US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2029 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MNUC, PARM, ENRG, TU, IR, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRANIAN FONMIN KHARRAZI'S VISIT TO TURKEY: IRAQI 
ELECTIONS, IRANIAN NUKES, ENERGY 
 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Turkish MFA interlocutors tell us PM Erdogan 
strongly underscored Turkish concerns about Iran's nuclear 
program to visiting Iranian FonMin Kharrazi.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) In separate, coordinated Dec. 29 calls on MFA, 
Polcounselor met DDG for South Asia (including Iran) Evirgen 
and PolMilcounselor met DDG for Disarmament and Arms Control 
Meric for readout of Dec. 24 Kharrazi visit. 
 
3. (C) Both our interlocutors said the visit was arranged 
hastily at the request of Kharrazi, who wanted to focus on 
Iran's concerns about possible postponement of Iraqi 
elections.  Evirgen reported that both sides agreed to use 
their influence on all parties in Iraq to ensure no 
postponement. 
 
4. (C) We queried both MFA interlocutors whether the Turkish 
side raised Iran's nuclear program.  Both affirmed that PM 
Erdogan did so but neither President Sezer nor FonMin Gul 
did.  Both said Erdogan told Kharrazi that Turkey recognizes 
Iran's right to a nuclear energy program as long as it is for 
peaceful purposes but that Turkey urges Iran fully to comply 
with IAEA requirements. 
 
5. (C) We pressed Evirgen, who attended the meetings, for 
more details.  The U.S. has noted that, whereas key elements 
of the Turkish state -- the MFA and General Staff -- have 
expressed strong concern about the implications of Iran's 
nuclear program, the lack of public interest or debate 
suggests that the GOT at the political level does not see the 
program as a concern.  How strongly did Erdogan express the 
Turkish view?  Evirgen acknowledged that, in the past, the 
Turkish approach had been "too soft" and that he had not 
expected Erdogan would raise the issue.  However, surprising 
both Evirgen and, more important, Kharrazi, Erdogan did so 
with vigor, drawing on the MFA's now more forcefully 
expressed talking points.  Erdogan even said that Turkey 
"wants to believe" the Iranian program is only for peaceful 
uses.  Noting that, to a Turk, "wants to believe" contains an 
even stronger warning than "doesn't believe", we asked 
whether the Turks had used their own interpreter and whether 
Kharrazi had gotten the nuance.  Evirgen said the Turks had 
used Kharrazi's interpreter but his (Evirgen's) Persian was 
still good enough to follow the gist, and the interpretation 
was faithful.  Indeed, Evirgen said, Kharrazi's face 
stiffened and he grew visibly uneasy. 
 
6. (C) We asked both Evirgen and Meric whether they thought 
the Iranians might construe the Turks' concession that Iran 
has a right to a nuclear program for peaceful purposes as a 
wink and a nod about the rest.  Both said that the Turks used 
the right to peaceful uses line first in order to take it 
away from the Iranians as an arguing point. 
 
7. (S/NF) We asked Evirgen whether, if Iran did obtain nukes, 
Turkey might consider a counter step.  Misunderstanding our 
question as asking whether Turkey might consider a 
pre-emptive military response, Evirgen said quietly that, "a 
few days ago", Turkey and Israel held very detailed 
discussions about options.  Noting the appearance of some 
speculative columns in the Turkish press, we then asked 
whether Turkey might be considering a nuke program of its own 
or in cooperation with any of several nuclear weapons-holding 
countries.  Evirgen asserted he has heard of no such 
considerations, "but who knows what the world will look like 
in 20 years." 
 
8. (C) In response to our question whether Kharrazi raised 
Iran's interest in concluding a comprehensive natural gas 
deal, Evirgen affirmed that he did but the Turks did not 
yield.  We have heard separately from leading national 
security analyst Faruk Demir, who has close contacts with 
Turkish Energy Minister Guler, that, because the Turks want 
to avoid antagonizing the U.S. through a deal with Iran but 
see no sign of a U.S. push for a breakthrough on a Caspian 
natural gas pipeline, Erdogan is ready to sign a 
comprehensive energy agreement with Russia when he visits 
Moscow Jan. 11. 
 
9. (C) Kharrazi also brought up President Khatemi's interest 
in making an official visit to Turkey.  According to Evirgen, 
both sides agreed the timing would have to be right. 
However, Evirgen noted wryly, unusually for the normally wily 
Iranians, Khatemi has boxed himself in by acknowledging that 
in order to be able to make the trip he would first have to 
resolve the barriers Turkish investors (Turkcell for the 
mobile phone network and TAV for management of the new Tehran 
airport) have run into at the hands of more radical elements 
in Iran. 
 
10. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN