US embassy cable - 04ADANA177

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADANA 000177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB, ETRD, MARR, IZ, TU, ADANA 
SUBJECT: TURKISH TRUCKER STRIKE AGAINST SOMO CRUMBLES 
 
REF: ADANA 171; ANKARA 7119; BAGHDAD 282 
 
 
1.(SBU)  As of late 12/24, the wildcat Turkish trucker strike 
against SOMO started to crumble and, by mid-day 12/26, almost 
all Turkish oil supply companies started fueling transport 
vehicles to resume shipments to SOMO.  U.S. military sources 
report that, as of early 12/27, 112 SOMO-related vehicles are in 
northern Iraq awaiting southbound convoying.  Turkish oil sector 
contractors predict that that number will rise rapidly and 
request "every U.S. effort to open the Habur gate to its maximum 
capacity both southbound and northbound to get fuel flowing 
again at required levels."  The strike was "solved" through a 
variety of mixed wage concessions and perceived driver need for 
renewed cash flow.  End Summary. 
 
2.(SBU)  According to Turkish oil industry contacts, the wildcat 
Turkish strucker strike, begun on December 6, against SOMO 
started to crumble late on 12/24.  Reportedly one to two small 
Turkish SOMO consortium players, comprising approximately five 
to ten percent of daily SOMO contracting, and reportedly 
including Kizil, paid "very significant wage increases" to 
truckers and started filling tankers as early as late 12/24. 
Several other suppliers over the weekend agreed to "small wage 
increases" (note: industry contacts would not give exact 
figures, but several speculated that "the others" paid 
approximately 5-15 percent increases.  End Note.)  Large 
players, such as OPET, reportedly the biggest Turkish SOMO 
consortium supplier, and Petrol Ofisi,  perhaps third or fourth 
largest supplier, according to their own accounts "broke the 
strike" and paid no wage increases, but started recovering 
sub-contracted trucking groups for fueling throughout the course 
of the weekend.  (Comment: confirmation or contrasting 
information from SOMO as to its Turkish oil supplier consortium 
composition and accounts of the strike's breakdown are welcome; 
we are assembling  these accounts from a variety of fragmented 
sources whose accounts are difficult to verify on an individual 
basis.  End Comment.) 
 
3.(SBU)  U.S. military logistic contacts in northern Iraq report 
receiving up to 112 tanker trucks related to SOMO as of late 
12/26 and having them ready on 12/27 for southbound convoys. 
This number  consists of  67 Benzene, 27 Diesel, 18 Kerosene and 
no LPG tankers. According to U.S. military sources, this is 
about 24 percent of the daily SOMO requirement. The daily SOMO 
requirement is 160 benzene trucks, 180 diesel, 37 kerosene, and 
70 LPG tankers.  On a related note, regarding U.S. military 
sustainment fuel shipments, which had been affected by a 
sympathy strike/slowdown, there were 180 JP8 and 17 MOGAS 
tankers ready for southbound convoys as of early 12/27.  Petrol 
Ofisi, the main Turkish sustainment fuel contractor, said it was 
resuming its regular MOGAS and diesel filling levels 
"immediately" now that it drivers presumedly would not be 
harassed near the Habur gate by wildcat SOMO strikers. 
 
4.(SBU)  OPET and Petrol Ofisi senior level contacts stressed 
the need "for the U.S. government to make every effort to open 
the Habur gate to its maximum capacity both southbound and 
northbound to get fuel flowing again at required levels." OPET 
said that it would fuel tankers "above the daily load 
requirement to start making up for missed shipments."  (Comment: 
AMCON ADANA underscores the need for the Habur gate to be open 
both southbound and northbound above the currently informally 
agreed 1500 transits per day north and south-bound - i.e., total 
3,000 daily transits.  Limited Turkish trucker supply dictates 
that, even over a short timeframe, recovering and refueling 
Turkish trucks after successful return through the Habur gate is 
as important as getting them initially through the Habur gate to 
Iraqi download points.  Backups northbound caused by both 
lengthy Turkish customs searches for contraband and Iraqi 
inconsistently-timed northbound "pushes" will need immediate 
additional coordination and perhaps will require different 
resource allocations, even if short-term, to be successful.  For 
example, more Turkish Jandarma to conduct inbound customs 
screening would be helpful in reducing the already 50-plus 
kilometer northbound backlog of Turkish trucks.  Tackling this 
complex task will require joint efforts by both the GoT and IIG. 
 End Comment.) 
 
5.(SBU)  Comment:  For now, the strike seems to be over, but its 
"resolution" was not comprehensive and reportedly is based on 
varying wage concessions by different Turkish oil supplier 
companies with their trucking sub-contractors.  This could 
result in further problems once news of varying wage concessions 
becomes more widespread.  The Turkish oil supply companies also 
still may seek increased 2005 contracts with SOMO.  End Comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REID