US embassy cable - 02ABUJA426

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000426 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AN ARMY COLONEL ON DEMOCRACY AND THE 
MILITARY 
 
 
REF: LAGOS 212 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.6X6. 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In an unusually frank discussion, Nigerian 
Colonel and ECOWAS staff member M. Dixon Dikio (please 
strictly protect) told PolMilOff that a major breakdown of 
command led to reprisal attacks in Benue, and those attacks 
were unjustifiable.  In his view, LTG Malu's response to the 
Benue situation served to highlight Malu's lack of 
intellectual honesty, and furthermore, justified Malu's 
removal as Chief of Army Staff.  Touting both Operation Focus 
Relief and ACRI, the Colonel said more of both were needed, 
in Nigeria and throughout West Africa.  Later, responding to 
the explosions at the Ikeja cantonment, and reflecting on the 
Benue events, he viscerally lamented a lack of accountability 
in the Nigerian military.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2. (C) The Colonel spoke very highly of Operation Focus 
Relief, and said his colleagues in the Nigerian Army were 
impressed and wanted more.  He spoke positively about the 
benefits of ACRI (he had witnessed ACRI training), and had 
been quietly trying to convince his military colleagues to 
rethink Nigeria's past opposition to ACRI.  In his 
estimation, creating inter-operability between West African 
militaries would be the key to stability in the sub-region 
under the umbrella of ECOWAS.  Both ACRI and Operation Focus 
Relief would support this goal if provided systematically. 
Moreover, these programs could be conduits for needed reforms 
in regional militaries, he believed. 
 
 
3. (C) The Colonel was visibly disgusted when asked about 
violence in Benue last October.  Turning first to LTG Samuel 
Victor Malu (former Chief of Army Staff), he said, "If I had 
any respect left for Malu before Benue, it is gone now."  He 
opined that President Obasanjo had erred when he selected 
Malu as Chief of Army Staff.  Obasanjo should have reached 
deeper into the Army to avoid "corrupted" officers.  Malu had 
led the attacks that resulted in the destruction of Odi in 
1999, which the Colonel described as a "slaughter."  Then 
Malu, as Chief of Army Staff, had publicly spoken out against 
government policies.  "Malu should have been removed 
earlier," he said, "but when he began publicly criticizing 
government policy, that was it." 
 
 
4. (C) After Benue, the Colonel stated, Malu did not have the 
intellectual honesty to admit the similarity with Odi. 
PolMilOff referred to a magazine article where, in the same 
breath, Malu had said that Nigeria had nothing to learn from 
the U.S. on peacekeeping (OFR) and that the Nigerian Army had 
no ability for peacekeeping (Benue).  The Colonel replied, 
"Exactly - intellectual dishonesty." 
 
 
5. (C) PolMilOff noted that it appeared an order was given to 
dispatch troops to Benue after the death of the 19 soldiers, 
and that order had come from the Presidency, but it remained 
undetermined whether a high-level order had been given to 
raze villages and engage in reprisal attacks.  The Colonel 
stated there was a clear breakdown of command, which was 
unacceptable.  Chief of Army Staff, LTG Ogomudia was 
responsible, whether he had given orders or not, and what had 
happened was unjustifiable in a democracy.  The Colonel 
agreed that lack of civilian policing capacity led to the 
Army's insertion in Benue, as in Odi.  However, until the 
police could handle violent civil disturbances, the Army 
would continue to be called upon and more tragic incidents 
could result (unless the army received sufficient training in 
controlling civil disturbances), he reflected. 
 
 
6. (C) The Colonel opined that the events in Benue, like 
those in Odi, exacerbated the civil-military gap in Nigerian 
society.  They also indicated just how far command and 
control had broken down.  Describing the Nigerian Army as a 
leper, he said, "Everyone knows it is there and is a human 
being, but no one wants to touch it."  While there is 
widespread sulking in the military, and the GON is performing 
badly on many fronts, he surmised that the Army, like a 
seriously ill patient, was in no position to cause trouble. 
 
 
7. (C) The Colonel argued that the creation of state police 
forces in Nigeria could help manage insecurity.  State police 
forces would allow for better, more localized response to 
crises.  Countering the common argument that state forces 
would become political tools in local politics, he reasoned 
that the Inspector General of Police, who reports to the 
President, and was far from immune to political pressure. 
Moreover, he explained, state police commissioners had de 
facto veto power over governors who were elected by the 
people: They could choose to ignore Governors' orders simply 
by saying that they were waiting for instructions from Abuja. 
 Simply put, the commissioners of police in each state were 
already influenced by political considerations.  Furthermore, 
while fear of state police forces being unduly influenced was 
a justifiable concern, that problem could be minimized 
through better training and proper management. 
 
 
8. (C) PolMilOff met the Colonel on a second occasion, after 
the disaster at the Ikeja military cantonment.  Visibly 
distraught over the catastrophe, he stated that the 
cantonment had been intended to receive and redistribute 
ordnance unused after deployments such as those to Liberia 
and Sierra Leone.  However, because "nothing works in the 
Army anymore," ordnance had never been redistributed as 
planned.  The disaster happened, like events in Benue, he 
stated, because there was no accountability in the Nigerian 
military.  Someone must be held accountable, he said. 
 
 
9. (C) COMMENT: Nothing the Colonel said was a revelation. 
However, it is extremely uncommon for a Nigerian Army officer 
to talk to a diplomat from a Western Embassy so candidly and 
critically about his service and its behavior, and his 
comments offer some insight into the mood of mid-level 
Nigerian officers.  Ironically, while strongly criticizing 
LTG Malu, he echoed Malu's comments to the Ambassador 
regarding the Army's inability to threaten Nigeria's nascent 
democracy (reftel). 
Jeter