US embassy cable - 05ANKARA64

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2030 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, TU, IZ, SY, JO, IR 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES IRAQ AND SYRIA WITH 
TURKISH CHOD 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  At their Jan. 3 meeting, Deputy Secretary 
Armitage told Turkish General Staff Chief GEN Hilmi Ozkok 
that his most recent visit to Iraq made him more optimistic 
about the January 30 elections there.  He outlined steps that 
were being taken to reach out to Sunni Arabs, to improve 
security, and to convince the Kurds to reverse their decision 
to boycott elections in Kirkuk.  He asked Turkey to support a 
statement calling on full participation in elections 
occurring on time at the meeting of Iraq's neighbors on Jan. 
6.  He also suggested that Turkey use its influence with 
Damascus to encourage more responsible Syrian behavior. 
Ozkok evinced suspicion of Kurdish intentions in the north, 
concern about Sunni participation in the Jan. 30 elections; 
and, doubts that Syrian President Asad was as in command as 
he tried to project.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) During their Jan. 3 meeting in Ankara, Deputy 
Secretary Richard Armitage and Turkish General Staff (TGS) 
 
SIPDIS 
Chief GEN Hilmi Ozkok agreed that the US and Turkey shared 
the same overall goal in Iraq.  "Your success is our 
success," Ozkok said.  The Deputy Secretary noted that Turkey 
and the US were working together for success and, in that 
vein, it was important to consult and, especially for public 
opinion, to be seen as consulting. 
 
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Iraq Elections 
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3. (C) Having just visited Iraq, the Deputy Secretary 
provided Ozkok with his assessment of the situation.  Deputy 
Secretary Armitage said that he had asked PM Allawi, who he 
 
SIPDIS 
met in Amman before traveling to Iraq, what he was doing to 
reach out to Sunni Arabs.  Allawi provided a sober 
presentation, describing his meeting with various tribal and 
political leaders.  All were arguing for a delay in the 
elections, but could not explain what they would do during 
the interim to ensure a successful outcome.  Their lack of a 
plan led Allawi to the conclusion that there was no point in 
a postponement. 
 
4. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that he came away from his 
meeting with the IECI impressed with Iraqis' courage and 
commitment, and feeling better about the prospects for 
successful elections that he had before.  He admitted that 
Ninewah (Mosul) and Anbar remained problem areas, but even in 
these provinces elections were still possible:  for example, 
more troops were being dispatched to Mosul to improve 
security, and easier-to-secure voting places outside of urban 
centers were being discussed for Anbar. 
 
5. (C) The Deputy Secretary explained that he had changed his 
itinerary in order to talk to Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) leader Masood Barzani about his threat to boycott the 
Kirkuk provincial elections.  He told Barzani in a direct 
manner we would be very unhappy if the KDP forced elections 
in Kirkuk to be postponed.  Although the Deputy Secretary 
said that he was not sure whether he convinced Barzani, US 
observers at the session judged that Barzani's position 
softened as a result.  In fact, the KDP leader told the press 
after the meeting that "we will find a compromise" on Kirkuk. 
 
6. (C) Ozkok responded by saying that TGS shared the Deputy 
Secretary's assessment in large part.  He noted that there is 
 
SIPDIS 
a danger of the Kurds pushing their aim for an independent 
Kurdistan too far, but he believed that they will act 
responsibly in the end.  On Kirkuk, the Kurds seek a delay in 
the elections because they have failed to alter the ethnic 
balance in the province.  However, the future of Kirkuk 
should be decided by all Iraqis.  Ozkok believed that the US 
could convince Barzani, who he described as straightforward 
and stubborn, "to do the right thing."  Similarly, he thought 
the US had leverage with Sunni Arabs to convince them to 
participate in elections.  The Deputy Secretary agreed, but 
added that we were looking to friends like Turkey and Jordan 
to speak publicly about the need for Iraqis to participate. 
All of Iraq's neighbors, with the possible exception of Iran, 
appeared prepared to support such a statement at their Jan. 6 
meeting in Jordan.  PM Allawi has said that he would like a 
statement that calls on all Iraqis to participate in 
elections held on time. 
 
7. (C) Ozkok asked whether the US had a plan in the event 
there was little Sunni participation in the elections.  The 
Deputy Secretary said that there was no "plan B."  Polling 
data showed that with adequate security significant Sunni 
participation was possible in Baghdad and Ninewah; Anbar was 
more difficult, he allowed. NEA Assistant Secretary William 
Burns added that Sunni participation is likely to be lower 
than that of Kurds and Shia, but still significant if 
security is sufficient. 
 
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Security Forces 
--------------- 
 
8. (C) PM Allawi learned two lessons from the operations in 
Fallujah, Deputy Secretary Armitage reported.  First, he 
received much less "political blow-back" than he expected. 
The lesson here was that the PM should use his authority 
more, the Deputy Secretary explained.  Second, he appointed 
competent people who were succeeding.  The lack of leadership 
has been a problem for the security forces, the Deputy 
Secretary said.  The IIG was considering bringing back former 
 
SIPDIS 
regime officers to address this problem, but their loyalty 
was uncertain.  Ozkok said what Iraq needed was a developed 
armed forces.  The Deputy Secretary disagreed, saying that 
police were needed to take the lead.  Ozkok noted that in 
Turkey, the police and the Jandarma are called in first, but 
then Turkish governors have the option of turning to the 
military for help.  In Iraq, Ozkok doubted that the police 
alone would be enough. 
 
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Mosul and Syria 
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9. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked what TGS was hearing from 
its liaison officers with Task Force Olympia (TFO) in Mosul. 
Ozkok said that he has heard of a build-up of coalition 
forces and unconfirmed media reports that the coalition plans 
to arm Kurds to allow them to protect themselves.  He assumed 
that a military operation would begin soon "to calm the city" 
after the influx of insurgents following the Fallujah 
operation.  He said that Turkey wanted the situation calm 
before elections, but added that any movement of troops 
especially from the north could have a bad effect on the 
local Turkmen, Arabs and other non-Kurdish ethnic groups. 
 
10. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that the insurgents arrived 
from not only Fallujah, but also Aleppo.  The previous day he 
had met with Syrian President Asad and told him that the 
Syrians must do more to stop the flow.  He told the Syrians, 
he said, that they cannot just wait for the US to provide 
information on these individuals, but should use their own 
intelligence to go after these people.  The bottom line of 
the message to Asad was that the road to better relations 
with the US lay through Baghdad. 
 
11. (C) Ozkok replied that the Syrians are suspicious about 
what kind of future awaits Iraq.  This causes them to hedge 
their bets.  "If everything is clear, they may be more 
cooperative."  But if they believe that the US is going to 
pull out of Iraq soon, then they will be less so.  Also, 
there are two groups in the government in Damascus; although 
Asad wants overall control, he doesn't have it completely. 
If Asad's hand were strengthened, Ozkok stated, Syria would 
be more cooperative.  Damascus asks for Ankara's help in 
improving relations with the US, so there is a prospective 
for better relations, he noted.  The Deputy Secretary 
responded that we take satisfaction with your relations with 
Syria that have come a long way from five years ago when 
Turkey amassed troops on the border.  "It gives you 
influence" in Damascus, he concluded. 
 
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Participants 
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12. (SBU) Ozkok was joined by TGS/J5 Lt Gen Aydogan Babaoglu, 
TGS/J3 LTG Metin Yavuz Yalcin, TGS/J5 Strategy Dept Chief MG 
M. Cengiz Arslan, MFA Americas DG Selahattin Alpar, and his 
aide COL Tayyar Sungu.  With the Deputy Secretary in addition 
to A/S Burns were the Ambassador, EUR Assistant Secretary 
Elizabeth Jones and PolMilCouns (notetaker) and acting DATT 
LtCol Joseph Collins. 
 
13. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage has cleared 
this cable. 
 
14. Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN