US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3350

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 003350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU PRESIDENCY:  ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND 
LESSONS LEARNED (VIEW FROM THE HAGUE) 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 3183 
     B. THE HAGUE 2691 
     C. THE HAGUE 1670 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The December 17 European Council decision to 
offer Turkey a starting 
date for accession negotiations let the Dutch end their 
presidency on a high note.  The 
Dutch recorded several important accomplishments, of which 
the successful Turkish 
negotiations were the most notable, while maintaining a high 
degree of transparency 
during a challenging period for both the EU and the 
Netherlands.  Significant progress 
was made in strengthening U.S.-EU coordination on Justice and 
Home Affairs, laying the 
groundwork for more effective cooperation in the future. 
Particularly with regard to 
terrorist financing, the Dutch accepted and promoted the U.S. 
effort to address the issue 
"across pillars" and look forward to continuing to show 
leadership in this area.  Despite 
early protestations about the primacy of remaining "neutral" 
during the Presidency, the 
Dutch ultimately wielded their position effectively to 
prevent a premature lift of the 
China Arms Embargo and to get a "yes" decision on Turkey. 
The Dutch also pushed the 
EU to take a more active and positive stance on Iraq, 
although the results have so far 
fallen short of expectations, and strove to take advantage of 
near-term opportunities in 
the Middle East in the wake of Yasser Arafat's death while 
avoiding focusing on final 
status issues.  The Ukraine election crisis provided an 
unexpected opportunity for the EU 
to demonstrate resolve but highlighted long-term worries 
about the EU-Russia relations. 
End summary. 
 
A DIFFICULT TIME TO BE PRESIDENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (C)  As noted refs, the 2004 Dutch EU presidency took 
place against a backdrop of 
deliberately lowered expectations combined with a series of 
unusual complications (both 
expected and unanticipated).  The Dutch were the first 
presidency to preside over an EU 
at 25, and also the first to deal with a European 
Parliament's refusal to confirm a new 
commission.  Domestically, Prime Minister Balkenende's 
extended illness (which caused 
the postponement of at least one summit and led another to be 
chaired by Luxembourg) 
and anti-Muslim sentiment provoked by the November murder of 
a Dutch filmmaker by a 
Dutch Islamic extremist of Moroccan descent posed unique 
challenges for the Dutch 
presidency.  In the end, however, the Dutch achieved nearly 
all their stated objectives 
for the presidency and more -- even when operating without a 
functioning commission or 
Prime Minister.  This reflected both extensive Dutch 
pre-presidency contingency 
planning and a surprising (for the Dutch) degree of 
flexibility which allowed the 
presidency to find and exploit opportunities for progress 
despite such obstacles. 
 
TRANSATLANTIC TRANSPARENCY 
------------------------- 
 
3. (C)  Extensive contacts between Dutch officials and their 
Washington, Hague, and 
Brussels counterparts -- up to and including the U.S.-EU 
Ministerial Troika meeting in 
December -- helped maintain a mood of productive consultation 
throughout the Dutch 
presidency, even when dealing with contentious issues such as 
the possible lift of the 
EU's China Arms Embargo.  By describing their own thinking 
and the positions of other 
member states, the Dutch often alerted the USG to troublesome 
developments within the 
EU councils as well as promising openings for U.S. 
intervention.  Within EU fora 
(including the December 17 POLDIRS meeting chaired by Dutch 
POLDIR Hugo 
Siblesz), the Dutch helped set a practical, down-to-earth 
tone for the U.S.-EU dialogue 
by highlighting areas of actual partnership (such as Ukraine) 
and shared objectives (such 
as Iraq), while seeking constructive ways to work through 
areas of real disagreement 
(including the China Arms Embargo). 
 
