US embassy cable - 05ANKARA2

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

TURKISH FUEL TRUCKS ROLLING AGAIN, BUT HEADACHES REMAIN

Identifier: 05ANKARA2
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA2 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-01-01 05:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

010501Z Jan 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2014 
TAGS: PREL 
SUBJECT: TURKISH FUEL TRUCKS ROLLING AGAIN, BUT HEADACHES 
REMAIN 
 
REF: A. ADANA 174 
 
     B. ANKARA 6675 
     C. ANKARA 7141 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Gerri O'Brien for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The second strike of Turkish truckers 
delivering fuel to Iraq ended December 26.  Fuel loadings at 
Turkish ports and trucks entering Iraq have resumed at full 
speed.  Although the drivers received higher payments, most 
trucker complaints remain unaddressed and the bottlenecks at 
the Turkey-Iraq border will continue to restrict the 
efficiency of the supply operation and irritate drivers. 
Turkey and Iraq held a bilateral meeting to follow up on 
items agreed at the November 30 talks in Ankara.  Turkish 
officials look forward to the second trilateral 
(U.S.-Iraq-Turkey) meeting on trucker security.  End Summary. 
 
Trucks Rolling 
 
2.  (U) As reported ref a, the wildcat strike ended over the 
weekend (December 24-26), with truckers lining up at fuel 
depots in the Turkish ports of Mersin and Iskenderun to load 
their trucks.  The volume of trucks reaching the border 
jumped sharply, with the backlog waiting to cross into Iraq 
building from almost zero December 25 to 3,600 on December 
30.  Customs officials at the border have responded by 
boosting southbound processing, which reached over 1,700 
trucks on December 29.  The number of SOMO trucks that 
crossed the border and departed in convoys for deliveries in 
Iraq reached 539 on December 29, 20% above SOMO's average 
daily requirement. 
 
3.  (SBU) This strike was similar to the November 2003 
strike.  It was a wildcat strike, organized without prior 
warning to the Turkish contractors and organized by a loose 
coalition of small trucking companies and clan leaders. 
However, the 2003 strike was resolved in three days, largely 
as a result of U.S. interest in resolving the problem 
quickly, as all the contracts were USG-funded.  This time, 
the Turkish companies working for SOMO were willing to wait 
out the strike.  The strikers were surprised to find that 
there was no "rush" to convoke negotiations once the wildcat 
strike commenced.  The Turkish contractors knew the drivers 
well and calculated that they would soon run out of money and 
would be willing to settle for smaller concessions. 
 
The job is not done... 
 
4.  (SBU) Now that the faucet is turned back on from southern 
Turkey, the challenge shifts east to the bottleneck at the 
Habur gate.  Border officials are processing southbound 
trucks at a record pace and the convoys are being formed and 
dispatched quickly for deliveries in Iraq.  The near-term 
problem will be the return trip to Turkey.  Processing of 
trucks northbound has been a long-standing problem.  Even 
with a three-week strike of SOMO drivers, the backlog of 
trucks waiting to cross the border to Turkey was nearly 3,000 
on December 29.  For most of the strike period, northbound 
processing averaged about 1,000 trucks per day, well below 
the 1,500 average needed to avoid long delays for truckers. 
As noted above, the line southbound dwindled to almost zero 
during the strike.  As the wave of recent strikers returns 
from their deliveries, they will again face a long wait to 
return to Turkey and pick up another load.  This wait not 
only aggravates already-frustrated drivers, it translates 
into a large monetary loss for them.  Border delays have 
averaged about 7 days (2 days southbound and 5 days 
northbound), reducing the number of roundtrips per month and 
truckers' income significantly.  While this is not a problem 
for us or SOMO as long as the drivers drive and adequate 
numbers of trucks are able to load at the ports, the 
increased frustration makes the drivers more prone to job 
action. 
 
What are the Problems 
 
5.  (U) Customs officials on both sides continue to do an 
adequate job -- under sometimes miserable conditions -- of 
steadily processing truck traffic.  Ankara took steps in 2003 
and early 2004 to increase the number of Customs personnel at 
the border and process 24/7.  In addition, Iraqi-Turkish and 
U.S. officials responsible for border operations meet weekly 
to resolve operational issues.  This process works fairly 
well. 
 
6.  (SBU) U.S. observers at the border report frequent 
problems coordinating the flow of trucks from one side to the 
other.  This week, for example, Iraqi officials have not been 
sending a consistent flow of vehicles across, meaning that 
Turkish officials are sometimes idle. 
7.  (C) Turkish officials have repeatedly complained about 
"arbitrary" fees charged by Iraqi/Kurdish border officials, 
at one point claiming that they were the single biggest 
problem.  Turkish officials said the fees average about $300 
per truck.  However, Turkish trucker groups estimate the 
average to be about $125-$150  It is unclear how large of a 
problem this is for the drivers and what portion of these 
fees are legitimate and what portion are bribes.  It is also 
not clear whether the drivers are able to recover the cost of 
fees from their employers or if this comes out of their own 
pockets.  Probably as important is the degree of uncertainty 
-- drivers do not know what combination of fees they will be 
forced to pay on any trip.  Finally, the fees, reportedly 
unique to the border with Turkey, pick at the Turkish 
hyper-sensitivity about Kurdish officials operating 
independently in northern Iraq. 
 
8.  (C) The most serious problem on the Turkish side is the 
secondary inspection conducted by the Turkish Jandarma.  The 
GOT remains concerned that the large volume of trucks 
entering Turkey are a dangerous source for smuggling PKK, 
Iraqi insurgents or separatist weapons, materials or 
logistics into Turkey.  Accordingly, the Turkish Jandarma 
conducts a separate search, just outside the Customs yard in 
Turkey.  This is a makeshift operation, which is done 
single-file and at night is done using flashlights, causing 
the entire system to back up. 
 
Turkey-Iraq Discussions Continue 
 
9.  (U) Iraqi and Turkish officials are meeting this week in 
Ankara to implement a number of measures agreed to 
at the November 30 trilateral trucker security meeting (ref 
b).  An MFA official confirmed Turkey's interest in convening 
soon the next trilateral meeting. 
 
10.  (C) Comment:  The Turkish truckers' strike underscored 
the complex array of issues involved with supplying fuel and 
other sustainment supplies from Turkey to Iraq.  In the face 
of strong domestic criticism, the Turkish government remains 
committed to this operation, and we are encouraged by their 
efforts to work with Iraq on achievable steps to improve the 
situation.  From our vantage point, the biggest remaining 
problems are the Kurdish fees and the Jandarma inspections. 
We will work on the inspections issue with GOT officials.  We 
defer to Embassy Baghdad on the Kurdish fees issue, and await 
word on when Iraqi officials plan to have the next trilateral 
meeting on trucker security.  End Comment. 
 
11.(U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
EDELMAN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04