US embassy cable - 04PARIS9145

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FRANCE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN STATES

Identifier: 04PARIS9145
Wikileaks: View 04PARIS9145 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2004-12-28 10:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PHUM CN MA MP SE XW XA FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 009145 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, CN, MA, MP, SE, XW, XA, FR 
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN STATES 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  The standoff in 2002 between Marc 
Ravalomanana and Didier Ratsiraka following the disputed 
election in Madagascar was a serious political crisis for the 
government of France, exposing divisions between the MFA and 
the presidency.  With the crisis resolved, France's attention 
to the Indian Ocean states is largely focused on economic and 
development issues, in large part resulting from the 
proximity of the French territories of Mayotte and Reunion to 
the Comoros and Seychelles respectively.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MADAGASCAR 
 
2. (C) The French response to the Madagascar crisis during 
the first six months of 2002 revealed a relatively rare 
glimpse of inter-agency rivalry within the GOF, specifically 
between the MFA and the Presidency.  The crisis produced a 
notable casualty when Michel Dupuch, President Chirac's 
advisor on African affairs resigned his position July 5 
following then-FM de Villepin's travel to Antananarivo to 
confer French recognition on Marc Ravalomanana.  Although the 
crisis straddled the change of leadership at the MFA 
following French elections in April 2002, the MFA recognized 
early in the crisis that Ravalomanana was likely to emerge 
victorious from the standoff with Didier Ratsiraka.  However, 
at the Presidency Dupuch, and possibly Chirac himself, were 
unwilling to dump Ratsiraka.  The stated reason was that 
France (and the U.S.) should not get ahead of the OAU, which 
was reluctant to accept Ravalomanana's victory.  It is also 
likely that decades of personal contact and friendship 
between Chirac and Ratsiraka also played a role in the 
Elysee's disinclination to support Ravalomanana.  If Dupuch 
was the loser, Stanislas de Laboulaye, who was the French 
Ambassador during the crisis, and reportedly argued in favor 
of accepting Ravalomanana's victory, was a winner.  Following 
French recognition of Ravalomanana in July 2002, Villepin 
appointed Laboulaye (an ENA classmate) as the MFA political 
director (P-equivalent), a post he still occupies. 
Meanwhile, Ratsiraka is in exile in the Paris suburbs, 
apparently on the condition that he "behave," i.e., that 
there be no repetition of the June 2002 chartered flight 
carrying twelve mercenaries destined for Madagascar, which 
obliged Villepin to intercede with the government of Tanzania 
to ensure that they were turned around in Dar es Salaam. 
 
3. (C) With 24,000 French nationals (60 per cent of whom are 
dual nationals) in Madagascar, the GOF is doubtless pleased 
to have moved beyond the crisis.  France has made efforts to 
establish a working relationship with Ravalomanana, 
notwithstanding initial concerns about his and his 
supporters' religious fervor, his lack of fluency in French 
and his origins as a businessman.  The French were pleased to 
see Ravalomanana attend the France/Africa summit in France in 
February 2003 and again in August this year to commemorate 
the 60th anniversary of allied landings in southern France. 
Chirac will attend the summit of Indian Ocean states in March 
in Antananarivo, having already been to Madagascar, stopping 
in Antananarivo in July this year in conjunction with his 
summer vacation.  The MFA claims that Ravalomanana has joined 
other Chirac friends such as Gabon's Bongo and Congo/B's 
Sassou as recipients of Chirac's warm embraces.  The MFA 
views the situation for Ravalomanana's TIM party and its 
allies as fragile, but notes that notwithstanding traditional 
Malagasy views about land, the GOM has taken courageous steps 
in creating conditions for foreign ownership. 
 
COMOROS 
 
4. (C) The GOF is supportive of a Federal structure for the 
Comoros under the Fomboni accords, as exemplified by the 
refusal of French ministers to meet with Anjouan President 
Mohammed Bacar during his visits to Paris.  The GOF has been 
discouraging Bacar's desire for an independent Anjouan and 
views him as overly authoritarian.  Unfortunately for France, 
they find the Federal government incompetent, not even able 
to produce a budget for review by the IMF.  About the only 
thing the government can do, an MFA contact told us, is to 
pursue Comoros' territorial claim to Mayotte.  MFA contacts 
occasionally remind us that Comoros is the closest African 
country to France, just over 100 miles from the French 
territory of Mayotte (claimed by Comoros).  They express 
concern about the strong presence of Madrasa schools 
established by individuals coming from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
and Pakistan, which preach extreme pro-Islamic, anti-western 
tenets to Comorian youth.  France is also concerned about 
trafficking of goods and money laundering in the Comoros as 
well as "boat people" seeking to flee to Mayotte.  The MFA 
claims that there are 40,000 clandestine Comorians in Mayotte 
and that 70 per cent of the births in Mayotte are to Comorian 
mothers.  The GOF is concerned about the drain on welfare 
resources caused by these illegal immigrants and the growth 
of violence, including by vigilante groups against the 
Comorians. 
 
MAURITIUS 
 
5. (C) MFA contacts told us in February 2004 that the visit 
to France of Mauritian PM Paul Berenger had gone very well. 
They noted with satisfaction that FM Cuttaree did not share 
the anti-French sentiments of his predecessor Anil Gayan. 
French interests in Mauritius are essentially economic (given 
Mauritian engagement on WTO issues) and commercial, although 
both countries are engaged on the issue of Comoros. 
 
SEYCHELLES 
 
6. (C) After 27 years of rule by Albert Rene, new President 
James Michel is relatively unknown to the French.  The GOF 
sees much of the Seychelles' economy dominated by Rene 
cronies, with the majority of Seychellois economically 
marginalized.  France views the economic situation in the 
Seychelles as very bad, with almost all commerce under the 
control of the Seychelles Marketing Board.  The MFA drew an 
analogy with Cuba, saying that there were constant food 
shortages.  The French also have concerns about the political 
situation, fearing that elections scheduled for 2006 will go 
badly. 
Wolff 

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