US embassy cable - 05USNATO3

S E C R E T  USNATO 000003 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, NP/PPC, AC/DS 
OSD/ISP FOR SCHLESS, ROSE 
OSD/MDA FOR KIEFER, SEARSE 
NSC FOR VOLKER, DICASAGRANDE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014 
TAGS: NATO, KNNP, PARM, MNUC 
SUBJECT: NATO MOVES FORWARD WITH LANDMARK BALLISTIC MISSILE 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: C-M(2004)109 
 
Classified By: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1.  (S) Summary: During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the 
completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile 
Risks and Threats.  The fruit of more than 18 months of 
negotiations, the Analysis fulfills in part a 2002 Prague 
Summit tasking to examine options for addressing ballistic 
missile threats to the Alliance.  At 180 pages, it provides 
the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and ballistic 
missile (BM) proliferation trends the Alliance has ever 
produced.  Among the document's key findings are that some 
countries currently have the capability to launch a ballistic 
missile attack on NATO's southeastern flank and U.S. forces 
in the Pacific, and that the risk of a ballistic missile 
attack on any Alliance territory, population centers or NATO 
forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade 
to come.  The Analysis contains unprecedented consensus 
positions on the intentions, capabilities and proliferation 
record of Iran, Syria and North Korea as well as Russia and 
China.  It also addresses the contributions of 
non-proliferation instruments, including new approaches such 
as PSI and UNSCR 1540, as well as the implications of the 
A.Q. Khan network. 
 
2.  (C) Combined with two major feasibility studies and 
ongoing technical consultations, the Analysis provides NATO 
with the political consensus and general assessment necessary 
to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the 
acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against the 
full range of ballistic missile threats.  In this context, 
USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Community's strong 
support for the Analysis's development, will continue to 
request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and 
welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to 
brief Allies in the Senior Politico-Military Group on 
Proliferation (SGP) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 
WMD and BM proliferation-related topics.  End Summary. 
 
Context of the Longer-Term Analysis 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) While NATO has yet to make a definitive decision on 
missile defense for populations and territories, NATO's 
Strategic Concept notes that NATO's posture against the 
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery "must 
continue to improve, including through work on missile 
defense."  At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and 
Government agreed "to examine options for addressing the 
increasing missile threat to NATO territory, forces and 
population centers in an effective and efficient way through 
an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along 
with deterrence" as well as to initiate a Theater Missile 
Defense (TMD) Feasibility Study. 
 
4.  (C) This TMD feasibility study, which focuses on the 
technical requirements, costs, and time scale of possible 
architectures for an Active-Layered Theater Ballistic Missile 
Defense (ALTBMD) system to protect NATO deployed forces, was 
completed in 2003.  In January 2004, a second Missile Defense 
Feasibility Study was contracted to examine options for 
protecting Alliance territory and population centers.  Upon 
its scheduled completion in July 2005, this study will be 
submitted to the Conference of National Armaments Directors, 
which will review and approve a consolidated report in late 
2005.  This report in turn will be forwarded to the Executive 
Working Group (Reinforced) (EWG(R)), NATO's primary forum for 
missile defense consultations. 
 
5.  (C) During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the 
completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile 
Risks and Threats (reftel), which fulfilled another 2002 
Prague Summit tasking to assess current and potential WMD and 
ballistic missile threats to the Alliance over the next ten 
years.  The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations, 
this 180-page Analysis contains unprecedented consensus 
positions on key countries of proliferation concern and 
provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and BM 
risks and threats the Alliance has ever produced. 
 
6.  (S) The Analysis is divided into five chapters, which 
address non-proliferation regimes and national measures; 
capabilities and intentions; alternative means of delivery; 
secondary proliferation and procurement networks; and 
 
 
intelligence gaps.  As a whole, it clearly demonstrates that 
NATO already faces certain risks and potential threats, and 
that the Alliance must continue to closely monitor the 
intentions and capabilities of countries of proliferation 
concern. 
 
7.  (C) Combined with the EWG(R)'s ongoing work and the two 
Missile Defense Feasibility Studies, the Analysis provides 
NATO with the political consensus and general assessment 
necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the 
acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against 
ballistic missile threats.  This includes the goal of 
achieving initial operational capability for an ALTBMD system 
to protect NATO deployed forces by 2010 as well as possible 
steps toward acquiring capabilities to protect Alliance 
territory and population centers against the full range of BM 
threats. 
 
