US embassy cable - 04TAIPEI4076

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PRESIDENT CHEN, UNDER POST-ELECTION PRESSURE, CLAIMS U.S. ENVOY APPROVED HIS POLICIES

Identifier: 04TAIPEI4076
Wikileaks: View 04TAIPEI4076 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2004-12-27 21:29:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV CH TW Cross Strait Politics
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHEN, UNDER POST-ELECTION PRESSURE, 
CLAIMS U.S. ENVOY APPROVED HIS POLICIES 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 3988 
     B. TAIPEI 3918 AND PRECEDING 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas H. Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Post-December 11 election jockeying within 
the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and between 
Green and Blue alliances continues in ways that may affect 
cross-Strait and U.S. relations.  Members of the DPP's New 
Tide faction are publicly and messily blaming President Chen 
Shui-bian for failing to gain a better election result due to 
his efforts to stir voters' pro-independence sentiment.  Chen 
is being accused of damaging U.S. relations in the process. 
He is staying above the internecine fray while using 
supporters to fight back.  A long weekend of highly public 
intra-DPP bickering was capped Monday morning, December 27, 
by a front page banner headline in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" proclaiming "Secret U.S. Emissary Met 
President Chen, Said Taiwan-U.S. Relations Unchanged," and 
"confirmed approval of President Chen's performance."  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The DPP's perceived loss in the December 11 
legislative elections continues to reverberate through Taiwan 
("perceived loss" because, despite gaining two seats, the DPP 
failed to meet President Chen's stated expectations for 
pan-Green majority).  The post-election political maneuvering 
involves not only inter-party politics, with the pan-Blue 
alliance pressing its thin majority for increased leverage, 
but also within the ruling DPP itself, with its increasingly 
outspoken factions jockeying with a wounded President for 
ministerial and party posts and increased influence in the 
new government. 
 
3.  (C) The pragmatic -- vice ideologically-driven -- New 
Tide faction has taken the offensive within the DPP, 
criticizing President Chen for his use of sensitive 
independence-related rhetoric during the campaign.  The New 
Tide believes this backfired and alienated centrist voters 
and damaged Taiwan,s relations with the U.S.  Maverick New 
Tider Lin Cho-shui fired the opening salvo on Friday evening, 
December 24, publicly criticizing Chen's foreign policy, 
charging that Chen's rhetoric had used up Taiwan's credit 
with the U.S., and urging Chen to improve relations with the 
U.S.  The New Tide attack hit home because, as the largest 
and electorally most successful DPP faction, it will be 
crucial for DPP prospects in local elections next December. 
 
 
4.  (C) Chen himself has appeared to stay above the political 
fray since December 11 and kept discreetly out of the debate 
over the weekend as the DPP quarrel escalated in the media. 
He was, however, represented by a phalanx of advisors who 
fought back, casting aspersions on the critics' loyalty to 
the President and to Taiwan and rebutting their charges. 
Presidential Office Secretary General Chiou I-jen, himself a 
New Tide leader, was placed in the awkward position of 
defending his management of U.S. relations while protecting 
his faction.  He told the press on December 25 that Lin's 
charges were "far from the truth" and that actually 
Taiwan-U.S. relations had entered a new period of friction as 
the U.S. comes to understand that democracy on Taiwan will be 
accompanied by increasing Taiwan identity.  The quarrel 
become so public that DPP Central Discussion Committee Chair 
Kao Chi-peng called a press conference Sunday morning, 
December 26, to urge DPP factions not to air their criticisms 
in public, but rather to present and discuss them internally. 
 
 
5.  (U) The weekend of DPP internecine warfare and the 
defense of President Chen culminated in a front page banner 
headline in the pro-Green "Liberty Times" on December 27: 
"Secret U.S. Envoy Met President Chen, Said Taiwan-U.S. 
Relations Unchanged."  According to the report, "a high level 
Taiwan government official (shouzhang)" -- terminology 
suggesting Office of the President involvement -- revealed 
that an "extremely high level U.S. representative secretly 
visited Taipei before Christmas, confirmed U.S. support for 
President Chen,s performance, and stressed there is now no 
misunderstanding between Taiwan and the U.S.  Taiwan and the 
U.S., the report continued, wanted to maintain "this second 
channel of communication used by Special Envoys like (former 
NSC Senior Asia Director James) Moriarty." 
6.  (C) Comment.  Under attack, President Chen pulled out all 
stops and, via his palace guard, fought back against his 
critics within the DPP.  The "Special Envoy" press report 
suggests that, despite the DPP election setback and Chen,s 
subsequent lower profile, he and DPP insiders continue 
capable of putting partisan political advantage above foreign 
policy considerations.  The intra-DPP imbroglio may have 
receded from the headlines; DPP Deputy Secretary General Lee 
Ying-yuan told AIT the weekend dust-up occurred in the power 
vacuum left by Chen Shui-bian's resignation as Party 
Chairman.  The Presidential Office use of a heavy-handed 
"U.S. card" will produce its own after-effects as speculation 
and responses to it play out in the media and in talk shows. 
Beijing may want to know if the U.S. secretly told Chen it 
approves his performance.  During the election campaign, 
Pan-Green leaders dismissed criticisms of playing politics 
with national security and damaging Taiwan-U.S. relations 
over the past two years, replying that relations would be 
"mended" after the election.  This latest development 
continues the pattern of the past two years.  End Comment. 
PAAL 

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