US embassy cable - 05MUSCAT8

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC, 
CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 
TAGS: AEMR, ASEC, AMGT, PTER, CASC, KHLS, KVPR, MU, EAC 
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 01/02/2005 
 
REF: A. 04 MUSCAT 2291 
 
     B. 04 RIYADH 6557 
     C. 04 MUSCAT 2246 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. 
Reason: 1.4(c)(g). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (SBU)  The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core 
Emergency Action Committee January 2 to review the Embassy's 
security posture following to the local holiday weekend. 
Members of the EAC noted no substantive changes in the local 
security environment since the last meeting.  Accordingly, 
the EAC agreed that the Embassy's already heightened security 
posture and FPCON remain appropriate.  End Summary. 
 
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Security Environment 
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2.  (SBU)  On January 2, the Ambassador chaired a meeting of 
the core Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the 
Embassy's security posture following the local holiday 
weekend.  The meeting opened with a discussion of the local 
and regional security situations; the EAC continued to 
characterize the former as stable.  Likewise, the EAC noted 
no new threat reporting specific to Oman.  Members cited no 
security incidents among their staffs or family members over 
the weekend, and CONS confirmed that there were no security 
incidents or security-related queries from the private 
American citizen community. 
 
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Jeddah Lessons Learned 
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3.  (SBU)  In furtherance of the EAC's previous discussions 
on lessons learned from the December 6 terrorist attack on 
U.S. Consulate General Jeddah, RSO distributed copies of, and 
led a detailed discussion on, reftel B.  In addition to 
actions already taken in response to previous reporting of 
the attack (reftel C), the EAC will use Jeddah's lessons 
learned as part of their ongoing review of avenues to enhance 
and sustain the Embassy's security posture. 
 
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Continued Vigilance 
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4.  (SBU)  RSO reiterated that members of the EAC must 
continue reinforcing to both their staffs and family members 
the need for vigilance regarding all aspects of personal 
security, including the need to maintain a low profile and to 
remain unpredictable.  Likewise, RSO re-emphasized the 
importance of immediately reporting suspicious activity or 
security-related incidents -- especially those involving 
suspected surveillance -- to Post One. 
 
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Physical Security 
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5.  (C)  Prior to concluding the meeting, RSO advised that 
the trench barrier systems which run along the sides of the 
Chancery compound, where stand-off is reduced by vacant 
diplomatic lots, were re-dug over the weekend.  Jersey 
barriers were also repositioned to limit unauthorized access 
to the Chancery compound's employee parking lot and vehicle 
entrance. 
 
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EAC Conclusion 
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6.  (S/NF)  The EAC concluded that there have been no 
substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the 
local security environment since the last meeting held on 
December 29 (reftel A), and that the Embassy's FPCON and 
already heightened security posture remain appropriate. 
Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely aware of the need to 
monitor both the regional and local security and threat 
environments, and is prepared to take the necessary 
countermeasures should changes to either occur.  AMB, A/DCM, 
RSO, A/MGT, RMAS, P/E, CONS, MSG, DAO, OMC (USDR), and ECA 
(USCENTAF) participated in the meeting, which was preceded by 
a meeting of the Visas Viper Committee. 
BALTIMORE