US embassy cable - 05ANKARA68

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURNS DISCUSSES IRAQ AND MEPP WITH TURKISH MFA

Identifier: 05ANKARA68
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA68 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-01-05 16:40:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PTER PREL OVIP TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA, S/CT AND EUR/SE DOUG SILLIMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2029 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, OVIP, TU 
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURNS DISCUSSES IRAQ AND MEPP 
WITH TURKISH MFA 
 
REF: ANKARA 6809 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary: NEA Assistant Secretary Bill Burns 
reconfirmed for senior Turkish MFA Middle East officials US 
commitment to the fulfillment of Iraq-wide elections on 
January 30, the establishment of an equitable government 
thereafter and the creation of an Iraqi security force able 
to take the lead in securing the peace.  Highlighting the 
Deputy Secretary's recent meetings in the region (septels), 
he underscored US efforts with Kurdish leader Barzani to end 
his opposition to provincial elections in Kirkuk.  A/S Burns 
welcomed Turkish contributions to the NATO Training Mission 
for the Iraqi security forces but underscored the need for 
additional training and equipment assistance.  Turkish Acting 
Under Secretary Sensoy confirmed Turkey's firm support of the 
January elections but registered concerns about low Sunni 
participation and Kurdish aspirations for Kirkuk.  Sensoy 
expressed Turkey's disappointment at the lack of US action 
against the PKK and noted the desire for the organization's 
elimination in the near term.  Both looked forward to the 
Jan. 11 trilateral (TU/US/IZ) talks.  Deputy U/S Uzumcu asked 
for US assistance to facilitate the opening of a second 
border post with Iraq.  U/S Sensoy said FM Gul would 
emphasize Turkey's support for the Middle East Peace Process 
(MEPP) in upcoming meetings with Israeli and Palestinian 
officials and underscored Turkey's desire for a concrete 
role.  Deputy Director General (DDG) Akat pledged Turkey's 
continued efforts for the Broader Middle East and North 
Africa (BMENA) initiative. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) A/S Burns met with Turkish MFA Acting Under Secretary 
Nabi Sensoy and Deputy U/S for Middle East, Africa, Caucasus 
and South Asia Affairs Ahmet Uzumcu on Jan. 3, to discuss 
Iraq and the MEPP just hours before Uzumcu's departure with 
FM Gul for meetings with the Israelis and Palestinians.  Also 
participating in the meeting from Turkey were Deputy U/S 
Ahmet Uzumcu, Special Envoy for Iraq Osman Koruturk, DDG for 
Policy Planning Mehmet Akat, DDG for Middle East Affairs 
Sefak Gokturk and DDG for the Americas Suna Ilicak. 
PolCouns, PolMilCouns and Deputy PolMilCouns accompanied A/S 
Burns. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
Elections: 
 
3. (S) Election Timing: Acting U/S Sensoy emphasized that 
Turkey shared the fundamental US objective of a peaceful 
Iraq, both internally and in relations with its neighbors.  A 
united Iraq with a solid democratic structure was critical to 
avoid future instability.  In Sensoy's view, however, the 
current situation in Iraq didn't reflect these objectives. 
Turkey wanted to see elections take place as scheduled on 
Jan. 30, with equitable participation by all segments of 
society.  Concerned about low Sunni participation, Turkey was 
using its influence to persuade Sunni leaders but could not 
do this alone and needed US assistance.  Special Iraq Envoy 
Koruturk expressed concern about out-of-country voter fraud 
that could falsely inflate the number of Shia votes. 
Equitable participation was necessary to ensure fair 
representation in the new government and an equitable 
constitution.  Turkey would participate in the Jan. 6 meeting 
of neighboring countries in Amman, during which full election 
participation would be high on the agenda.  According to 
Sensoy, Turkey would try to influence its neighbors at the 
meeting to help combat those groups working against the 
election process,but in Sensoy's view the US also needed to 
make a forceful effort. 
 
