US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO17

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000017 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, EAID, AEMR, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: TFXO01:  LTTE PEACE SECRETARIAT HEAD BRIEFED ON 
USG DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: 04 COLOMBO 2000 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) On January 2 USAID Mission Director Carol Becker, 
USAID/OFDA DART leader Bill Berger and poloff met with S. 
Puleedevan, head of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) Peace Secretariat at the Norwegian Ambassador's 
residence to explain U.S. disaster relief efforts in Sri 
Lanka.  The AID Mission/Embassy delegation emphasized that 
the U.S. is working with other donors and INGOs to ensure 
equitable distribution of relief supplies, including in the 
north and east, but that USG personnel would not/not be in 
LTTE-controlled territory themselves.  Puleedevan urged the 
U.S. Government to rethink this position, claiming that 
Government and some lcoal NGOs could not be depended upon to 
distribute the supplies equitably, and stressing that members 
of the Tamil diaspora in the U.S. want to see a U.S. presence 
on the ground--including, he seemed to indicate, the U.S. 
military--distributing relief in LTTE areas.  Describing the 
U.S. as "a great friend," he encouraged greater communication 
and invited USAID to continue to send representatives to meet 
with the LTTE at Tiger "headquarters" in Kilinochchi.  U.S. 
Mission representatives reiterated that while U.S. relief 
supplies would be distributed equitably to all Sri Lankans in 
need, including in the north and east, that no USG personnel 
would enter LTTE-controlled territory.  The Tigers clearly 
are hoping for a USG presence on the ground in LTTE areas as 
a way to garner international repectability and legitimacy. 
End summary. 
 
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LTTE WELCOMES CHANCE FOR COORDINATION 
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2.  (C)  On January 2 USAID Mission Director Carol Becker, 
USAID/OFDA DART leader Bill Berger and poloff met with S. 
Puleedevan, head of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) Peace Secretariat, at the home of Norwegian Ambassador 
Hans Brattskar.  Brattskar had suggested the meeting as a way 
to allay possible Tiger concerns at media reports of the U.S. 
military being deployed to assist in the relief effort. 
After concurrence from Washington, the Ambassador agreed to 
the meeting on the condition it be kept confidential. 
Puleedevan agreed to these terms. 
 
3.  (C)  Poloff opened the meeting by expressing condolences 
and noting that the horrific tragedy provides fresh 
opportunities for the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) to work together.  Puleedevan enthusiastically agreed, 
noting that the LTTE found "encouraging" UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan's comments that the diaster offers a chance for 
both parties to cooperate.  Puleedevan expressed appreciation 
for U.S. disaster assistance and commended the Ambassador's 
remarks at a January 1 press conference (a copy of which he 
had brought with him) that U.S. aid would help all affected 
populations.  Berger then explained the role of the Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) worldwide, including the 
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) concept.  He added 
that in disasters of tremendous magnitude--such as the 
December 26 tsunami--or where affected locations are 
inaccessible--again, like the tsunami--OFDA may also call 
upon other U.S. agencies, including the Department of 
Defense, to "contribute to" the USG response.  OFDA, however, 
remains the lead agency in such cases.  Berger emphasized 
that DART is working with other bilateral and multilateral 
donors, as well as INGOs, to ensure an equitable distribution 
of relief to all affected areas.  Thus, although no U.S. 
personnel will actually be present in LTTE-controlled areas, 
U.S. relief supplies can be directed to LTTE-controlled areas 
for distribution by INGOs or other bilateral donors, he 
stressed. 
 
4.  (C)  Puleedevan expressed disappointment that no USG 
personnel would be present in LTTE areas to assist in relief 
efforts.  In particular, Puleedevan seemed disturbed at 
hearing that U.S. military personnel would not be deployed in 
LTTE-controlled areas.  The Tamil diaspora in the U.S. is 
anxious to see that American aid is equitably distributed; 
the GSL and some NGOs cannot be trusted to do so, he alleged. 
 Moreover, limiting the U.S. presence to 
government-controlled areas would give the wrong impression, 
he suggested.  The lack of communication between the U.S. and 
the Tigers leads to "miscommunication," he said, and urged 
USAID and/or the Embassy to send a representative to Tiger 
"headquarters" in Kilinochchi as a first step to clear up 
mutual misunderstanding.  "This is not the time for 
politics," he declared.  Poloff replied that that would not 
happen; instead, the U.S. would rely on others--with 
well-established contacts and long-standing experience in the 
area--to oversee the distribution of U.S. aid in the area. 
AID Mission Director Becker noted that a representative had 
been sent to Kilinochchi well before the December 26 tsunami 
to try to resolve the problem posed by LTTE efforts to tax 
USAID vehicles traveling to Jaffna, and that no greater 
clarity or understanding had emerged from that meeting 
(Reftel).  Dodging the issue, Puleedevan promised that AID 
vehicles, if clearly marked as carrying humanitarian relief 
supplies, would not be taxed upon entering LTTE territory. 
 
 
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LTTE RELIEF EFFORTS 
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5.  (C)  Puleedevan, armed with a CD-ROM and a power point 
presentation, briefed on LTTE relief efforts.  Within hours 
of the tidal wave, the LTTE had mobilized its cadres to help 
evacuate affected populations and to perform 
search-and-rescue operations, he said, while the Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) was immediately engaged to 
provide medical care and potable water.  The LTTE's quick 
response "saved lots of lives," he claimed.  Since then, 
Kilinochchi has established district secretariats in each of 
the five tsunami-affected districts claimed by the LTTE as 
part of the Tamil homeland (Jaffna and Mullaitivu in the 
north; Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara in the east). 
Headed by a representative of the LTTE Planning and 
Development wing, each district secretariat includes members 
of the LTTE district political wing; LTTE district 
administrative wing, the Government Agent; an NGO consortium; 
civil society; and INGOs, e.g., UNHCR, OXFAM, MSF, UNICEF, 
CARE, SAVE, etc.  The presence of the Government Agent (GA) 
provides a working link with the GSL, he asserted, which he 
offered as proof that the LTTE can and is coordinating with 
the Government on the relief effort.  (Note:  His description 
of parallel disaster relief units run by the GSL and 
LTTE--with the only common link the GA--tracks closely with 
observations made by UNDP ResRep Miguel Bermeo.  End note.) 
 
6.  (C)  The most immediate need, he continued, is 
well-cleaning equipment to pump out salt water from wells, as 
well as temporary shelter.  (Note:  Not surprisingly, this is 
also the GSL's priority.)  Resettlement of displaced persons 
and reconstruction work would occur in the next phase of the 
relief effort, he said, adding "We have a lot of experience 
with displaced populations."  Livelihoods is a key concern, 
he said; most people in these areas are fishermen who have 
seen their boats wrecked and their earning capacity plummet. 
The Norwegian government has already donated 5 million 
kroners to the TRO for emergency relief, he noted.  Reports 
in the national media that the Tigers had turned back aid 
trucks were untrue, he asserted, claiming that the Sinhalese 
chauvinist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna party had in fact 
commandeered goods intended for Tamil communities in 
Trincomalee to divert to Sinhalese communities further 
inland.  (Note:  It is difficult to determine the veracity of 
either version.  The local English press on January 3 carried 
another report of the LTTE turning back Russian aid workers 
in the north.  End note.) 
 
7.  (SBU) A total of 367 welfare centers are operating in the 
five districts accommodating 577,816 displaced persons, 
Puleedevan reported.  (Note:  This tally likely includes 
statistics from Government-controlled areas as well that the 
LTTE claims as part of its "homeland."  There is no reliable 
way to disaggregate the statistics.)  He offered the 
following data for the five districts as of December 30: 
Jaffna:  675 dead; 59 missing; Mullaitivu:  1,083 dead; 1,386 
missing; Trincolmalee:  855 dead; 325 missing; Batticaloa: 
1,901 dead; 692 missing; Ampara:  9,254 dead; 1,251 missing. 
 
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"OUR GOOD FRIEND" 
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8.  (C) In closing, Puleedevan said that he wanted to 
emphasize that the "LTTE considers the U.S. our good friend," 
adding that throughout the course of the insurgency "the LTTE 
has never thrown a stone at the American people." 
Distribution of aid supplies should not be "Government-driven 
or LTTE-driven, (but rather) emergency-driven."  He warned 
that the tsunami had caused the shifting of mines in the area 
and suggested that the U.S. military advise the LTTE in 
advance of any ship movements up the eastern/northern coasts 
so that the Tigers could warn of any sea mines in the area. 
The U.S. representatives thanked him for the presentation, 
reiterated that U.S. aid would be equitably distributed, even 
if U.S. personnel were not in LTTE-affected areas, and, upon 
being asked, referred him to address further queries to the 
Norwegian Ambassador, who had agreed to act as an 
intermediary should the need for subsequent communication 
arise. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C) From the LTTE political wing, Puleedevan is a 
well-practiced "barbarian handler," a typical representative 
of the more polished and suave public face (in comparison to 
the military wing) that the Tigers like to present to 
foreigners.  That said, his seemingly genuine disappointment 
that U.S. personnel, including U.S. military, would not 
actually be in Tiger territory is somewhat surprising.  The 
U.S.' long-standing to refusal to deal with the Tigers on a 
political level has always rankled them since it so clearly 
undercuts their claims of legitimacy on a par with the GSL. 
The Embassy/USAID representatives made clear at this meeting 
that that policy has not changed.  Nonetheless, the Tigers 
obviously are hoping that USG personnel will operate in Tiger 
areas as a way of gaining international respectability. 
 
 
 
 
 
LUNSTEAD