Key Findings of the Longer-Term Analysis 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (S) The risk of a ballistic missile attack on any 
Alliance territory, population centers, or NATO deployed 
forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade 
to come.  Iran and Syria have ballistic missiles that can 
reach parts of NATO territory and deployed forces, and they 
have chemical weapons (CW) for use as warheads.  Concerns 
over Russian and Chinese BM capabilities are currently 
primarily limited to the potential for accidental or 
unauthorized launches, and the risk that their technology 
will proliferate to unstable countries. 
 
9.  (S) Current and future assessments of BM capabilities 
must take into account scenarios where components 
indigenously developed or acquired from abroad are integrated 
into existing missile programs to improve accuracy and 
operational readiness.  Countries developing BMs may not 
necessarily follow U.S. or Russian patterns of development or 
deployment.  North Korea began fielding and selling the No 
Dong after a single flight test, and countries today may rely 
in part on computer modeling or other means aside from easily 
observable test launches to keep their development programs 
covert. 
 
10.  (S) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are not widely 
recognized as an immediate threat to the Alliance, but an 
indirect risk to NATO deployed forces is possible.  In the 
future, there will be an increased risk that UAVs could be 
converted to carry and dispense CW and biological weapons 
(BW).  The willingness of some states and illegal entities to 
transfer UAV or cruise missile (CM) components, peripheral 
equipment or technology is increasing and requires effective 
counter-proliferation measures to reduce their availability. 
There is currently no disarmament or non-proliferation 
agreement that restrains the production, development or 
possession of UAVs and CMs. 
 
11.  (S) Possession of WMD and their means of delivery has 
become a major goal for both state and non-state actors for 
reasons of prestige, influence or deterrence.  Proliferating 
states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated 
measures to obtain WMD- or BM-related equipment, materials 
and technologies.  Some countries that were proliferation 
customers in the 1980s have themselves become suppliers.  The 
development of indigenous capabilities in relevant dual-use 
applications such as nuclear power, biotechnology and space 
launch systems can help to conceal ultimate intentions. 
North Korea and Iran as well as Russian and Chinese entities 
are likely to remain the major suppliers of WMD- and 
BM-related equipment, materials and expertise.  The 
identification, monitoring, and eventual dismantlement of the 
A.Q. Khan network show that there is a complicated worldwide 
marketplace for these inputs. 
 
12.  (C) Although arms control agreements and 
non-proliferation regimes will continue to slow the 
proliferation of WMD and BMs, the capability of both 
suppliers and proliferants are likely to improve.  The 
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is the 
strongest affirmation of the international community's 
support for multilateral treaties and other international 
instruments that seek to prevent WMD proliferation. 
Traditional diplomatic measures are enhanced by new tools 
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and Operation 
Active Endeavour, which serve to complement and strengthen 
international norms and mechanisms. 
 
 
Select Country-Specific Conclusions 
----------------------------------- 
 
North Korea: 
 
13.  (S) Recent developments in North Korea seem to indicate 
ambitions to use WMD combined with BMs not only as a 
deterrent but also as a political bargaining chip and a means 
of blackmail to obtain economic or financial aid.  Various 
sources place North Korea has having 10 to 30 kg of 
weapons-grade plutonium, and while North Korea claims to have 
a nuclear deterrent, there is uncertainty as to whether it 
currently has operational nuclear weapons for military use. 
It is possible that North Korea would use WMD and BMs if it 
felt that the survival of the regime was at stake. 
 
14.  (S) Pyongyang is reportedly developing a new land-mobile 
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the 
Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched BM; if confirmed, this 
potential to use a more advanced propulsion technology would 
be of serious concern.  North Korea has continued with 
development work and ground-based testing of the Taepo 
Dong-2, which according to some Allies' experts with a third 
stage could deliver a weapons payload of 500 kg up to 15,000 
km--i.e., all of the United States and Europe, albeit with 
very poor accuracy.  U.S. forces in the Pacific are within 
range of North Korean missiles, and it is cause for serious 
concern that North Korea's willingness to proliferate 
longer-range BM technology will hasten the risk to broad 
expanses of NATO territory. 
 
Iran: 
 
15.  (S) Iran continues to put a high priority on an 
ambitious BM program focused on the development of both 
liquid and solid propellant short-range BMs and medium-range 
BMs with assistance from Russia, North Korea and China. 
Tehran has announced its intention to put satellites into 
orbit, which would establish the technical base to develop an 
IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. 
 Iran already has BM capabilities that put the southeastern 
flank of NATO within range, and within the next ten years, it 
is likely to produce qualitative and quantitative changes to 
its military capabilities that will significantly increase 
the potential threat to the Alliance and NATO forces deployed 
in the region. 
 
16.  (S) Concerns have been widely expressed over Iran's 
nuclear program and its failures and breaches regarding its 
Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), and the IAEA cannot positively identify that 
Iran's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. 
Should its nuclear program continue to proceed at the same 
pace, Iran could produce sufficient fissile material for a 
first nuclear device by 2010.  Iran is assessed to have an 
offensive BW program and has almost certainly conducted 
BW-related research using spray devices and adapted munitions 
for delivery.  Despite its ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran is also assessed to be 
retaining an offensive CW program and has the technological 
capability to develop a CW warhead for use on BMs. 
 
Syria: 
 
17.  (S) There is no evidence that Syria plans to attempt to 
acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability, and it 
currently lacks the resources, infrastructure and scientific 
expertise to pursue one.  Syria is judged to have a BW 
program in the research and development phase, as well as an 
advanced CW program that includes several facilities for 
testing, production and storage of CW.  Syria can produce 
SCUD missile fuel and various solid propellant ingredients, 
and continues to make progress in this area with probable 
Chinese and Iranian assistance.  It can deliver both sarin 
and VX with aerial bombs, SCUD-Bs and possibly SCUD-Cs. 
Qualitative and quantitative improvements in Syria's WMD and 
BM capabilities over the next ten years will increase the 
potential threat to NATO territory, notably the southeastern 
flank of the Alliance. 
 
China: 
 
18.  (S) China has a mature capability to develop and launch 
BMs with nuclear warheads and is carrying out a strategic 
modernization program to improve the quality of its arsenal, 
including replacing liquid-fueled ICBMs with solid-fuel 
systems and deploying more of its BMs on road-mobile 
 
 
launchers.  China is believed to have an advanced CW program 
as well as an offensive BW capability, and its voluntary 
declarations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete. 
While China has the capability to pose a potential threat to 
NATO territory or deployed forces, at present Beijing focuses 
on a strategic posture that defends its regional influence in 
Asia.  The greatest concern regarding Chinese capabilities is 
the risk of onward proliferation of technology and material 
to other countries.  In light of all these elements, NATO 
must remain aware of developments in China. 
 
Russia: 
 
19.  (S) While Moscow has no intention of executing military 
operations against the Alliance, Russia has a mature arsenal 
of BMs capable of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of 
NATO territory.  It is also modernizing its BMs at a measured 
pace and is pursuing warhead refurbishment.  While the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program will continue to improve 
the security of non-deployed nuclear warheads, weapons-grade 
fissile material will likely remain vulnerable to theft. 
Russia's BW program, which is probably still offensive, 
remains active and declarations to date have failed to reveal 
the full size and scope of the Soviet program.  Russia 
possesses a number of unacknowledged CW agents and weapons, 
and it cannot be entirely excluded that Russia could pursue 
some non-compliant activity without detection.  It has given 
priority to the development of modern CW systems and agents 
designed to defeat NATO protective systems and circumvent the 
CWC.  In light of its WMD and BM capabilities, NATO must 
remain concerned about the potential threat from Russia. 
 
Small Step for NATO MD, Giant Leap for SGP 
------------------------------------------ 
 
20.  (S) Comment: While the Longer-Term Analysis is but one 
of many inputs into the equation that will determine how NATO 
will face the spread of WMD and BM capabilities, it has also 
succeeded in highlighting proliferation issues of key 
importance to the U.S.  Spirited and sometimes contentious 
debate with Allies (especially France and Germany) over Iran, 
North Korea, and China in the SGP has in the end produced a 
broad and agreed foundation for continued engagement with 
Allies on tough proliferation questions.  In this context, 
USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Community's strong 
support for the Analysis's development, will continue to 
request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and 
welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to 
brief Allies in the SGP and the NAC on WMD and BM 
proliferation-related topics.  While such briefings--and the 
debates they provoke--may seem to parallel discussion in 
other fora, it is essential that we raise these issues at 
NATO Headquarters if the U.S. is to play a leadership role in 
shaping Alliance policy, guiding the development of 
collective capabilities, and considering operational 
responses to curb and counter the proliferation of WMD and 
their means of delivery.  End Comment. 
BURNS 
 
 
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