4. (S) US Approach: A/S Burns confirmed US agreement on our 
shared common goal of a unified, stable Iraq and reiterated 
the US three-pronged strategy (political, economic, security) 
toward that end.  In recent meetings with Deputy Secretary 
Armitage, Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi and the Independent 
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) had expressed their 
commitment to hold the elections on time.  The US shared 
concerns about possible vote fraud and was watching the 
situation closely.  To address security concerns in Mosul, 
the US 82nd AirBorne Division would send a brigade, and the 
Iraqi National Guard might also deploy forces.  On the 
economic side, assistance funds were being disbursed at an 
accelerated rate, in an effort to give people hope for the 
future.  A/S Burns underscored that the formation of a 
government after the elections was equally critical and must 
be closely watched.  In response to DDG Gokturk's question 
about US plans to deal with a possible large Shia win in the 
elections and the protection of Sunni rights, A/S Burns 
emphasized that the US focus was on ensuring equitable 
participation in the elections.  Any such outcome would be 
addressed afterwards. 
 
5. (S) Kirkuk Provincial Elections:  Sensoy said Kurds wanted 
to postpone the Kirkuk elections and seemed to be opting out 
of the Iraqi democratic process.  He added that the recent 
Kurdish proposal to the UN for a referendum on independence 
for the Kurdish area did not bode well for the future and 
should be stopped at all costs.  In Sensoy's view the Kurds 
covet Kirkuk and were doing everything conceivable to "steal 
it from the country."  The international community must 
ensure that this effort did not succeed.  Koruturk added that 
Turkey considered the lack of ethnic clashes in Iraq to-date 
to be hopeful, but feared that, if such a clash were to 
happen, it would take place in Kirkuk.  A/S Burns relayed 
DepSec Armitage's strong message to Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) leader Barzani that provincial and national 
elections were intertwined and all must occur on Jan. 30.  To 
pull out one thread would make the whole process unravel. 
While Barzani did not commit to participate, the US 
impression was that he was  moving in the right direction but 
trying to buy time to see what concessions he could get in 
return.  A/S Burns was hopeful that the Kirkuk elections 
would take place on time. 
 
 
Security: 
 
6.  (S) A/S Burns noted that the coalition was in a race 
against time to stand-up and train the Iraqi Security Forces 
and said there was an ambitious program to get them into the 
field.  The forces had started to prove themselves during 
recent fighting in Fallujah, where they performed much better 
than during battles there in the spring, when some forces 
fled.  He recognized Turkey's contributions to the NATO 
Training Mission for Iraq but emphasized the need for 
anything more Turkey could provide in the way of training and 
equipment within the context of that mission. 
 
Second Border Opening: 
 
7. (S) Sensoy said that passage through Habur provided the 
only direct route from Turkey into central Iraq.  Turkey 
wanted to establish a second border gate and requested US 
assistance to ensure that its access to the Iraqi seat of 
government was not controlled by northern Iraq.  DDG Akat 
seconded this request, saying that everything produced in 
Turkey had a market in Iraq.  Turkey's trade with Iraq 
totaled almost USD 2 billion and had actually increased 
during coalition efforts.  Opining that if it were left up to 
Barzani there would never be a second or third border 
opening, Deputy U/S Uzumcu asked for US pressure on Barzani, 
immediately following the elections, not to block the opening 
of a new gate.  Uzumcu expressed his understanding that 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Talabani supported 
an additional border opening, believing that three to five 
new gates would be needed. 
 
-------------- 
PKK/Kongra Gel 
-------------- 
 
8. (S) Sensoy, who had participated in previous bilateral 
discussions on the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party)/Kongra Gel, 
expressed great disappointment that the US had not fulfilled 
Turkey's expectations or US commitments to combat these 
terrorists.  In particular, he pointed to US agreement that 
no PKK-affiliated parties should participate in Iraqi 
elections.  In spite of this, Sensoy said two PKK/Kongra Gel 
affiliates, the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party and the 
Democratic Construction Party, were registered to take part 
in the elections.  Turkey considered this disturbing and 
hoped the US would address the issue (see reftel).  Sensoy 
said Turkey still expected the elimination of the PKK from 
northern Iraq and wanted to see that happen in the coming 
months.  A/S Burns emphasized that the US takes Turkey's 
concerns about the PKK seriously.  Suggesting the Jan. 11 
trilateral talks as the appropriate forum to address the 
issue, he confirmed that the US would send a strong team both 
from the region and from Washington that would be prepared to 
discuss all aspects of the problem. 
 