NEW MECHANISM FOR COOPERATION ON JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
(JHA) 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
4. (C) This area had been flagged prior to the presidency as 
one in which practical 
cooperation between the U.S. and EU should be a major 
priority.  The Dutch succeeded 
both in facilitating cross-pillar/interagency review of JHA 
issues (particularly in the 
area of terrorist financing) and directing senior level 
attention on the areas of U.S.-EU 
cooperation on JHA and CT issues.  The Dutch hosted several 
workshops at the expert 
level on terrorist financing and succeeded in laying the 
groundwork for a continuation of 
a U.S.-EU dialogue on combating terrorism finance.  They 
included DHS Secretary 
Ridge in a ministerial troika on JHA issues where he stressed 
the themes of our common 
efforts to address common problems.  The Dutch followed up by 
inviting AG Ashcroft 
and DHS Undersecretary Hutchinson to address an informal JHA 
Council including all 
25 EU member states.  This Dutch initiative of senior level 
U.S.-EU political review of 
common JHA issues has now been institutionalized as a 
multiannual concept, with the 
next meeting scheduled during the UK presidency in the second 
half of 2005.  During the 
meetings in The Hague, then-Commissioner for JHA Vittorino 
noted the importance of 
continued U.S. leadership in the JHA and counterterrorism 
areas, but stressed the need 
for better U.S.-EU coordination in managing public opinion to 
avoid the impression that 
the U.S. is dictating to the EU.  The EU has also shown 
strong interest in broadening our 
relationship with Eurojust and Europol (both based in the 
Netherlands.) 
 
TURKEY AND CHINA:  POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5. (C)  Although the Dutch often protested that they must 
remain "neutral" during their 
presidency, they ultimately proved both willing and able to 
use their presidency 
prerogatives to influence key EU decisions.  On Turkey, for 
example, the Dutch used the 
moral authority of the presidency to stress the principle 
that "a deal is a deal" to 
quiet both domestic Dutch and EU opposition, and to set the 
stage for the final 
negotiating crunch.  Highlighting the Commission's 
recommendations, the Dutch downplayed 
their own negotiating efforts until just a few weeks before 
the December 17 Council, even 
though they appear to have been coordinating closely with 
Germans, French and British 
while maintaining a good dialogue with the Turks.  Their 
careful preparation paid off in 
the end, although the bruising eleventh-hour negotiations in 
Brussels reportedly left PM 
Balkenende and other senior Dutch officials with strong 
negative impressions of the 
Turks.  Especially during the period between the November and 
December Councils, 
high-level Dutch-U.S. contacts alerted the USG to possible 
problems and enabled us to 
weigh in effectively at key moments  -- for example, on the 
question of military 
overflights of the Aegean  -- without creating a negative 
backlash inside the EU. 
 
6. (C) On China, the Dutch began their presidency resigned to 
(if not particularly 
enthusiastic about) a lift of the EU Arms Embargo on China 
before the December EU- 
China summit.  Initial Dutch responses to U.S. approaches 
reflected a desire to have the 
U.S. accept a lift as a "fait accompli."  Early and active US 
engagement at all levels 
(especially between Secretary Powell and Foreign Minister 
Bot), however, succeeded not 
only in convincing the Dutch not to support such a lift, but 
led Bot to use the powers of 
the presidency actively to prevent a lift from occurring 
during the Dutch presidency. 
While the December 17 Council conclusions "invite" the 
Luxembourg presidency to take 
up the issue with an eye to "finalizing" the work needed to 
lift, its references to not 
increasing the quality or quantity of EU imports to China and 
to the interests of " 
friendly and allied" nations place the issue in a more 
favorable context for discussion 
than existed prior to the Dutch presidency.   In a recent 
meeting with Ambassador Sobel, 
however, Hugo Siblesz made clear that the Dutch expect 
momentum to lift the Embargo to 
grow during the Luxembourg presidency, and urged the U.S. to 
engage now to ensure that 
the Code of Conduct and toolbox properly take U.S. interests 
into account. 
 
