US embassy cable - 02ROME585

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/WE, AND SA HOLMES 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 02/06/2007 
TAGS: MW, PREL, SR, ZL, UN 
SUBJECT:  GOI WORRIED ABOUT MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM; LOOKING 
FORWARD TO WORKING WITH SA HOLMES 
 
REF: A) BELGRADE 148 B) STATE 19796 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS TOM COUNTRYMAN.  REASON:1.5 (B)(D). 
 
1.  (U) ACTION REQUEST.  SEE PARA 8. 
 
2.  (C)  SUMMARY:  THE GOI AND EU ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY 
CONCERNED OVER THE POTENTIAL REGIONAL INSTABILITY THAT COULD 
BE FOMENTED BY AN INDEPENDENT MONTENEGRO.  THE EU BELIEVES 
THAT IT IS NOT TOO LATE FOR THE IC TO STALL THE MOMENTUM 
TOWARD A REFERENDUM.  ACCORDING TO THE ITALIANS, THERE IS A 
PERCEPTION AMONG LEADERS IN BELGRADE AND PODGORICA THAT THE 
USG HAS RESIGNED ITSELF TO THE INEVITABILITY OF AN 
INDEPENDENT EU.  WE HAVE REITERATED TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS IN 
THE MFA AND ON PRESIDENT CIAMPI'S STAFF THAT THE USG REMAINED 
FIRMLY COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE EU TO KEEP MONTENEGRO IN 
THE FRY.  OUR GOI CONTACTS LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH SA 
HOLMES ON BALKAN ISSUES, AND HOPE THAT HE CAN SCHEDULE A STOP 
IN ROME ON HIS WAY TO OR FROM THE REGION. 
 
3.  (C)  ON JANUARY 24, THE HEAD OF THE MFA'S BALKAN OFFICE, 
MAURIZIO MASSARI, TOLD POLOFF THAT THE GOI WAS BECOMING 
INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE PROSPECT OF A REFERENDUM ON 
THE STATUS OF MONTENEGRO, AND THE PRECEDENT FOR THE REGION 
SHOULD IT RESULT IN AN INDEPENDENT MONTENEGRO.  ANOTHER WEAK 
STATE, UNABLE TO STAND ON ITS OWN FEET ECONOMICALLY, 
POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY WOULD CAUSE FURTHER INSTABILITY IN 
THE REGION AND CREATE ANOTHER MONEY PIT FOR INCREASINGLY 
SCARCE IC AID FUNDS. AN ADDITIONAL OBVIOUS WORRY WAS THE 
POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ON KOSOVO.  MASSARI SAID THAT ITALY'S 
AND THE EU'S IDEAS WERE "FIRMING UP" REGARDING THE NEED FOR 
THE IC TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE AGAINST INDEPENDENCE BOTH IN 
PODGORICA AND BELGRADE.  THE EU'S VIEW IS IT WAS NOT TOO LATE 
FOR THE IC TO ELABORATE A LIST OF DISINCENTIVES TO HELP STALL 
THE MOMENTUM TOWARDS A REFERENDUM, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE IC 
UNDERSCORING THAT ALL INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE 
CHANNELED THROUGH BELGRADE.  MASSARI HOPED THAT THE U.S. 
WOULD JOIN THE EU IN SUPPORT OF SYG SOLANA'S EFFORTS TO KEEP 
MONTENEGRO WITHIN THE FRY. 
 
4.  (C)  MASSARI SAID THAT THERE WAS A PERCEPTION AMONG SOME 
LEADERS, IN BOTH BELGRADE AND PODGORICA, THAT THE USG HAD 
RESIGNED ITSELF TO THE INEVITABILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT 
MONTENEGRO.  THIS PERCEPTION WAS UNDERMINING THE EU'S EFFORTS 
TO STOP THE REFERENDUM.  POLOFF REITERATED TO MASSARI THAT 
THE USG POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED.  OUR VIEW WAS THAT A STABLE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, WHICH INCLUDED MONTENEGRO, 
WAS THE BEST OPTION FOR A SECURE FUTURE FOR MONTENEGRINS AND 
SERBS ALIKE.  POLOFF EMPHASIZED THAT FRY/MONTENEGRIN LEADERS 
SHOULD NOT MISTAKE THE USG'S SLIGHTLY LOWER PROFILE AT THE 
MOMENT, IN RELATION TO THE EU'S, FOR SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE 
OR A RIFT BETWEEN THE EU AND U.S. ON THIS ISSUE. 
 