---- 
MEPP 
---- 
 
9. (S)  Looking to the upcoming Palestinian Presidential 
elections, Sensoy said he saw reason for optimism in the 
peace process.  The new Palestinian government would face 
challenges from within, if Hamas viewed the rapprochement 
process as a threat and Israel would respond to any Hamas 
action.  However, Sensoy was optimistic that both sides would 
show restraint.  A/S Burns concurred that support of the 
post-election Palestinian government was key.  While the 
international community had made many promises, concrete 
support has been limited.  The US had recently announced an 
offer of direct economic support, the UK planned to support 
the re-building of the security forces and Egypt was 
contributing.  The US also looked to the Gulf states to 
provide tangible deliveries. 
 
10. (S) Israeli PM Sharon's Gaza withdrawal implementation 
plan was an excellent opportunity, according to Sensoy, but 
needed to be implemented in the context of the roadmap, and 
as part of a broader process.  It was important for the 
Quartet to help the parties implement a smooth withdrawal 
from Gaza, which must be done in consultation with the 
Palestinians, and to implement the roadmap.  Turkey would 
support the Quartet's efforts towards this end and would 
welcome a concrete role of its own in the process.  According 
to Uzumcu, it was important that the Turkish public see the 
country take a formal role in the MEPP.  A/S Burns allowed 
the possibility of strengthened US/TU consultations on MEPP 
and welcomed continued bilateral consultations during Quartet 
efforts. 
 
11. (S) Noting FM's Gul's trip to Israel that morning, Uzumcu 
said there were two goals for the trip: 1) Emphasize to 
Israel that Turkey values its bilateral relationship and 
wants to maintain it.  2) Urge Israel to seize the current 
opportunity to engage the Palestinians.  Gul would welcome 
Israel's planned withdrawal from Gaza and note Turkey's 
interest in supporting post-withdrawal efforts there.  Uzumcu 
underscored that the Gaza withdrawal must be consistent with 
the road map and added that peace talks were also key. 
Turkey had heard that talks might not begin until the end of 
2005, which, in his view, was too late.  During discussions 
with the Palestinians, Uzumcu expected Gul to note Turkey's 
support for the peace process and for a durable settlement. 
He would also urge them to streamline and control Palestinian 
security forces.  A/S Burns noted that the timing of FM Gul's 
visit to the region was good, with both sides having a 
fragile opportunity for peace, and welcomed the opportunity 
to talk again following the trip.    He agreed that, while 
the Gaza withdrawal could provide a launching pad for the 
peace process it could not end there.  The ultimate US goal 
remains a negotiated political settlement.  We would 
coordinate our efforts with other countries.  Egyptian 
participation was key.  A/S Burns welcomed the opportunity to 
talk with Turkey following Gul's trip to the region. 
 
12. (S) A/S Burns mentioned the Deputy Secretary's message to 
the Syrians to ensure that Hamas and others didn't negatively 
impact the peace process, and encouraged Turkey to repeat the 
message.  In response to a question by Deputy U/S Uzumcu 
about re-opening the Syria/Israel peace track, A/S Burns said 
Syria's behavior over the next six months, during the Gaza 
withdrawal process, would shape the US view of a future for 
the Syria/Israel track.  He added that a sense of hope on 
MEPP can positively impact Iraq and other issues in the 
region. 
 
----- 
BMENA 
----- 
 
13. (S) DDG Akat emphasized Turkey's continued support for 
BMENA, saying that its emphasis on transparency, equality, 
gender rights, etc. were in line with Turkey's foreign policy 
objectives.  Additionally, Turkey realized it was not 
possible to hang all efforts in the Middle East on a 
successful outcome of the MEPP, and therefore, supported a 
parallel track.  Akat noted appreciation for the change in 
the US position to take Turkish and EU views into account. 
Even countries that had initially refused to participate in 
BMENA subsequently signed on when they realized it was better 
to be included in the process than to be left out.  According 
to Akat, Turkey supports the participation of all countries, 
at their own pace.  Turkey's Ambassador to the OSCE had been 
designated to lead the government's effort and Turkey had 
identified an NGO to work with.  The government was already 
working with Italy and Yemen through this forum and planned 
to host a meeting of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue Group 
in 2005.  A/S Burns welcomed Turkey's participation and 
emphasized the need to translate Democracy Assistance 
Dialogue group efforts into practical actions. 
 
14. (U) Assistant Secretary Bill Burns cleared this cable. 
 
15. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
EDELMAN 

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