US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU333

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958:    N/A 
TAGS: NP, PGOV, SOCI, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPALI PARLIAMENT CONVENES FOR WINTER SESSION 
 
REF:  (A) KATHMANDU 0184; (B) KATHMANDU 2503; 
 
(C) 01 KATHMANDU 2302 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (SBU) The Winter Session of Parliament convened Feb. 
10 amid widespread expectations that the Lower House 
will ratify the state of national emergency declared 
November 26, allowing its continuation for another three 
months.  A vote on the emergency must take place before 
Feb. 22.  Preoccupation with the emergency--and 
political grandstanding against Prime Minister Deuba's 
handling of the Maoist insurgency--may put off 
consideration of a number of important pieces of 
legislation left pending from last year's Winter 
Session, including a long-awaited anti-corruption bill. 
End summary. 
 
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WINTER SESSION TO TAKE UP EMERGENCY 
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2.  (U)  The Winter Session of Parliament that convened 
Feb. 10 faces a particularly busy schedule.  First on 
the docket of the two-month session, MPs will have to 
address whether or not to ratify the state of national 
emergency declared November 26 by King Gyanendra after a 
series of violent Maoist attacks that unilaterally broke 
a four-month ceasefire.  At least two-thirds of the MPs 
in the Lower House must vote by Feb. 22 in favor of the 
emergency for it to continue for an additional three 
months.  (Note:  At the end of those additional three 
months, Parliament may then vote to extend the emergency 
for an another six months.  End note.) 
 
3.  (SBU) Deuba, whose Nepali Congress Party holds 113 
seats in the 205-seat Lower House, will need the support 
of the Communist Party of Nepal United Marxist-Leninist 
(UML), which holds 69 seats, to get the two-thirds 
majority necessary to uphold the emergency.  In spite of 
occasional public sniping from the larger Opposition 
parties--and an apparent ongoing sub rosa campaign to 
oust Prime Minister Deuba by his own Party President and 
long-time rival G. P. Koirala (Ref B)--most observers 
expect Deuba will ultimately get the votes he needs. 
 
4.  (U)  In his opening address to the new Session, 
Deuba asserted that although security forces have made 
significant progress since November 26 in combating the 
insurgency, more time is needed. He urged the MPs to 
ratify the emergency for another three months.  The 
immediate task is to disarm the Maoists, he said; only 
then might the resumption of talks with the insurgents 
be possible. Response from the Opposition was generally 
noncommittal, although UML Leader Madhav Nepal offered 
vague indications of support under certain, generally 
unlikely conditions, including the amendment of the 
Constitution to allow a national government.  Leaders of 
the three small left-wing parties, which together 
command a total of eight seats in the Lower House, 
confirmed, on the other hand, that their parties will 
not ratify the emergency. 
 
5.  (SBU) Of perhaps even greater concern to the PM than 
garnering the Opposition's support may be rumblings from 
within his own Nepali Congress Party leadership. 
Reports persist that supporters of former PM and Party 
President G.P. Koirala have launched a petition campaign 
calling for Deuba's resignation.  One "Koirala camp" MP, 
while stopping short of confirming the rumor, recently 
assured poloff vehemently that support for Deuba within 
the party--and for ratification of the emergency--is 
rapidly eroding.  But Ram Chandra Poudel, a Nepali 
Congress Central Committee member and former Deputy 
Prime Minister under Koirala, told poloff he suspects 
reports of surging support for Koirala are wildly 
exaggerated, primarily by none other than Koirala 
himself.  Instead, Poudel said his own discussions with 
Nepali Congress MPs reveal that most view any move to 
dump Deuba now as posing a serious and untimely threat 
to the stability of the country.  Thus, most are 
"resisting the Party President's request" for support. 
 
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OTHER NON-EMERGENCY BUSINESS 
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6.  (U)  Since an Opposition boycott pre-empted much of 
the Winter Session the previous year, many bills 
originally scheduled for action in the first half of 
2001 were left pending in legislative limbo until the 
current session.  Some observers fear that preoccupation 
with the state of emergency--to say nothing of the 
potential for intra-party intrigue within the Nepali 
Congress--may defer consideration of the stalled 
legislation still more.  Among the bills already tabled 
for consideration are amendments to the Health Services 
Act and the Education Act; a Finance Ordinance proposing 
changes to the tax code; and the Terrorist and 
Destructive Acts Ordinance (TADO) promulgated November 
26 (Ref C).  The TADO defines acts of terrorism; allows 
the Government to declare individuals and/or 
organizations terrorists; and provides for life 
imprisonment for those convicted of terrorism. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Also pending is a long-awaited, much-touted 
amendment to the Anti-Corruption Act of 1961.  The bill 
is aimed at strengthening the Commission for the Control 
of the Abuse of Authority (CIAA), empowering the largely 
toothless agency to take up corruption cases against 
government ministers and members of the judiciary. 
Since its inception in 1990, the CIAA has won no more 
than partial convictions in just 11 of the 111 cases it 
has filed. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (SBU) Widespread corruption is often cited as one of 
the prime reasons for the government's failure to 
deliver services equitably--which in turn is often cited 
as one of the major grievances fueling the Maoist 
insurgency.  It seems doubtful, however, that discussion 
of legislation to toughen anti-corruption laws will be 
accorded the same urgency as ratification of the 
emergency--if indeed the proposed amendment ends up 
being tabled during this session at all.  Deuba and his 
government can expect to entertain more political 
posturing and proposals for horse-trading from the 
Opposition (and, quite possibly, from some within the 
ruling party as well) in the two weeks between now and 
the Feb. 22 deadline for ratification of the emergency. 
Ultimately, however, we expect the emergency to be 
ratified with comparatively little trouble and to 
continue for another three months.  Whether Parliament 
will so quickly address the many other matters on its 
agenda, including long-deferred action on important 
legislation like the Anti-Corruption amendment, is less 
certain. 
MALINOWSKI