5.  (C) THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT CIAMPI, 
STEFANO STEFANINI, EXPRESSED SIMILAR WORRIES TO POL MC TOM 
COUNTRYMAN AND POLOFF ON JANUARY 25.  STEFANINI SAID THAT THE 
GOI WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE "SECURITY RISK" POSED BY A 
SMALL STATE OF ONE-HALF MILLION PEOPLE, FINANCED ALMOST 
EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING.  THIS "ILLEGAL 
SWITZERLAND" IN THE MIDDLE OF THE BALKANS WOULD BE MUCH 
HARDER TO CONTROL AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE THAN AS AN ENTITY 
WITHIN THE FRY. 
 
6.  (C)  STEFANINI REPORTED THAT IT BECAME CLEAR TO HIM 
DURING PRESIDENT CIAMPI'S JANUARY 17 VISIT TO THE FRY THAT 
PRO-INDEPENDENCE MONTENEGRIN POLITICIANS WERE ENCOURAGED BY 
WHAT THEY PERCEIVED AS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE EU AND U.S. ON THE 
ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE.  MASSARI ALSO COMPLAINED THAT EVEN 
THOUGH CIAMPI HAD MADE CLEAR IN HIS STATEMENTS AND MEETING 
THE GOI'S SUPPORT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERATION, 
THE MONTENEGRIN PRESS REPORTED ITS OWN "INCORRECT" SPIN ON 
CIAMPI'S TRIP. 
 
7.  (C)  COUNTRYMAN REASSURED STEFANINI THAT THE USG REMAINED 
FIRMLY COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE EU TO KEEP MONTENEGRO IN 
THE FRY.  HE USED AMBASSADOR MONTGOMERY'S REMARKS TO 
MONTENEGRIN LEADERS, REPORTED REF A, IN WHICH MONTGOMERY 
CALLED ON ALL SIDES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EU SPONSORED 
DIALOGUE AND WARNED AGAINST HOLDING THE REFERENDUM WITHOUT 
THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL PARTIES AND THE IC, AS EVIDENCE THAT 
WE WERE IN LINE WITH EU VIEWS.  COUNTRYMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT 
THE U.S. MAY HAVE SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME 
OF THE PROCESS, GIVEN THE FACT THAT BOTH PARTIES HAD FAILED, 
THUS FAR, TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY.  WE ARE ALSO BEING REALISTIC 
BY STARTING TO THINK ABOUT CONTINGENCIES SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS 
REMAIN STALLED AND A REFERENDUM BECOMES MORE IMMINENT.  BUT, 
EMPHASIZED COUNTRYMAN, THAT SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS 
SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENDUM. 
 
8.  (C)  BOTH MASSARI AND STEFANINI WERE PLEASED TO HEAR THAT 
AMBASSADOR HOLMES HAD BEEN APPOINTED AS SA FOR SOUTHEAST 
EUROPE (REF B).  MASSARI IN PARTICULAR WAS ANXIOUS TO HAVE 
HOLMES VISIT ITALY TO DISCUSS STRATEGY ON A RANGE OF BALKAN 
ISSUES AND, DEPENDING ON TIMING, WOULD WORK WITH US TO SECURE 
HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS IN THE MFA, UP TO AND INCLUDING 
SECRETARY GENERAL BALDOCCI.  EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT 
 
SIPDIS 
ONE OF AMBASSADOR HOLMES' FIRST EUROPEAN STOPS IS ROME. 
ITALY, AS HEAD OF THE G-8 BALKAN WORKING GROUP IN 2001, DID 
AN EXCELLENT JOB IN STEERING G-8 POLICY AND STATEMENTS ON A 
NUMBER OF CRITICAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE KOSOVO ELECTIONS AND 
FYROM FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT.  AS EU PRESIDENT IN THE LATTER 
HALF OF '03, THE GOI WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE IN DRIVING FUTURE 
EUROPEAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS.  DEPT IS REQUESTED TO 
KEEP POST UPDATED ON SA HOLMES' TRAVEL PLANS TO THE REGION. 
 
9.  (U)  MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
SEMBLER