US embassy cable - 05ANKARA63

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000063 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S JAN. 3 MEETING WITH SPEAKER OF 
TURKISH PARLIAMENT ARINC 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Deputy Secretary emphasized the 
importance of strong U.S.-Turkish consultations on a wide 
range of issues.  In response to Speaker Arinc's emotional 
criticism of "100,000 deaths" in Iraq and the Fallujah 
operation, the Deputy Secretary pointed to the misuse of 
mosques by insurgents in Fallujah and questioned 
inappropriate statements about coalition efforts in Iraq. 
Arinc responded by underscoring the importance of bilateral 
relations and the need for the U.S. to trust Turkey as a 
strategic partner.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) The Deputy Secretary led off by noting an irony in 
U.S.-Turkish relations.  While there is more reason than 
ever to consult, in the last several months neither side 
has done what is needed to consult or to give new vitality 
to the relationship.  The U.S. desires increased 
consultations, whether on Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Cyprus, 
or a number of other issues. 
 
3. (C) Arinc averred in response that the relationship, 
based on traditional ties and a strategic partnership, is 
stronger than ever, despite some "unpleasant incidents." 
The two sides know each other much better now.  Aside from 
historical shared fate in Korea, NATO, Bosnia, etc., no one 
can deny the U.S. support for Turkey's EU avocation.  Arinc 
himself unfailingly receives every Codel, every delegation 
at whatever level.  Two years ago he received Speaker 
Hastert and telephoned him recently when Hastert was 
passing through Turkey. 
 
4. (C) He, PM Erdogan, and FonMin Gul are the most sincere 
among all Turkish politicians in wanting to strengthen 
relations with the U.S., Arinc continued.  From time to 
time Turkey's parliamentary decisions may differ from the 
desires of the Turkish government, but everyone must 
respect this element of democracy.  For instance, in March 
2003 the parliament rejected the GOT motion to allow 
deployment of U.S. troops through Turkey, but the decision 
didn't create bilateral problems.  In any event, the 
operation went ahead and in the spirit of protecting Iraqi 
territorial integrity and supporting democracy and 
reconstruction, Turkey has opened its ports, airfields, and 
roads to the flow of supplies to Iraq. 
 
5. (C) Iraq is a close neighbor, with strong ties of 
religion, Arinc declared.  One should understand Turkey's 
intense interest and Turkey's great regret at the 100,000 
(sic) deaths in Iraq since the operation started, 
especially the deaths and suffering of Muslim civilians. 
More than 70 Turkish truck drivers have been killed and 
security has not been achieved.  Recently, five Turkish 
security personnel were killed on the way to Baghdad. 
While U.S. assistance in this incident is recognized, the 
Turkish public continues to make its concerns about the 
general situation known to MPs and it is impossible to 
remain indifferent to this pressure from the public. 
 
6. (C) What makes the situation even more difficult were 
the pictures of the incidents in Fallujah's mosques, the 
pictures and film of suffering women and children in 
Fallujah, the pictures of American soldiers torturing 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib.  It is impossible to remain 
insensitive to the sharp reactions among the Turkish 
public.  While PM Erdogan, FonMin Gul and Arinc himself 
expressed their reactions in a way "not to hurt relations 
with the U.S." (sic), there have been cases of intemperate 
remarks, for instance the labelling of the Fallujah 
operation as genocide by parliamentary human rights 
committee chairman Elkatmis.  This remark was a mistake, 
but we have to appreciate that sometimes people express 
what they feel. 
 
7. (C) The Deputy Secretary answered that it is precisely 
because we value Turkey's and the Turkish parliament's 
views that he wanted to visit.  The U.S. understands the 
pressure on Turkish MPs.  The U.S. also wishes the same MPs 
had been so outspoken during all the years when Saddam was 
committing true genocide against his own people. 
 
8. (C) Regarding Abu Ghraib, the actions of some American 
soldiers stained our honor, the Deputy Secretary said. 
It's indeed upsetting for all of us to see pictures of 
destroyed mosques.  But the misuse of mosques as arms 
depots and firing points is also a problem. 
 
9. (C) Arinc responded defensively.  My sensitivities are 
formed by what I see in the media, he said.  The U.S. has 
carried out its operation in the name of peace, but 
"100,000 deaths" (sic) contradicts this stated aim.  This 
is a sincere view, one I express as a friend, he asserted. 
We are all aware Saddam was a dictator.  Elkatmis made a 
mistake, he expressed only his personal opinion, not that 
of the parliament or government.  The U.S. should trust 
Turkey's friendship.  Turkey cannot be underestimated.  We 
are an honest country.  We are the best partner for 
strategic cooperation.  You should believe this. 
 
10. (C) Turning to Iraqi elections, both Arinc and the 
Deputy Secretary agreed on the importance of holding the 
elections according to schedule.  Arinc emphasized that the 
Sunni boycott is a wrong approach.  Turkey is trying to 
convince the Sunnis to participate and Arinc noted his own 
lobbying efforts with Iraqi Sunnis in this regard. 
 
11. (C) Rushing to get in the last word, Arinc then called 
for more border crossings between Turkey and Iraq.  Turkey 
wants northern Iraq to be free of threats to Turkey, and is 
exasperated at having its views not taken into account. 
But in the end it is the Turkish-U.S. partnership that is 
important for solving regional problems, whether in Iraq or 
the Middle East in general.  The Deputy Secretary responded 
that, concerning Turkey's security and northern Iraq, the 
U.S. would be sending a strong delegation to the Jan. 11 
trilateral talks in Ankara to discuss how to eliminate the 
PKK threat. 
 
12. (U) This cable was approved by the Deputy Secretary. 
EDELMAN