US embassy cable - 04PARIS9167

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 009167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, CM, CT, CH, ZF, XA, FR 
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND CENTRAL AFRICA (NORTH) 
 
REF: PARIS 9133 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  Chad, where France maintains a permanent 
miltary presence, and the Central African Republic (CAR), 
where France is supporting military and economic reform are 
key countries for France's Africa policy.  The crisis in 
Darfur has caused concern in France about additional threats 
to the stability of the Deby regime in Chad.  France supports 
Deby, including in his apparent aim to win another term as 
President.  France has glossed over the manner in which 
Francois Bozize came to power in Bangui, and is working with 
CAR on training gendarmes and providing support in the IFIs. 
In Cameroon, the French see President Biya as a luckluster 
leader but, while trying to avoid involvement in the 
Cameroonian dispute with Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula, 
are anxious to ensure that Nigeria complies with the ruling 
of the International Court of Justice.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CHAD 
 
2. (C) Seeing no credible candidates among the opposition, 
the French see Chadian President Idriss Deby as the best hope 
for stability.  MFA officials have made clear to us that 
their support for Deby would extend to supporting him when he 
decides to seek a further term as President.  Deby's problems 
with poor health have occasioned periodic visits to Paris for 
medical treatment.  Although President Chirac has offered the 
use of a French military hospital, Deby prefers to use the 
American hospital in the Paris suburb of Neuilly. 
 
3. (C) France has maintained a permanent military base of 
about 700 troops in Chad for many years.  The current number 
is just over a thousand, with French forces having been 
engaged in assisting NGOs providing relief efforts to 
refugees from Darfur.  France, which according to an MFA 
contact, owns half of N'djamena, has been negotiating with 
the Chadians over the return of 90 per cent of the property 
as a form of assistance in kind, leaving the remainder for 
use by the French garrison. 
 
4. (C) France views the crisis in Darfur (see Reftel on 
France and East Africa) as a threat to the stability of Chad. 
 France sees Deby as caught between his ties to his Zaghawa 
kinsmen, who installed and maintained him in power and who 
are allied with the Darfur rebels, or acting as a national 
leader in the interests of all Chadians.  French officials 
also note that Deby can not put Chad in the position of 
opposing the Khartoum regime. 
 
CAR 
 
5. (C) Francois Bozize's coup in March 2003 brought an end to 
uncomfortable relations between Paris and former President 
Felix-Ange Patasse.  Patasse was variously described to us by 
French officials as unpredictable and unstable and his 
departure was no loss to the GOF.  Having financially 
supported the CEMAC troops who had replaced the Libyans in 
Bangui, France sent 300 troops to CAR to provide security 
immediately following the coup.  For several months, the GOF 
ducked the issue of whether Bozize should be addressed as 
"Mr. President," but it was always clear that as soon as 
neighboring African leaders, particularly Gabon's Bongo, were 
on board, France would treat with Bozize as de facto head of 
state.  Meanwhile, France quietly exfiltrated Patasse's Prime 
Minister, Martin Ziguele who had taken refuge at the French 
embassy in Bangui and gave him asylum in France.  At the end 
of July 2003, FM de Villepin visited Bozize in CAR, finally 
confirming France's de facto recognition. 
 
6. (C) Despite the removal of Patasse, the French remain 
pessimistic about CAR.  They use every opportunity to ask us 
to support CAR in the IFIs, notwithstanding s.508 
requirements and are anxious to see the return of U.S. 
diplomats to Bangui.  France continues to support the CEMAC 
deployment in CAR as well as its own military presence which 
is engaged in training of gendarmes. 
 
7. (C) CAR had a brief spell in the glare of international 
publicity in February this year when Bozize agreed to a 
French request, coordinated with the USG, to welcome former 
Haitian President Aristide. 
 
CAMEROON 
 
8. (C) In September 2002, The GOF provided facilities for a 
discreet meeting among Nigerian President Obasanjo, 
Cameroonian President Biya and UNSYG Annan to discuss the 
disputed Bakassi peninsula.  The GOF, aware that Nigeria 
would suspect that France favored Cameroon, took pains to 
ensure that there was no French involvement in the meeting. 
In August 2004, with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
having ruled largely in Cameroon's favor, French officials 
expressed concern to us over Nigeria's failure to implement 
the ICJ decision.  The French also took the opportunity, 
notwithstanding their reservations about Biya's lackluster 
leadership, to press us on support for Cameroon in the IFIs. 
 
9. (C) As with several other long-serving African heads of 
state, Biya apparently benefits from Chirac's personal 
support as evidenced by the premature statement of 
congratulations from the Elysee on Biya's October 2004 
election victory even before the vote had been finalized. 
Wolff