US embassy cable - 04LAGOS2591

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SOUTHERN POLITICAL FIGURES TALK OF REMOVING A STUMBLING OBASANJO

Identifier: 04LAGOS2591
Wikileaks: View 04LAGOS2591 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Lagos
Created: 2004-12-30 12:39:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PGOV PINS KDEM NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

301239Z Dec 04
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 002591 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR, AF/W, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, KDEM, NI 
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN POLITICAL FIGURES TALK OF REMOVING A 
STUMBLING OBASANJO 
 
REF: A. LAGOS 2513 
 
     B. ABUJA 2075 
 
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne per 1.4 b and d 
 
1.  (S)  Based on the Consul General's conversations with 
several political contacts over the past few days, talk of 
"what to do with President Obasanjo" is widespread.  Many 
Southern political figures believe Obasanjo is not only 
unpopular and increasingly detached from sound political 
moorings, but also politically vulnerable.  A weak economy 
and a rather dispirited holiday season only added fuel to 
this uncharitable sentiment.  In the view of these political 
figures, Obasanjo's mishandling of his exchange of letters 
with People's Democratic Party (PDP) Chairman Audu Ogbeh 
epitomizes the president's detachment and weakness. 
 
2.  (S) Distilled to its essence, Ogbeh's letter delivered 
two broad messages to Obasanjo (reftels).  First, Ogbeh 
cautioned that he was beginning to see political storm clouds 
gather in such a way that reminded him of the early signs of 
trouble that presaged the downfall of the Second Republic in 
1983.  Secondly, Ogbeh observed that economic and social 
conditions in Nigeria were amiss; he urged Obasanjo to take 
steps to improve the economic lot of the average Nigerian. 
However, because of his own desire to jettison Ogbeh, 
Obasanjo chose to focus on the first message and to 
purposefully misinterpret it as a threat not a warning.  His 
critics say he ignored the second message about Nigeria's 
economic sickness, because he does not see the reality of the 
current situation.  While Ogbeh's letter was an accurate 
barometer of public opinion, Obasanjo and his minions saw it 
as such an inaccuracy that they could expect this perceived 
misstep by Ogbeh to cost him his job.  Thus, they leaked the 
letter, hoping to publicly rub Ogbeh's nose in it.  However, 
publication of the letter only strengthened Ogbeh's position 
in the public mind and thus ultimately protected his position 
within the party. 
 
3.  (S) Obasanjo also misjudged his own political standing. 
Obasanjo believed the revelations in his response letter 
would hurt Ogbeh.  Instead, they have hurt Obasanjo. 
Miscalculating his strength within the party, Obasanjo 
believed he could force Ogbeh from the PDP chairmanship.  But 
Vice President Atiku has more control of the party's internal 
structure than Obasanjo, and Ogbeh is aligned with Atiku. 
After weathering Obasanjo's blow, Ogbeh has now gone on the 
counter-offensive.  Ogbeh has called the PDP National 
Executive Committee to meet January 4 to tackle the party's 
current foremost issue: the 2003 election fraud in Anambra 
State.  This meeting has all the portents of another 
presidential setback--Obasanjo may be forced to jettison his 
support for Anambra businessman/heavy Chris Uba. 
 
4.  (S) The rumblings in the PDP are reflective of the angst 
making its rounds through the political elite in Lagos. 
Obasanjo's opponents strongly believe he intends to continue 
his presidency beyond 2007.  This belief, coupled with many 
political operatives' assessment that Obasanjo is running the 
country poorly, has led to significant chatter about the 
possibility of removing Obasanjo from office.  A lot of this 
may be the futile chatter of opposition politicians 
chastising the person responsible for their being sidelined. 
Whenever Nigeria hits a bad patch, rumors of coups arise. 
This time, the ease and frequency with which people broach 
the subject is noteworthy. 
 
5.  (S) Perennial presidential candidate and opposition 
politician Tunji Braithwaite (strictly protect) told CG that 
even Yoruba politicians have been holding a series of 
meetings lamenting about Obasanjo's performance, or lack 
thereof.  He said the "hot heads," the most vocal of the 
bunch, have been advocating some type of quick ouster.  Some 
endorsed encouraging the military to take over.  Braithwaite 
said the more moderate attendees wanted to explore 
impeachment proceedings using Obasanjo's tacit support for 
Chris Uba in the Anambra political saga as the gravamen of 
their charges.  The impeachment proponents argue that it is 
the safer approach, and would at least constrain Obasanjo's 
behavior while the proceedings were being conducted.  The CG 
told Braithwaite that it was a dire mistake for a civilian 
politician to advocate a military takeover.  The CG continued 
that such a move would be disastrous for Nigeria and its 
international relationships.  Whatever opposition is mounted, 
it must be done through legal, democratic channels, the CG 
stressed. 
 
6.  (S) Professor Ukande Damachi (strictly protect), a 
long-time contact and advisor to former Head of State 
Babangida, informed CG that Babangida was very worried about 
the potential for a military coup.  Damachi said Babangida 
was spending both his time and own money in trying to keep a 
lid on the military.  Babangida was not doing this for 
altruistic reasons, of course.  He has every intention of 
running in 2007 and does not want the country to fall apart 
before then, Damachi confided.  Damachi and the CG discussed 
that Obasanjo possibly could lower the political temperature 
if he took steps to resolve the Anambra crisis and to ensure 
military pensions and salaries were paid timely. 
 
7.  (S) Comment:  Obasanjo is a general and thus should know 
better than to end up facing too many battles on different 
fronts.  He has more enemies than allies and the list of the 
former appears to be growing.  Politically, he has 
overstepped and overstayed his welcome in the Anambra crisis. 
 He has let the crass antics and ambitions of Chris Uba drag 
him into an affair that never really offered much benefit. 
Now that it has become a national scandal and has escalated 
into an intra-party showdown, Anambra could become an 
Achilles heel.  Obasanjo would be wise to quickly and 
decisively estrange himself from Chris Uba.  That would be a 
key first step in what appears to be a long row of fence 
mending that he will need to do in order to put a damper on 
much of the chatter that is building against him.  End 
comment. 
 
8.  (U) This cable has been cleared by Embassy Abuja. 
BROWNE 

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