OTHER ISSUES:  IRAQ, MIDDLE EAST, UKRAINE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The Dutch took on the difficult and apparently 
thankless task of refocusing the EU 
on Iraq as a top priority even before beginning their 
presidency.  While progress has 
been slow and painful, the Dutch did succeed in focusing the 
EU on the positive and 
necessary role it can play in promoting security, stability, 
and reconstruction in Iraq. 
The Dutch pressed the European Union to send experts to 
Baghdad -- providing a plane and 
the personal leadership of FM Bot to forestall possible 
objections -- and to develop a 
concrete plan of assistance.  The Dutch (responding to a 
German proposal) invited Iraqi 
PM Allawi to address the November European Council, at least 
partly to force quick 
agreement on the plan.  In a recent meeting with Ambassador 
Sobel, POLDIR Hugo 
Siblesz admitted that while the EU has done well "on paper," 
the Dutch are frustrated 
that more has not been achieved on the ground.  On the other 
hand, the shift in the EU's 
focus will hopefully help set a more positive tone for US-EU 
discussions on Iraq in the 
future. 
 
8. (C) With regard to Middle East peace prospects, the Dutch 
(and FM Bot in particular) 
were quick to take advantage of the opportunity presented by 
Yasser Arafat's death to 
promote an active EU role in promoting Palestinian elections. 
 At the EUROMED 
ministerial in December, Bot brought the Israeli and 
Palestinian representatives together 
for a meeting and photo op, and worked to ensure that Solana 
and others focused on near- 
term, achievable goals rather than trying to shift the 
discussion to "final status" 
issues.  The Dutch will hand the EU presidency to Luxembourg 
full of hope that a window 
of opportunity has been opened for roadmap implementation. 
Bot has also clearly signaled 
that he would be happy remain actively involved in the 
process, perhaps by providing a 
"back channel" for the parties and/or providing advice to his 
(in his view) "less 
experienced" Luxembourg counterparts. 
 
9. (C) Finally, the Ukraine election crisis gave the EU an 
unexpected opportunity to 
raise its profile in the "new neighborhood" of the states of 
the Former Soviet Union. 
During a contentious lunch discussion on Ukraine during the 
EU-Russia summit in November, 
Bot and Balkenende reportedly stood firm against a 
well-prepared and assertive Putin in 
asserting the EU's interest in Ukraine.  While the Poles, 
Lithuanians, and Solana played 
a more public role than the EU presidency on the ground than 
the Dutch -- a tactical 
decision, according to Bot, designed to avoid the appearance 
of "ganging up" on Russia -- 
the firm handling of the Ukraine issue (as well as the 
broader issue of EU-Russian 
relations in the "new neighborhood," which at one point 
threatened to derail the EU- 
Russia summit) is likely to be remembered as one of the most 
significant achievements of 
the Dutch EU presidency.  From the Dutch perspective, the 
Ukraine episode was a good 
example of how the EU can and should operate -- staking out a 
strong, coherent position 
on an important international issue while coordinating 
closely with the U.S. -- but also 
highlighted growing concerns regarding the likely direction 
of EU-Russian relations. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
10. (C) During the lead-up to the presidency, Dutch 
interlocutors tried to lower 
expectations for their presidency by citing the special 
character of their semester (new 
Commission, new parliament, long summer break) and the 
"obstacle" (a Bot word in his 
final briefing of the diplomatic community on the presidency) 
of the US election as 
reasons not to expect much progress.  At the end of their 
presidency, however, the Dutch 
appear confident that they have successfully met all 
challenges while racking up 
commendable set of solid achievements -- and they are clearly 
reluctant to give up the 
privileges of the presidency to become "just one of 25." 
Strong personal contacts at all 
levels, especially between the Secretary and FM Bot, were a 
key factor in encouraging 
the Dutch to assert their presidency prerogatives in support 
of a shared transatlantic 
agenda.  (This China Arms Embargo discussion in particular 
demonstrates the critical 
importance of weighing in before a firm EU consensus position 
has been set in stone.) 
Going into the Luxembourg presidency, we believe that the 
Dutch experience, combined 
with a new Commission, leaves the US and EU well positioned 
to renew a deeper and 
constructive cooperation on many of the issues that face us 
both. 
 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The December 17 European Council decision to 
offer Turkey a starting 
date for accession negotiations let the Dutch end their 
presidency on a high note.  The 
Dutch recorded several important accomplishments, of which 
the successful Turkish 
negotiations were the most notable, while maintaining a high 
degree of transparency 
during a challenging period for both the EU and the 
Netherlands.  Significant progress 
was made in strengthening U.S.-EU coordination on Justice and 
Home Affairs, laying the 
groundwork for more effective cooperation in the future. 
Particularly with regard to 
terrorist financing, the Dutch accepted and promoted the U.S. 
effort to address the issue 
"across pillars" and look forward to continuing to show 
leadership in this area.  Despite 
early protestations about the primacy of remaining "neutral" 
during the Presidency, the 
Dutch ultimately wielded their position effectively to 
prevent a premature lift of the 
China Arms Embargo and to get a "yes" decision on Turkey. 
The Dutch also pushed the 
EU to take a more active and positive stance on Iraq, 
although the results have so far 
fallen short of expectations, and strove to take advantage of 
near-term opportunities in 
the Middle East in the wake of Yasser Arafat's death while 
avoiding focusing on final 
status issues.  The Ukraine election crisis provided an 
unexpected opportunity for the EU 
to demonstrate resolve but highlighted long-term worries 
about the EU-Russia relations. 
End summary. 
 
A DIFFICULT TIME TO BE PRESIDENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (C)  As noted refs, the 2004 Dutch EU presidency took 
place against a backdrop of 
deliberately lowered expectations combined with a series of 
unusual complications (both 
expected and unanticipated).  The Dutch were the first 
presidency to preside over an EU 
at 25, and also the first to deal with a European 
Parliament's refusal to confirm a new 
commission.  Domestically, Prime Minister Balkenende's 
extended illness (which caused 
the postponement of at least one summit and led another to be 
chaired by Luxembourg) 
and anti-Muslim sentiment provoked by the November murder of 
a Dutch filmmaker by a 
Dutch Islamic extremist of Moroccan descent posed unique 
challenges for the Dutch 
presidency.  In the end, however, the Dutch achieved nearly 
all their stated objectives 
for the presidency and more -- even when operating without a 
functioning commission or 
Prime Minister.  This reflected both extensive Dutch 
pre-presidency contingency 
planning and a surprising (for the Dutch) degree of 
flexibility which allowed the 
presidency to find and exploit opportunities for progress 
despite such obstacles. 
 
TRANSATLANTIC TRANSPARENCY 
------------------------- 
 
3. (C)  Extensive contacts between Dutch officials and their 
Washington, Hague, and 
Brussels counterparts -- up to and including the U.S.-EU 
Ministerial Troika meeting in 
December -- helped maintain a mood of productive consultation 
throughout the Dutch 
presidency, even when dealing with contentious issues such as 
the possible lift of the 
EU's China Arms Embargo.  By describing their own thinking 
and the positions of other 
member states, the Dutch often alerted the USG to troublesome 
developments within the 
EU councils as well as promising openings for U.S. 
intervention.  Within EU fora 
(including the December 17 POLDIRS meeting chaired by Dutch 
POLDIR Hugo Siblesz), the 
Dutch helped set a practical, down-to-earth tone for the 
U.S.-EU dialogue by highlighting 
areas of actual partnership (such as Ukraine) and shared 
objectives (such as Iraq), while 
seeking constructive ways to work through areas of real 
disagreement 
(including the China Arms Embargo). 
 
NEW MECHANISM FOR COOPERATION ON JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
(JHA) 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
4. (C) This area had been flagged prior to the presidency as 
one in which practical 
cooperation between the U.S. and EU should be a major 
priority.  The Dutch succeeded 
both in facilitating cross-pillar/interagency review of JHA 
issues (particularly in the 
area of terrorist financing) and directing senior level 
attention on the areas of U.S.-EU 
cooperation on JHA and CT issues.  The Dutch hosted several 
workshops at the expert 
level on terrorist financing and succeeded in laying the 
groundwork for a continuation of 
a U.S.-EU dialogue on combating terrorism finance.  They 
included DHS Secretary 
Ridge in a ministerial troika on JHA issues where he stressed 
the themes of our common 
efforts to address common problems.  The Dutch followed up by 
inviting AG Ashcroft 
and DHS Undersecretary Hutchinson to address an informal JHA 
Council including all 
25 EU member states.  This Dutch initiative of senior level 
U.S.-EU political review of 
common JHA issues has now been institutionalized as a 
multiannual concept, with the 
next meeting scheduled during the UK presidency in the second 
half of 2005.  During the 
meetings in The Hague, then-Commissioner for JHA Vittorino 
noted the importance of 
continued U.S. leadership in the JHA and counterterrorism 
areas, but stressed the need 
for better U.S.-EU coordination in managing public opinion to 
avoid the impression that 
the U.S. is dictating to the EU.  The EU has also shown 
strong interest in broadening our 
relationship with Eurojust and Europol (both based in the 
Netherlands.) 
 
TURKEY AND CHINA:  POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5. (C)  Although the Dutch often protested that they must 
remain "neutral" during their 
presidency, they ultimately proved both willing and able to 
use their presidency 
prerogatives to influence key EU decisions.  On Turkey, for 
example, the Dutch used the 
moral authority of the presidency to stress the principle 
that "a deal is a deal" to 
quiet both domestic Dutch and EU opposition, and to set the 
stage for the final 
negotiating crunch.  Highlighting the Commission's 
recommendations, the Dutch downplayed 
their own negotiating efforts until just a few weeks before 
the December 17 Council, even 
though they appear to have been coordinating closely with 
Germans, French and British 
while maintaining a good dialogue with the Turks.  Their 
careful preparation paid off in 
the end, although the bruising eleventh-hour negotiations in 
Brussels reportedly left PM 
Balkenende and other senior Dutch officials with strong 
negative impressions of the 
Turks.  Especially during the period between the November and 
December Councils, 
high-level Dutch-U.S. contacts alerted the USG to possible 
problems and enabled us to 
weigh in effectively at key moments  -- for example, on the 
question of military 
overflights of the Aegean  -- without creating a negative 
backlash inside the EU. 
 
6. (C) On China, the Dutch began their presidency resigned to 
(if not particularly 
enthusiastic about) a lift of the EU Arms Embargo on China 
before the December EU- 
China summit.  Initial Dutch responses to U.S. approaches 
reflected a desire to have the 
U.S. accept a lift as a "fait accompli."  Early and active US 
engagement at all levels 
(especially between Secretary Powell and Foreign Minister 
Bot), however, succeeded not 
only in convincing the Dutch not to support such a lift, but 
led Bot to use the powers of 
the presidency actively to prevent a lift from occurring 
during the Dutch presidency. 
While the December 17 Council conclusions "invite" the 
Luxembourg presidency to take 
up the issue with an eye to "finalizing" the work needed to 
lift, its references to not 
increasing the quality or quantity of EU imports to China and 
to the interests of " 
friendly and allied" nations place the issue in a more 
favorable context for discussion 
than existed prior to the Dutch presidency.   In a recent 
meeting with Ambassador Sobel, 
however, Hugo Siblesz made clear that the Dutch expect 
momentum to lift the Embargo to 
grow during the Luxembourg presidency, and urged the U.S. to 
engage now to ensure that 
the Code of Conduct and toolbox properly take U.S. interests 
into account. 
 
OTHER ISSUES:  IRAQ, MIDDLE EAST, UKRAINE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The Dutch took on the difficult and apparently 
thankless task of refocusing the EU 
on Iraq as a top priority even before beginning their 
presidency.  While progress has 
been slow and painful, the Dutch did succeed in focusing the 
EU on the positive and 
necessary role it can play in promoting security, stability, 
and reconstruction in Iraq. 
The Dutch pressed the European Union to send experts to 
Baghdad -- providing a plane and 
the personal leadership of FM Bot to forestall possible 
objections -- and to develop a 
concrete plan of assistance.  The Dutch (responding to a 
German proposal) invited Iraqi 
PM Allawi to address the November European Council, at least 
partly to force quick 
agreement on the plan.  In a recent meeting with Ambassador 
Sobel, POLDIR Hugo 
Siblesz admitted that while the EU has done well "on paper," 
the Dutch are frustrated 
that more has not been achieved on the ground.  On the other 
hand, the shift in the EU's 
focus will hopefully help set a more positive tone for US-EU 
discussions on Iraq in the future. 
 
 
 
8. (C) With regard to Middle East peace prospects, the Dutch 
(and FM Bot in particular) 
were quick to take advantage of the opportunity presented by 
Yasser Arafat's death to 
promote an active EU role in promoting Palestinian elections. 
 At the EUROMED 
ministerial in December, Bot brought the Israeli and 
Palestinian representatives together 
for a meeting and photo op, and worked to ensure that Solana 
and others focused on near- 
term, achievable goals rather than trying to shift the 
discussion to "final status" 
issues.  The Dutch will hand the EU presidency to Luxembourg 
full of hope that a window 
of opportunity has been opened for roadmap implementation. 
Bot has also clearly signaled 
that he would be happy remain actively involved in the 
process, perhaps by providing a 
"back channel" for the parties and/or providing advice to his 
(in his view) "less 
experienced" Luxembourg counterparts. 
 
9. (C) Finally, the Ukraine election crisis gave the EU an 
unexpected opportunity to 
raise its profile in the "new neighborhood" of the states of 
the Former Soviet Union.  During a 
contentious lunch discussion on Ukraine during the EU-Russia 
summit in November, Bot 
and Balkenende reportedly stood firm against a well-prepared 
and assertive Putin in 
asserting the EU's interest in Ukraine.  While the Poles, 
Lithuanians, and Solana played 
a more public role than the EU presidency on the ground than 
the Dutch -- a tactical 
decision, according to Bot, designed to avoid the appearance 
of "ganging up" on Russia -- 
the firm handling of the Ukraine issue (as well as the 
broader issue of EU-Russian 
relations in the "new neighborhood," which at one point 
threatened to derail the EU- 
Russia summit) is likely to be remembered as one of the most 
significant achievements of 
the Dutch EU presidency.  From the Dutch perspective, the 
Ukraine episode was a good 
example of how the EU can and should operate -- staking out a 
strong, coherent position 
on an important international issue while coordinating 
closely with the U.S. -- but also 
highlighted growing concerns regarding the likely direction 
of EU-Russian relations. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (C) During the lead-up to the presidency, Dutch 
interlocutors tried to lower 
expectations for their presidency by citing the special 
character of their semester (new 
Commission, new parliament, long summer break) and the 
"obstacle" (a Bot word in his 
final briefing of the diplomatic community on the presidency) 
of the US election as 
reasons not to expect much progress.  At the end of their 
presidency, however, the Dutch 
appear confident that they have successfully met all 
challenges while racking up 
commendable set of solid achievements -- and they are clearly 
reluctant to give up the 
privileges of the presidency to become "just one of 25." 
Strong personal contacts at all 
levels, especially between the Secretary and FM Bot, were a 
key factor in encouraging 
the Dutch to assert their presidency prerogatives in support 
of a shared transatlantic 
agenda.  (This China Arms Embargo discussion in particular 
demonstrates the critical 
importance of weighing in before a firm EU consensus position 
has been set in stone.) 
Going into the Luxembourg presidency, we believe that the 
Dutch experience, combined 
with a new Commission, leaves the US and EU well positioned 
to renew a deeper and 
constructive cooperation on many of the issues that face us 
both. 
 
 
 
SOBEL