US embassy cable - 05ANKARA14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2030 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PINR, IZ, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH FIRST ARMY COMMANDER APOLOGIZES PRIVATELY 
FOR PUBLIC REMARKS ON MOSUL ATTACK 
 
REF: A. 04 ANKARA 7075 
 
     B. 04 ANKARA 7099 
 
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Gerri H. O'Brien 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Turkish First Army Commander GEN Tolon was 
apologetic about his Dec. 19 statement implying the US was 
complicit with the attack on Turkish police in Mosul when ODC 
Chief Maj Gen Sutton discussed it with him during a Dec. 29 
courtesy call.  Tolon said he had assumed that the movement 
of the police from Turkey to the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad 
had been coordinated in advance with the US.  He undertook to 
look into the apparent breakdown of internal GOT 
coordination.  While we doubt Tolon's inquiries will have 
much impact on the Turkish government's chronic interagency 
coordination problems, we believe this outspoken general got 
the message that speaking on the basis of assumption and 
rumor is not appropriate.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On Dec. 29 ODC Chief Maj Gen Sutton paid a courtesy 
call on Turkish First Army Commander GEN Hursit Tolon.  Tolon 
had made a statement following the Dec. 17 attack on a 
Turkish police convoy in Mosul in which the general suggested 
the US was somehow culpable by not preventing the attack (ref 
a); the Charge registered our displeasure with the general's 
statement to Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) 
GEN Ilker Basbug Dec. 21 (ref b).  Maj Gen Sutton's scheduled 
30-minute meeting with Tolon ran for close to two hours as 
the discussion turned to the attack and Tolon's statement. 
 
3. (C) Tolon professed to be a good friend of the US, 
detailing for General Sutton his and his wife,s positive 
experiences in the US.  On Iraq, Tolon said that he shared 
the USG,s goals of a free and unified Iraq and urged the US 
to stay the course.  When General Sutton expressed 
condolences for the loss of five policemen in the Dec 17 
attack, Tolon began an explanation of his statement the 
following day attacking the US and Iraqi Kurds for not 
preventing the attack, remarking that he regretted that since 
the Turkish special police convoy was traveling with the 
knowledge of US Forces in Iraq and leaders like Kurdistan 
Democratic Party head Barzani, it was difficult to see them 
subjected to an ambush with a loss of life. 
 
4. (C) General Sutton corrected Tolon, saying that to the 
best of his knowledge, no US military or governmental 
officials were made aware of the Turkish special security 
police movement into Iraq (and through Mosul) until AFTER the 
ambush took place.  Neither TGS nor the Turkish liaison 
officers in Tampa, Baghdad and Mosul had informed the US of 
the movement, and he was unaware of any communication from 
Turkish officials to our embassies in either Ankara or 
Baghdad. 
 
5. (C) During this explanation, GEN Tolon became silent and 
his complexion became ashen - he was speechless.  After 
several moments, the two reviewed the sequence of events 
again, with General Sutton emphasizing that the first contact 
he had with TGS was after the attack when TGS/J3 contacted 
him to request the US military investigate the attack.  The 
ODC Chief added that Task Force Olympia (TFO) Commander BG 
Ham had specifically told him that if he had known in advance 
of this convoy,s movement, he could and would have suggested 
an alternate routing and possibly could have provided some 
military escort support. 
 
6. (C) Tolon said that he had assumed that this entire police 
convoy movement had been carefully coordinated with both US 
Forces in Iraq and key Kurdish leadership - hence his anguish 
when the convoy had been ambushed and lives lost.  He spent 
several minutes apologizing for his statements to the 
press...and said he was deeply troubled.  He then made a 
phone call to an individual he said was a friend in a 
significant position with the Turkish Special Police to ask 
who the police had coordinated the movement with inside the 
Turkish government and TGS.  He reported that this individual 
told him that the Turkish police "exchange" in Baghdad had 
been arranged with only two day,s notice...and that the 
individual was not sure who in TGS was supposed to be 
notified but that he thought that some type of coordination 
was to have taken place.  Tolon,s police contact promised to 
look into it and report back to the First Army commander. 
 
7. (C) Tolon thanked the ODC Chief for coming to him 
personally to discuss the security police convoy situation 
and apologized again for his statements which he said were 
based on a false assumption.  He emphasized that he was 
incredulous at the likely total breakdown in coordination 
within his government,s various departments and that he 
would over the next weeks, carefully look into this matter. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  When the Charge raised Tolon's statement 
with DCHOD GEN Basbug and PolMilCouns subsequently raised it 
with TGS/J5 Strategy Chief MG Cengiz Arslan, both explained 
that Tolon was speaking from emotions and with a lack of 
information.  This appears to have been the case.  In fact, 
Tolon has a reputation of being an outspoken hardliner. 
Nonetheless, we believe that both Tolon and his colleagues in 
TGS got the message that we do not view such irresponsible 
and ill-informed statements as appropriate behavior by people 
in positions of authority.  End comment. 
 
9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN