism. 
Asked about the prospects for the Iraqi elections, the King 
reviewed his constructive discussions with IIG Prime Minister 
Allawi and their shared conviction of the importance of 
holding the elections on time and of maximizing Sunni 
participation.  The King reviewed his well-voiced concerns 
about Iranian influence in Iraq and how it could lead, in a 
worst-case scenario, to the emergence of an Iranian dominated 
theocratic regime.  If Sunni Muslim participation in the 
elections is imperfect, the King continued, it would be 
important to look for other ways to draw the Sunnis into the 
process, as a bulwark against Iranian advances.  The King 
also urged faster efforts to reconstitute the army, both to 
mop up the huge pool of unemployed Sunnis who were ripe 
recruits for the insurgency, and to improve security.  He 
advocated greater use of Jordan for training of Iraqi 
recruits, including by integrating units into Jordan's only 
18-month training cycle.  He expressed frustration that the 
Iraqis were asking Jordan for basic supplies for their 
troops, which he thought should be provided as an integral 
part of fielding these units.  He was pleased with the 
success in our joint training of Iraqi counter-insurgency 
units, which have performed well when deployed. 
 
4.  (C) Asked about the Iranian nuclear program, the King 
said a US/EU united front was the only diplomatic way to 
influence Iranian behavior; Tehran was adept at exploiting 
any hint of a gap.  In any event, it was his estimate that 
the Iranians were determined to proceed with their nuclear 
program regardless of the international community's views. 
In the longer run, coalition success in stabilizing Iraq was 
the best way to contain Iran and the "axis of evil"; 
conversely, failure to do so would allow Iran to expand its 
influence immeasurably.  Iraq had become the new strategic 
battlefield between the U.S. and Iran, he said.  Asked to 
assess the global war on terrorism, the King said we had not 
lost ground, but not gained much either.  Without progress on 
the peace process and in Iraq, street-level militancy would 
grow throughout the region ) affecting all regimes in the 
long-run.  Jordan was also working on a long-term and global 
effort to mobilize moderate, non-governmental Islamic leaders 
behind the "Amman message."  The aim was to enable the 
mainstream of Islam to counter extremists, rhetoric by 
noting that violence in the name of religion was a violation 
of the tenets of Islam, a faith of tolerance.  He would later 
BE RESENT UNDER NEW MRN AND MCN'S - ZFR ZFR - DISREGARD 
be in touch with us on how to extend this process to Muslim 
communities in the U.S., in order to combat homegrown 
Salafist movements.  Turning to Syria, the King reviewed his 
understanding of the direct messages the USG has conveyed to 
Bashar al-Asad, and his intention to reinforce them when the 
two meet in Amman the week of January 9. 
 
5.  (C) The meeting concluded with the King's review of 
Jordan's supplemental assistance request, which he viewed as 
enabling him to gain essential political insulation so he can 
continue to "stick his neck out" on unpopular but necessary 
steps to support our common strategic goals in the region. 
He was grateful for the enormous help Jordan had already 
received, but if the U.S. was to continue to look to Jordan 
as a platform in the troubled region, more was needed. 
Senator Kerry praised the enormous help Jordan had provided 
and pledged his personal support in congress's review of 
Jordan's needs.  Hexam 
HALE 

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