US embassy cable - 04ANKARA7210

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TURKEY CONSIDERING STEPPING (BACK) UP ITS PSI PARTICIPATION; MAY TAKE PSI INTO BLACK SEA

Identifier: 04ANKARA7210
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA7210 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-12-29 15:29:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM PREL TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2029 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY CONSIDERING STEPPING (BACK) UP ITS PSI 
PARTICIPATION; MAY TAKE PSI INTO BLACK SEA 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 6261 
     B. ANKARA 5380 
     C. ANKARA 5015 
     D. STATE 188228 (ALL NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Gerri H. O'Brien for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  See para 4. 
 
2. (C) Summary:  Turkey is preparing to step its 
participation up in the Proliferation Security Initiative -- 
participating in events in 2005 in Portugal and Spain, 
sending experts from Ankara to operational expert meetings 
even outside of Turkey's immediate region, and considering 
hosting a PSI exercise in 2006, perhaps in the Black Sea. 
MFA requests the time and location of the next operational 
experts meeting and for information on Black Sea littoral 
states' positions regarding PSI.  While Ankara appears 
prepared to increase its participation in PSI even without 
formal membership in the Core Group, we are told that a 
meeting of the core group that excludes Turkey would derail 
Turkey's participation in PSI.  End Summary. 
 
3. (C) The new MFA Deputy Director General for Disarmament 
and Arms Control, Bulent Meric, informed PolMilCouns and 
PolMilOff December 29 that the GOT was preparing to step up 
its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI).  Although Turkey did not participate in the Sydney 
operational experts group meeting, Meric said the GOT was 
going to participate in future meetings with officials from 
Ankara.  He asked when and where the next PSI experts group 
meeting would be held. 
 
4. (C) Meric confirmed that Turkey intends to participate in 
PSI exercises hosted by Portugal and Spain in 2005.  He added 
that the GOT was considering whether to host a PSI exercise 
in 2006, and so far the indications from other agencies were 
positive.  PolMilCouns noted that one place where Turkey 
could make a unique contribution to PSI might be in the Black 
Sea region were Turkey already was running Operation Black 
Sea Harmony (a counter-trafficking operation akin to (and 
sharing data with) NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the 
Mediterranean) which might provide Turkey with relevant 
experience on which to base an exercise.  Meric said he had 
also been thinking about raising PSI at the February meeting 
of BLACKSEAFOR political experts.  (Note:  BLACKSEAFOR was a 
Turkish initiate in 2001 to build cooperation among Black Sea 
littoral states' navies.  Beginning as annual exercises, 
BLACKSEAFOR has developed a political dialogue at the vice 
ministerial level and a rotating command structure.  In June 
2004, participants agreed to expand the mandate to include 
naval cooperation to counter terrorism and WMD proliferation. 
 End note.)  His hope would be to win agreement for a PSI 
exercise centered on BLACKSEAFOR, although as a PSI exercise 
it would be open to all PSI participants.  He asked whether 
we had information on littoral states' position on PSI -- he 
was aware that Ukraine and Russia had joined PSI, but was 
less clear about Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. 
 
5. (C) The one potential problem to this increased 
participation would be a meeting of the Core Group that did 
not include Turkey, Meric stated.  That would be a huge 
problem, he said. 
 
6. (C) Comment: Meric's warning that a Core Group meeting 
without Turkey would undermine this newfound resolve to 
actively participate in PSI is serious.  The slight perceived 
from Turkey's exclusion from the Core Group led to the 
self-imposed limit on Ankara's participation to events in 
Turkey's own region only.  We have been encouraging Meric 
(who was previously the MFA Disarmament Department Head) and 
officers at the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to reconsider 
this limitation.  Our arguments that the operational experts 
gatherings are the real engine driving the initiative and 
that we had no plan to convene the core group in the 
foreseeable future appear to have resonated more with Meric 
than his predecessor, Haluk Ilicak.  Ilicak sold PSI to a 
reluctant interagency process in Ankara by promising that if 
Turkey participated vigorously in the initiative, it would be 
recognized with a seat at the table of the initiative's 
policy making body.  With that not in the cards, Meric 
appears to have sold greater participation on the basis that, 
with no core group meetings expected, the experts group is 
where real decisions are made.  A core group meeting without 
Turkey would undermine this argument.  End comment. 
 
7. (C) Action request:  Presuming we still foresee no need to 
reconvene the core group anytime soon, we should encourage 
Meric's efforts to re-energize Turkey's participation in PSI. 
 To that end, we request Washington provide answers to 
Meric's questions:  When and where will the next operational 
experts group meeting occur; and, whether Romania, Bulgaria 
and Georgia have subscribed to the founding principles of PSI. 
EDELMAN 

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