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| Identifier: | 04TAIPEI4075 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04TAIPEI4075 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
| Created: | 2004-12-27 07:32:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | OPRC KMDR KPAO TW Cross Strait Politics Foreign Policy |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 004075 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ROBERT PALLADINO DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC, KMDR, KPAO, TW, Cross Strait Politics, Foreign Policy SUBJECT: CHINA'S "ANTI-SECESSION LAW," AND U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS A) "The Premises Have Been Destroyed and How Can the Four Nos Remain Unchanged" An article in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" said (12/27): ". China's `anti-secession law,' if correctly expected by the government, provides the basis to use force against Taiwan, then the law explicitly challenges the premises President Chen Shui-bian set for the promises of `Four Nos and One Will Not.' "The Taiwan government is forced to face a critical problem, that is whether President Chen Shui-bian's promises on `Four Nos and One Will Not' still be effective in the future? "To answer the question is extremely difficult for Taiwan, especially when current U.S-China relations consistently improve `to the best status for the last 30 years.' Since there are several unexpected situations in U.S-Taiwan relations, however, the question would more easily irritate the sensitive nerves of the United States. "After all, this is not a question concerning the fundamental position of cross-Strait relations. If the grand direction is not ascertained, any repairing or mending [the cross-Strait relations] will end up with no rewards. If Taiwan ignores this question, the next challenge [from China] is the position of Taiwan's sovereignty. ." B) " `Anti-Taiwan Independence' Does Not Equal `Anti- Taiwan'- the Crisis and the Turning Point in the `Anti- Secession Law'" Political Critic Nan Fang-suo said in the centrist, pro- status quo "China Times" (12/27): ". The purpose [of China] is not to legislate the `Unification Law,' but to legislate the negative, passive, and even the defensive `anti-secession law.' On one hand, to legislate from a negative sense is technically easier; and on the other hand, the `anti- secession law' may stimulate the independent faction in Taiwan, but expresses good will toward the non- independent faction in Taiwan and by so doing reduces the negative effect of the legislation to the minimum. Most important of all, to abandon the `unification law' and to choose the `anti-secession law' reflects that other than `anti-independence,' Beijing currently is not urgent on `promoting unification' since there is no time table and, thus, there is elasticity toward unification. "As the degree of internationalization increases, Beijing knows more and more each day how to utilize the international environment. In the `anti-secession law,' Beijing's action has been defined as a kind of `defense,' instead of `offense.' More critically, President Chen Shui-bian in the past year made several moves intended to make use of the disparity that the United States at the same time asserts `One China' and upholds the `Taiwan Relations Act.' President Chen tried to manipulate the `Taiwan Relations Act' in the hope that the United States will change its `One China' policy. However, President Chen's intention caused negative feelings in the United States, and forced Secretary of State Colin Powell to say `Taiwan is not SIPDIS an independent sovereign state,' and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to say `there is no need to defend Taiwan,' and `Taiwan is a part of China.' All of these indicate that China and the United States have become consistent on the position of `anti-Taiwan independence.' It is a signal worth noting that China informed the United States before drafting the `anti- secession law,' and to some extent China got the `understanding' from the United States. At the current stage, the United States' `anti-independence' not only focused on the perspective of `de-jure Taiwan independence,' but started to pay attention to `contextual Taiwan independence' as well. When China and the United States moved toward the same position of `anti-Taiwan independence,' the space in which to manipulate `Taiwan independence' is incrementally decreased. "President Chen Shui-bian has used up the credit that U.S. diplomacy afforded, and left the United States with no choice but to stand together with China regarding the issue of `anti-independence.' In the past few years the DPP government persistently, implicitly or explicitly, played the `Taiwan independence card' and now it is `game over.' "As to Taiwan independence, however, the situation that the `Taiwan independence card' leads to a dead end may be the biggest crisis. Not only does Taiwan independence lose the legitimacy in the international community, it also becomes an illegal activity as well. But the situation is a major turning point for the non- independent fraction. "Hence, the `anti-secession law' and the statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of SIPDIS State Richard Armitage may cause the end of Taiwan independence, but certainly not the end of Taiwan. "People in Taiwan are not allowed to hate the same enemy [i.e. China] with the DPP under DPP's dominance. People in Taiwan should realize with optimism that whenever Taiwan independence diminishes, that is the time for the hope of Taiwan to actually start. ." C) "This Legislation Hands the Hot Potato Back to the United States; China Will Have More Room for Manipulation and the Right to Define the `Cross-Strait Status Quo' Will Be the Target for Bilateral Struggle in the Future" Journalist Sun Yang-ming wrote in the conservative, pro- unification "United Daily News" (12/26): ". The real issue is that once this anti-secession bill becomes a law, there will be a struggle between Washington and Beijing over who has the dominant right to define the so-called `status-quo' in the future. The basic strategic thinking and attitude of China toward how to deal with the Taiwan issue has changed. As a result, which direction Taiwan will be moving and the issue of independence will become a burden for the United States. The concept of an anti-secession law coincides with this [new] attitude. "The Neo-Conservatives of the Bush administration have been trying to use Taiwan as a means to delay China's rise [as a power] and let Taiwan become a burden for China. However, China is passing back this hot potato and having the United States accountable for the consequences should Taiwan cross the red line. This is why Beijing only wants an `anti-secession law' rather than a `unification law.'." D) "Criticizing Chen Shui-bian? Taiwan is not the problem, but China is" The pro-independence "Liberty Times" said in its editorial (12/27): "The United States is caught in between the democratic Taiwan and despotic China. China always has used international negotiation and its domestic market to threaten the United States for concessions on the issue of cross-Strait relations. The United States consequently faces a dilemma in choosing between the two. "Theoretically, the United States is a democratic country, it should enhance its interaction with the democratic Taiwan and should express the respectfulness of the basic human rights to the people of Taiwan. Unfortunately, as leaders in the United States and Taiwan lack direct communication, unnecessary misunderstandings have occurred. Such misunderstanding would be reduced significantly if the ban on contacts of high-ranking leaders were lifted. But if [the United States] continuously lets the `One-China'policy stymie arbitrarily, the situation could not be improved. This is the structural problem between the United States and Taiwan. "Anyway, Taiwan is not the problem, but the China is. In the past twenty years, the long-term goal of the international investments to China, including investment from Taiwan, seeks to promote political reforms through economic development, and to push China to fulfill its international obligations. The foreign capital brings the economic growth [in China], but it becomes the resources for China to build its military. In the meantime, China increases its political control internally, and prepares to use force to solve international disputes. Furthermore, China is playing `big nation diplomacy.' By making use of the United States' needs for cooperation on North Korea, Iraq and anti-terrorism issues, China manipulates the United States with `cooperation but faction' strategy. Taiwan is among the gains from this strategy." E) "U.S. Support for Taiwan May Not Be a Sure Thing" Chin Heng-wei commented in the pro-independence "Taipei Times"(12/26): ". The U.S. true focus is not the Taiwan question but the threat of China, and Taiwan is merely a landmine placed between the two giants. It is only when the situation is looked at in this light that one can understand the U.S. standpoint on the Taiwan question, the TRA and U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. "Naturally, America has the choice of not defending Taiwan, should it relinquish its interests in the West Pacific Region. To put it more clearly, if the U.S. sells the `Taiwan landmine' down the river, and scraps the TRA, they will be losing the Western Pacific Region as a sphere of influence. This will be tantamount to making the same errors they committed 50 years ago, and creating a monster that they cannot control. ." PAAL
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